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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates a number of ways in which an eighteenth century 
British philosophical movement known as “moral sense theory” influenced the development 
of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) moral theory. “Moral sense theory,” 
as presented in the works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), 
and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747), can be captured by two related claims: (1) morally good 
actions are motivated by benevolence, i.e. the disinterested desire for the happiness of others, 
and (2) we judge benevolent actions as morally good on the basis of “the moral sense,” a 
capacity that allows us to feel a particular kind of pleasure when we perceive such actions. I 
illustrate that Kant found both of these claims appealing during the earliest stage of his 
philosophical development, but eventually came to reject moral sense theory’s conception of 
moral judgement. However, I illustrate that even after this rejection Kant preserves certain 
features of moral sense theory’s conception of moral motivation. In the mature presentation 
of his moral philosophy Kant offers detailed objections to moral sense theory’s conception of 
moral judgement, but I illustrate that, in opposition to the claims of many recent interpreters, 
the considered presentation of his conception of moral motivation has only a few superficial 
features in common with the view presented by Hutcheson in particular. Nonetheless, this 
comparison helps illuminate Kant’s complex position on moral motivation. Important for an 
understanding of Kant’s mature conception of motivation is also the thought of Adam Smith 
(1723-1790), a thinker who is not part of but was highly influenced by moral sense theory. I 
illustrate that Smith’s notion of the attitude of “regard” for what he calls the “general rules of 
conduct,” as well as his conception of the “sense of duty,” influenced Kant’s conception of 
“respect [Achtung]” for the moral law. Finally, I illustrate that Kant’s understanding of the 
pleasure associated with acting morally, what he calls “self-contentment 
[Selbstzufriedenheit],” can be clarified in light of how Hutcheson solves a problem related to 
the pleasure of the moral sense. 
Keywords 
Kant, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, moral sense, moral judgement, motivation, 
respect, duty, pleasure, virtue.  
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Introduction 
 After more than 200 years since its initial presentation, Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) 
moral philosophy continues to attract a significant amount of attention. Especially over the 
course of the last fifty years, the amount of scholarship devoted to nearly every aspect of 
Kant’s moral philosophy has steadily increased. Despite this large and growing body of 
scholarship, however, comparatively little attention has been paid to two topics: 1. the way in 
which Kant’s moral philosophy was influenced by his contemporaries and predecessors, and 
2. the development of Kant’s moral philosophy over the course of his philosophical career. 
The following dissertation aims to help remedy this situation by exploring one of the most 
important influences on the development of Kant’s moral philosophy: British moral sense 
theory, as reflected in the thought of Anthony Ashley Cooper (a.k.a. Shaftesbury) (1671-
1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747). 
 The works of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and many other eighteenth century British 
philosophers were widely discussed in Germany in second half of the eighteenth century, and 
this was made possible in large part by the, in some cases rapid, translation of their texts into 
German. With respect to Shaftesbury’s works, for example, his Soliloquy, or Advice to an 
Author (originally published in 1710) was first translated into German in 1738 by Georg 
Venzki and seems to have been so popular that it received a second, anonymous translation 
in 1746. Shaftesbury’s two most important works on moral philosophy, The Moralists (1709) 
and An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699), were both translated by Johann Joachim 
Spalding in 1745 and 1747 respectively.  
With respect to Hutcheson’s reception in eighteenth century Germany, in the first 
instance this was made possible by a 1756 translation of Hutcheson’s System of Moral 
Philosophy (originally published just one year earlier in 1755) by the German author 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. A translation of Hutcheson’s An Essay on the Nature and 
Conduct of the Passions (1728) appeared in 1760, by Johann Gottfried Gellius, and one of An 
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) in 1762, by Johann 
Heinrich Merck. Although these translations would have attracted attention on their own in 
virtue of the fact that they were among the works of a number of English language 
philosophers who were being discussed in Germany at the time (see Kuehn 2001, 183-4), it 
 x 
 
certainly did not hurt their reception that they were translated by individuals (Spalding and 
Lessing) who were important figures in eighteenth century German academic life themselves. 
 To be sure, above all else it was the general content of their philosophical positions 
that would have made the works of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson attractive to many eighteenth 
century German philosophers and writers. In his biography of Kant, for example, Manfred 
Kuehn states the following:  
The works of Locke, Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and almost 
every other British philosopher of note were full of problems that needed solutions 
and observations that needed to be explained, if German philosophy of the traditional 
sort was to succeed. (Kuehn 2001, 183-4) 
One such problem was in fact the existence and nature of a “moral sense” introduced by 
Shaftesbury and then given a more systematic treatment by Hutcheson. As Jan Engbers 
explains in detail, the German authors who were among the first to discuss the idea of a 
moral sense and the thought of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in general were Christian 
Fürchtegott Gellert (1715-1769)1, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), Christoph Martin 
Wieland (1733-1813)2, and also Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86)3, among others (see Engbers 
2001, esp. 59-66). While not always positive4, the extent to which moral sense theory was 
discussed at the time at least makes it unsurprising that we find Kant mentioning Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson as well. As will become clear in the following, however, in the case of Kant it 
                                                
1 See esp. the tenth lecture of Gellert’s Moralische Vorlesungen (Gellert 1989, Vol. 6, pg. 119ff.). See 
also Kuehn (2009) for a discussion of how these lectures may have played an important role in Kant’s 
early development. 
2 See Wieland’s 1755 Ankündigung einer Dunciade für die Deutschen. (Wieland 1916, Vol. 4, esp. 
pg. 81) 
3 See Mendelssohn’s Verwandschaft des Schönen und Guten (see Mendelssohn 1844, Vol. 4, pg. 78-
82), wherein he contrasts his view with that of Hutcheson (see Engbers 2001, 86ff.). Furthermore, 
Kuehn argues (see 1987, pg. 41n) that Mendelssohn’s Philosophische Gespräche are patterned off of 
a dialogue of Shaftesbury’s, that other of his works show Shaftesbury’s influence, and that 
Mendelssohn even began a translation of Shaftesbury’s Sensus Communis. 
4 Indeed, Engbers claims that the reception of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in Germany falls into two 
stages: (1) the period between 1750-56 wherein Shaftesbury’s ideas are discussed and processed, and 
(2) the ten-year period after 1756 wherein Hutcheson’s thought is largely criticized (see Engbers 
2001, 8). 
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is largely Hutcheson’s thought that is the topic of discussion, while Shaftesbury comes into 
play only marginally and as the originator of moral sense theory. 
It is of course no new discovery that British philosophers like Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson had an influence on Kant’s thought. In his early 1804 biography of Kant, for 
example, Ludwig Borowski states the following: “In the years when I belonged among his 
[Kant’s] students, Hutcheson and Hume were of exceptional worth, the former in subjects of 
morals, the latter in his deepest philosophical investigations. … He recommended both of 
these writers to us for a most careful study” (1804, 170). Serious scholarship on both Kant’s 
development and on the influence of British moral philosophy on his thought did not begin 
for quite some time, however. German scholarship on the development of Kant’s philosophy 
began with Paul Menzer’s studies in the late 1800s (see Menzer 1897, 1898, 1899), and 
culminated with the studies produced by Josef Schmucker (1961) and Dieter Henrich (1957/8 
and 1963) in the middle of the twentieth century. In English, only the studies by Paul Arthur 
Schilpp (1938) and Keith Ward (1972) exist. Clemens Schwaiger makes three claims about 
scholarship on the development of Kant’s moral philosophy: (1) it reached a high point with 
the studies by Schmucker and Henrich, (2) research into this development has not been 
deepened nor superseded since the publication of the studies by Henrich and Schmucker, and 
(3) research into this topic was stagnant for three decades thereafter (see Schwaiger 1999, 14-
16). The most important event that took place after the studies by Henrich and Schmucker is 
of course the publication in the latter half of the 1970s of the various lecture notes from 
Kant’s courses on moral philosophy, anthropology, and natural law, among others. Since the 
material from Kant’s lectures has been available, only Schwaiger’s 1999 study has appeared 
and it is only concerned with Kant’s development up until the publication of his first work on 
moral philosophy (the Groundwork) in 1785, and indeed his focus is quite narrow in this 
study, namely on Kant’s understanding of imperatives.5 Indeed, this focus on Kant’s pre-
critical writings and the absence of a detailed account of the relation between his early 
                                                
5 Paul Menzer published a small selection of notes from Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy in 1924 
(see Kant 1924 and 1963) and at least Henrich seems to have used them. I should also note here that I 
do not wish to imply that Kant scholars did not read his lecture notes before their official publication 
in the Academy edition. At the same time, none of the studies produced before the official publication 
of the lectures notes make extensive use of this material and, as mentioned, only a few studies exist 
that were published afterwards. 
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influences and his later, mature positions is common to almost all scholarship on the 
development of Kant’s moral philosophy (Henrich’s 1957/8 article is an exception). In light 
of the fact that the many lecture notes are now easily accessible, there is a justified need to 
revisit many of the conclusions of previous scholarship concerning the development of 
Kant’s pre-Critical moral philosophy, to say nothing about the development of his thought in 
general. As mentioned, there is also a particular need to use this material to determine how 
Kant’s thought develops during his mature period as well. The following project is intended 
to, at least in part, satisfy these needs. 
Not only is there need to revisit the development of Kant’s ethics, but there is also 
need to revisit the influence of the moral sense theorists in particular. In the literature that 
currently exists, the extent to which the moral sense theorists in fact influenced Kant is a 
matter of debate. Some claim that Kant himself belonged to the moral sense school early in 
his development (MacBeath 1973, 283), others that the moral sense theorists only made Kant 
realize that there is an emotional factor to ethical consciousness (Schilpp 1938, 39). 
Schmucker claims that, prior to his study, the influence of the moral sense theorists has been 
overestimated compared to the influence of Crusius and Wolff (Schmucker 1961, 21-2) and 
others go as far as to say that Kant was in fact never really impressed with these writers and 
that the early Kant was not influenced by them (see Henrich 2009, 31, although Henrich does 
not share this view). Now that the lecture notes are easily accessible, we are in a position to 
better determine the precise nature of the influence of moral sense theory on Kant’s thought, 
both during his earlier and later periods of development.6 Above all else, this is what I hope 
to accomplish in the five chapters of this dissertation. 
 I do not pretend to provide an exhaustive discussion of the many ways in which moral 
sense theory influenced the development of Kant’s thinking on moral philosophy. This would 
be an enormous undertaking beyond the scope of a single dissertation. Instead, I focus on the 
topics that stand at the center of moral sense theory and which are also the ones with which 
                                                
6 At the same time, throughout my dissertation I am careful when using Kant’s lecture notes and, 
wherever possible, rely on Kant’s published position first and use the lectures notes only to confirm 
what we can with good reason attribute to Kant. At the same time, especially in the case of the pre-
Critical period, the lectures notes are often our only source to rely on (especially during Kant’s “silent 
decade”). Even here, however, it is important to exercise caution, especially since Kant himself 
expressed doubt about the reliability of the note takers in his classes (see AA 10:242 as well as 
Louden 2000, 188 and 2011, 67). 
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Kant engages the most extensively, namely (1) the foundation of moral judgement and (2) 
the nature of moral motivation.  
 In chapter one, I set the stage for the later discussion of Kant’s engagement with 
moral sense theory by explaining Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s version of moral sense 
theory in detail. First, I discuss some of Shaftesbury’s key positions on his conception of 
motivation and the moral sense. I then deal with Hutcheson, the moral sense theorist who had 
the biggest influence on Kant. This part of the chapter is more substantial, although in 
general I restrict myself to three questions that are the most important for the following 
chapters, namely moral motivation, the moral sense, as well as Hutcheson’s answer to what I 
will call the “pleasure problem,” i.e. the problem of how acting morally can be both 
pleasurable but not performed for the sake of this pleasure. In this chapter I illustrate that 
while Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are often lumped together as proponents of the same 
“moral sense theory,” there are in fact significant differences between their views, especially 
with respect to the nature of the foundation of moral judgement. This is important, for this 
makes clear that the version of moral sense theory with which Kant engages is Hutcheson’s 
rather than Shaftesbury’s. 
In chapter two, I turn to the focus of my dissertation and discuss the role of moral 
sense theory in Kant’s moral philosophy, focusing in this chapter on Kant’s pre-Critical 
writings (i.e. those written before the 1781 publication of the first Critique). More 
specifically, in this chapter I explain Kant’s various discussions of “moral feeling” during the 
pre-Critical period and use this as a way to gauge the extent to which the moral sense 
theorists influenced Kant early on in his development. I illustrate that Kant uses moral 
feeling to refer to both a capacity for moral judgement as well as a motivational force. With 
this distinction in mind I show that the nature of moral sense theory’s influence changes 
during this period, taking distinct forms before and after Kant’s so-called “great light” that 
took place around 1769. Whereas Kant finds moral sense theory’s conception of moral 
judgement attractive before 1769, after 1770 he rejects this element of the theory entirely. At 
the same time, I illustrate that Kant nonetheless preserves a place for moral feeling as a 
motivational force even after 1769. 
In chapter three I turn to Kant’s Critical period and investigate the way in which 
moral sense theory’s conceptions of moral judgement and motivation influenced Kant’s 
mature moral philosophy. Given the rational character of his mature moral theory, Kant’s 
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opinion of Hutcheson’s conception of moral judgement in particular is largely negative 
during the Critical period, and in the first part of this chapter I outline six main criticisms 
Kant makes against moral sense theory on this issue. My main focus in this chapter, however, 
is on the extent to which moral sense theory’s conception of moral motivation influences 
Kant into the Critical period. In the past, interpreters have suggested that Kant adopts 
elements of the conception of motivation common to his English and Scottish predecessors, 
largely because of the role he assigns to feeling in moral action. Thus, the bulk of this chapter 
is devoted to presenting my interpretation of Kant’s conception of moral motivation, paying 
particular attention to the role of both feeling and desire therein. I then survey what I take to 
be the dominant secondary interpretations of Kant’s conception of moral motivation, 
including those that claim that Kant’s view shares features in common with the “empiricist” 
view of action presented by Hume and others. I argue that while Kant’s conception of 
motivation shares certain superficial features with Hutcheson’s understanding of the issue, 
there are ultimately more differences than similarities. In this chapter I therefore hope to not 
only clarify Kant’s engagement with moral sense theory during his Critical period, but I also 
hope to shed light on Kant’s mature conception of motivation by illustrating how it is both 
similar to and different from the view presented by Hutcheson. 
In chapter four I continue discussing Kant’s conception of moral motivation, but I 
seek to clarify certain aspects of it by placing it in the context of the thought of a thinker who 
is not a moral sense theorist himself, but who is nonetheless intimately linked to moral sense 
theory, namely Adam Smith. In particular, I argue that understanding Smith’s notion of 
“regard” for the general rules of conduct can help clarify Kant’s conception of “respect 
[Achtung]” for the moral law. I explain how Smith’s notion of regard embodies both a 
recognition of the validity and authority of the general rules, as well as a motive to action that 
Smith refers to as the “sense of duty.” Similar to Smith, I then show that Kant’s notion of 
“respect” in his mature moral philosophy refers to both an attitude (our consciousness of the 
validity and supreme authority of the moral law) as well as a feeling (that of respect) which 
functions as a motive. I argue that both the nature of this attitude and the relation between the 
attitude and the feeling of respect in Kant can be clarified by placing it in context with Smith. 
I conclude by suggesting that it is only once Kant came to re-think the nature of the faculty of 
desire that he incorporated Smith’s notion of Achtung, and he did so because it supplied a 
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necessary piece to his conception of moral motivation, something he was still unsure about 
during the time when he would have read Smith.  
 In the fifth and final chapter I turn my attention to Kant’s notion of the satisfaction 
involved in the performance of virtuous action, what he calls self-contentment 
[Selbstzufriedenheit]. I explain this concept in detail and outline an objection this concept 
invites that was raised by Kant’s contemporary, Christian Garve. Garve’s objection is similar 
to a problem Hutcheson anticipated in relation to the pleasure felt by the moral sense, what I 
called in chapter one the “pleasure problem.” I argue that, with his concept of self-
contentment, Kant offers a better solution to the problem than the one offered by Hutcheson. 
I conclude the chapter by distinguishing self-contentment from a number of other terms, with 
which Kant scholars have equated it in the past. 
My project ends with a short concluding chapter, wherein I survey the results of the 
previous chapters and assess what they say about the influence that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
and also Smith had on the development of Kant’s moral philosophy. I also briefly discuss a 
few avenues of future research by illustrating a few additional ways in which eighteenth 
century British moral philosophy may have influenced Kant and which could be addressed in 
a future project. As a whole, I hope to illustrate in this project that the relation between Kant 
and eighteenth century British moral philosophy is an underappreciated but rich area of 
research that can greatly enhance our understanding of both Kant as well as the British 
philosophers I discuss in this project. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Moral Sense Theory 
Before turning to the focus of this project directly, in this chapter I introduce and 
explain the ideas of two moral sense theorists that will be essential for understanding 
Kant’s engagement with them in the following chapters. In the first part of this chapter 
(1.1), I discuss some key positions of Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury. I 
focus on Shaftesbury’s conception of motivation and the moral sense. In the second part 
of this chapter (1.2) I deal with Francis Hutcheson, the moral sense theorist who had the 
biggest influence on Kant. This second part is more substantial, although in general I 
restrict myself to three topics that will figure most prominently in the following chapters, 
namely Hutcheson’s understanding of moral motivation and the moral sense, as well as 
his solution to what I will call the “pleasure problem.”  
1.1  Shaftesbury 
Although Kant does not engage with Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy extensively, 
it will be helpful for the remainder of my project to discuss a few core aspects of 
Shaftesbury’s philosophy. First, I discuss Shaftesbury’s conception of motivation. His 
understanding of motivation is a broadly “empirical” one, according to which human 
beings are only moved by passions and desires. This conception of motivation is one that 
influenced Hutcheson and, as we will see later, it is a view of motivation that influenced 
Kant as well. Second, Shaftesbury is largely regarded as the originator of the idea of a 
“moral sense,” but his understanding of this capacity is very different from Hutcheson’s. 
In this section I therefore discuss how Shaftesbury understands this idea in order to 
determine later on which version Kant had in mind when engaging with moral sense 
theory. I begin with Shaftesbury’s understanding of motivation.  
1.1.1 Motivation 
 According to Shaftesbury, there are many ways in which a creature can be moved. 
On the one hand there are the cases of “convulsive fits” or when “a creature strikes itself” 
(C 195) where, according to Shaftesbury, “it is a simple mechanism” that acts and “not 
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the animal” (C 195). Shaftesbury therefore makes an initial distinction between cases 
where an animal moves but does not act, i.e. where only mechanism operates, and cases 
where we can say that it is the animal that acts and not something else. For Shaftesbury, 
whatever “is done or acted by any animal as such is done only through some affection or 
passion” (C 195).7 When an action can appropriately be attributed to an animal, the 
action is caused by passion or affection, and for this reason Shaftesbury claims that “no 
animal can be said properly to act otherwise than through affections or passions, such are 
proper to an animal” (C 195). All creatures, therefore, humans included, only act from 
passion or affection. Above all, this means that Shaftesbury rules out reason as a potential 
motivator.8  
In that acting from passion and affection allows us to say a creature is properly 
the actor, rather than something else, Shaftesbury also believes that it is through passion 
or affection that good or ill is brought about by a creature. As Shaftesbury says:  
in a sensible creature, that which is not done through any affection at all makes 
neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature, who then only is supposed good 
when the good or ill of the system to which he has relation is the immediate object 
of some passion or affection moving him. (C 169)  
In order to say that a creature has brought about a good, then, two conditions must be 
satisfied: first, that creature has to have acted from some passion or affection; and second, 
the immediate or intended object of this creature’s passion or affection must be the good 
or ill of a system to which it belongs in order to say that this creature is good in relation 
to that system. Two things deserve discussion here: first is Shaftesbury’s conception of 
goodness, and second is his categorization of the affections passions and his discussion of 
which of these can be considered good or ill. I deal with each of these topics in turn.   
                                                
7 Voitle (1955) states that “affection” has a meaning for Shaftesbury that is not obvious in 
“emotion” or any other term with which we might equate it. According to Voitle, “affection” in 
Shaftesbury simply means an “inclination of the soul toward the object” (1955, 20). Furthermore, 
Gill (2011) claims that for Shaftesbury “passion” and “affection” are at times used 
interchangeably, such that there is no strong distinction between the two. As such, when 
discussing Shaftesbury in the following I also use these two terms interchangeably. 
8 See Gill (2006, 91). 
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A central element of Shaftesbury’s moral theory as presented in his An Inquiry 
Concerning Virtue or Merit is his conception of the good. Shaftesbury distinguishes 
between private interest and goodness. Every creature, says Shaftesbury, has a private 
good and interest, and this is defined as the “right state” of a creature that is forwarded 
and sought by its nature (C 167). A creature is good, however, only in relation to others. 
According to Shaftesbury, we can never say that a creature is good, even if it is perfectly 
happy in itself, so long as this creature is in complete isolation from other creatures (see 
C 168). “Good” is therefore a relative term, for Shaftesbury, such that a creature can be 
called good or bad only in relation to the “system,” to which it belongs. This system can 
be anything that “points beyond” a creature, and a creature is part of a system when it is 
“discovered to have relation to some other being or nature besides his own” (C 168). 
Shaftesbury gives the examples of belonging to “a particular race or species of living 
creatures” (C 168), and if such a species or race is also part of another system, the animal 
kingdom as a whole, for example, then a creature can be said to belong to a number of 
systems of various levels of generality, and can be considered good or bad in relation to 
each of them. Shaftesbury believes, however, that no matter what other systems a 
creature may belong to, every creature can be considered as part of “a system of all things 
and a universal nature” such that “there can be no particular being or system which is not 
either good or ill in that general one [system] of the universe, for, if it be insignificant and 
of no use, it is a fault or imperfection and consequently ill in the general system” (C 169). 
Given that a creature is therefore often a part of many systems, a creature can be 
considered bad for one system but good for another, and arguably the most important 
judgement of all is if a creature is good or ill in relation to the most general system of all 
things, i.e. the universe. In such a case, Shaftesbury says, a creature can be called “wholly 
and absolutely” (C 169) good or ill. Despite this, however, it is clear that Shaftesbury 
mainly discusses goodness in the context of the relation of a creature to its species (see 
Gill 2006, 90 and Darwall 1995, 183), and in the following when I speak of Shaftesbury’s 
concept of goodness I restrict myself to this situation as well. Now that we have a grasp 
of Shaftesbury’s understanding of goodness and we have seen that goodness is brought 
about by passions and affections, we are now in a position to see which affections and 
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passions are good, for Shaftesbury. This will become clear after taking a look at 
Shaftesbury’s distinction between three kinds of affections and passions. 
According to Shaftesbury, there are three types of affections that can move a 
creature. First there are the self-affections “which lead only to the good of the private” (C 
196). In contrast to these there are the natural affections “which lead to the good of the 
public” (C 196) or more generally to the good of a system. Distinct from both of these are 
the unnatural affections, which do not tend “either to any good of the public or private, 
but contrariwise” (C 196). As we saw above, goodness must be brought about by a 
passion or affection, and a passion or affection is good when it has the good of a system 
as its immediate object. Shaftesbury therefore believes it is the natural affections that are 
good, given they have the good of the system as their immediate or intended object. This 
implies that the unnatural affections are “wholly vicious” (C 196) in that they necessarily 
and always intend the ill of a system. It should be mentioned, however, that the unnatural 
and the self-affections do not necessarily and always bring about ill, nor do the natural 
affections necessarily and always bring about the good of the system. Shaftesbury says 
that each of these can at least be compatible with the good in moderation. The self-
affections, for example, are not necessarily ill, but only when they are so strong or are 
given preference so as to not be compatible with the public good. As such, acting on them 
is not incompatible with bringing about the public good. At the same time, however, 
these affections cannot be considered “good” themselves because they do not have the 
public good as their “immediate” object. Rather, their immediate object is private good 
and at the most they therefore bring about the public good only mediately. This also 
implies that the lack of the self-affections is not necessarily good in itself, for a complete 
absence of these affections, for example, would be injurious to the species (in that the 
species would not survive without the survival of each individual). As such, a moderate 
degree of this affection seems necessary and at least compatible with the good. Although, 
as mentioned, the unnatural affections are “wholly vicious” (C 196), because they 
necessarily and always intend the ill of a system it could be said that a moderate amount 
of them is compatible with the good of a system as well. Shaftesbury would surely want 
to admit that affections such as vengeance or even hatred in moderation might be 
required for self-preservation or to deter others from meddling in my affairs, and thus, 
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again at least in moderation, might be compatible with the good of a system. At the same 
time, it should be stressed here that these affections cannot be good in themselves, and 
indeed should be considered vicious because they do not immediately intend the good of 
a system. 
The same can be said of the natural affections in that too strong an affection 
towards the care of one’s children, for example (see C 169), can be injurious to the good 
of the child and to public good. Thus although the natural affections by nature intend the 
good of a system, they also need to be of a moderate degree in order to be compatible 
with the good of such a system. Indeed, Shaftesbury’s general view is that only a proper 
balance of all of the affections together is good, a creature only being good if their 
“natural temper” (C 171), i.e. their character or the balance of their passions and 
affections, is primarily ruled by passions and affections directed immediately towards the 
public good. Shaftesbury details what this “natural temper” looks like and consists in, but 
discussing this would take me too far afield for my purposes. What is essential here is, 
first, that Shaftesbury believes creatures, human beings included, are moved by a variety 
of different affections and passions (not just self affection, for example). Second, 
Shaftesbury believes it is the natural affections that are good because they immediately 
intend the public good. Third, the self-affections, and perhaps even the unnatural 
affections, are not incompatible with public good. What is even more essential, however, 
is Shaftesbury’s distinction between goodness and virtue, the discussion of which will 
bring us to the next major theme important for the rest of my project: Shaftesbury’s 
conception of the moral sense.  
1.1.2 The Moral Sense and the Origin of Right and Wrong 
 In contrast to “mere” goodness and what “lies within the reach and capacity of all 
sensible creatures,” Shaftesbury claims that “virtue or merit … is allowed to man only” 
(C 172). According to Shaftesbury, human beings have a kind of “reflected sense” such 
that “not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of 
the affection, but the very actions themselves and the affections of pity, kindness, 
gratitude and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects” 
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(C 172). It is this latter kind of reflection in particular that makes human beings capable 
of virtue. For Shaftesbury:  
if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect 
on what he himself does or sees others do so as to take notice of what is worthy or 
honest and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of 
his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous. For, thus and no 
otherwise, he is capable of having a sense of right or wrong, a sentiment or 
judgement of what is done through just, equal and good affection or the contrary. 
(C 173)  
Shaftesbury’s mention here of a “sense of right and wrong” is what might be called his 
conception of the moral sense. 9 Because it will be important for the discussion in later 
chapters, it will be important to look closer at what this amounts to for Shaftesbury. 
 If a creature is capable of reflection, then it is capable of sensing not only “the 
ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense” but also “the mental or moral subjects” (C 
172). In other words, reflection allows a creature to sense its own thoughts, affections, 
passions, and even actions. With respect to what might be called the internal objects of 
reflection and the ordinary outer objects of sense, Shaftesbury says the following: 
The shapes, motions, colours and proportions of these latter being presented to 
our eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity, according to the different 
measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in behaviour and 
actions, when presented to our understanding, there must be found, of necessity, 
an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the subjects. 
(C 172) 
Shaftesbury therefore compares our appraisal of behaviour and action to our appraisal of 
beauty, such that we necessarily view some outer objects as beautiful or deformed, and so 
do we judge of behaviour and actions.10 Indeed, Shaftesbury has a strong view of the 
                                                
9 Although it is true that Shaftesbury is generally thought to have invented this expression, there 
are other historical precursors to Shaftesbury as well. See Tuveson (1948) for a discussion as well 
as Darwall (1995, 185 note 21), Gill (2006, 89), and Schneewind (1998, 301 note 28). It is 
interesting to note that Shaftesbury’s use of the expression “moral sense” is extremely limited. As 
Schneewind points out (1998, 301 note 28), the expression is absent from the original (1699) 
edition of the Inquiry, is present in the first edition of Characteristics (1711), but is absent again 
in the second edition of Characteristics (1714). 
10 As we will see, the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgement is important for Hutcheson, 
as well. 
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extent to which we judge the beauty of objects in general. As he says: “The mind … 
cannot be without its eye and ear so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound and scan 
each sentiment or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its censure” (C 
172). Even in sleep Shaftesbury claims we are judging what comes before our mind (see 
C 173). Because we are constantly judging when we reflect on our actions, behaviour, 
passions, or affections, we necessarily judge them and can have certain affections or 
passions in relation to them. As Shaftesbury states: “by means of this reflected sense, 
there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which 
have been already felt and have now become the subject of a new liking or dislike” (C 
172). One has to be careful here, however, for if one already has a rudimentary 
understanding of Hutcheson’s conception of the moral sense and interprets Shaftesbury’s 
conception of it in light of Hutcheson’s, one is likely to misinterpret what exactly 
Shaftesbury’s view is. It isn’t clear, for example, that our “affections of affections” are 
what ground moral judgement, i.e. it is not clear in Shaftesbury that we call an action 
good or virtuous because we have an approving affection of an affection. Shaftesbury’s 
view of the origin of our moral ideas is in fact much more complex than one might first 
expect. 
Before turning to look at what the ultimate ground of moral judgement is, for 
Shaftesbury, it is worth asking how he uses the term “virtue” in contrast to goodness. 
Goodness, as we saw above, can be used in numerous ways. A passion or affection is 
good if it is a natural affection, and similarly an action based on such a passion or 
affection is good. A creature is good in a particular instance if it acts on a natural 
affection, a creature can be good or ill “in general” if it acts on natural affections more 
often than not, and a creature can even be “wholly and absolutely” good if it tends to 
bring about the good of the universal system in general. The question is: can virtue be 
used in a similar way and, if so, what would that mean? According to Lawrence Klein, 
“Shaftesbury’s account seems to imply a distinction between the “goodness” of acts and 
the “virtue” of actors” (1994, 54n, see also Grean 1967, 226ff.). Michael Gill, however, 
disagrees and claims there is such a thing as virtuous action in contrast to merely good 
actions, the former being those that are motivated by what he calls the “second-order 
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affections” (2006, 91ff.) of the moral sense.11 It is important for Kant’s reception of 
moral sense theory to acknowledge that, at least on one reading, the moral sense itself 
plays a role in motivation. As we will see, such an interpretation makes sense for 
Hutcheson’s moral theory, but Gill’s attribution of this view to Shaftesbury is not 
convincing for a number of reasons.  
First, if Shaftesbury considered these second-order affections, an expression he 
himself does not use, as capable of moving humans to action like the other affections, it is 
curious that he did not include this kind of affection in his taxonomy of affections 
explicitly. Second, even if he only implicitly thought these second-order affections were 
capable of motivating to action, it isn’t clear how this would be the case since the object 
of these affections is not something that can be brought about through action, as is the 
case with all the other affections. The “object” of these affections, i.e. first-order 
affections, is rather an affection itself, and indeed these objects already exist and are 
therefore not objects that can or need to be brought about through action. Indeed, it 
therefore seems that second-order affections have “objects” in a different, unspecified 
sense than first-order affections. Third, if second-order affections are capable of moving 
humans to action, then presumably they would fall into one of the three categories listed 
by Shaftesbury, i.e. self-affections, natural affections, or unnatural affections. Because 
virtue seems to be a kind of higher-order goodness, for Shaftesbury (and as such perhaps 
a subset of goodness, see Gill 2006, 93), presumably second-order affections would have 
to be reducible to the natural affections. Gill suggests as much (see 2006, 92) but he isn’t 
clear about how he thinks this is the case. Again, it isn’t clear how this would be possible 
because the natural affections have a particular immediate object, public goodness, and 
the second-order affections have a different object, i.e. first-order affections, which, 
again, seem to be a different kind of object altogether given they already exist. In light of 
these reasons it does not seem appropriate to say that virtuous actions are produced by 
second-order affections, and furthermore it isn’t clear that it makes sense, for 
Shaftesbury, to say that actions can be virtuous in contrast to merely good; it is an actor 
                                                
11 Voitle (1955, 21) similarly calls these “secondary affection.” 
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that is virtuous, not its actions. In order to further see why it might make more sense to 
say that only agents are virtuous and not actions, we should turn to a further quality that 
makes humans capable of virtue. 
According to Shaftesbury, the possession of a power of reflection is not the only 
thing that makes a creature capable of virtue. In addition to this power of reflection, 
Shaftesbury claims that human beings, in contrast to other sensible creatures, are 
“capable of forming general notions of things” (C 172). More specifically, human beings 
“can have the notion of a public interest and can attain the speculation or science of what 
is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong” and it is “in this case 
alone … we call any creature worthy or virtuous” (C 173, my emphasis). Not only 
reflection, therefore, but the cognitive capacity to have knowledge or understanding of 
what is in the public good, of what is morally right or wrong, is necessary to be capable 
of virtue. More specifically, for Shaftesbury there is such a thing as “the eternal measures 
and immutable independent nature of worth and virtue” (C 175). What this appears to 
mean, at the very least, is that Shaftesbury believes in some sort of objective moral 
rightness and wrongness. According to Shaftesbury, our “knowledge of right and wrong” 
is gained by “a use of reason,” and this is done for the following purpose: 
to secure a right application of the affections, that nothing horrid or unnatural, 
nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural affection by which the 
species or society is upheld, may on any account or through any principle or 
notion of honour or religion be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and 
proper object of esteem. (C 175)  
For Shaftesbury, therefore, we “know” right and wrong through reason, and this 
knowledge of right and wrong concerns what is “truly” or “objectively” good for a 
system. This knowledge needs to be objective in order to prevent fake standards of right 
and wrong from gaining authority.12 Indeed, in contrast to such knowledge there is also 
much “opinion, belief or speculation” (C 174) concerning what is right and wrong. It is 
the job of reason to determine if such opinion, belief or speculation concerning what is 
                                                
12 Gill (see 2006, 93) plausibly suggests that Shaftesbury included this element into virtue in 
order to preserve the possibility of rationally resolving moral disagreement. 
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good is in fact true knowledge or is at odds with the eternal and immutable truths of what 
is good for a system. For Shaftesbury, it is our ability to have knowledge or the “notion” 
of such things that is a central part of what is means to be capable of virtue.  
With this in hand it might be easier to make sense of what it means to say an 
agent is “virtuous” but not her actions. What makes humans different from other 
creatures is, first, that they can have second-order affections, and second, that they can 
know or have a notion of what is in the public interest. An agent, therefore, is virtuous 
when she performs “good” actions knowingly, i.e. when she both acts on a natural 
affection and knows that acting on such an affection is what brings about public good. An 
agent is also virtuous when she has second-order affections for those affections that truly 
do bring about public good. It is unclear, of course, if an agent needs to satisfy both of 
these conditions or just one, and which one, in order to be virtuous but this is at least 
perhaps one way of making sense of the claim that only actions are “good” and agents 
“virtuous.” 
This discussion of how possessing one or both of two qualities (1. the knowledge 
of true right or wrong and 2. having second-order affection for what is good) makes one 
virtuous highlights a tension in Shaftesbury’s thought. If we “know” right and wrong 
through reason, for Shaftesbury, what function does the moral sense play, if any, with 
respect to our ideas of moral good an ill? In other words, which one of these is the 
ultimate criterion of moral evaluation – the moral sense or reason? This is not an easy 
question to resolve in Shaftesbury’s thought. In the following I will present two ways that 
scholars have tried to make sense of this tension in Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy. 
 According to J.B. Schneewind, it is ultimately feeling that is the final judge of 
what is objectively right and wrong. Schneewind claims it is through the moral sense, for 
Shaftesbury, that “we become aware of an objective order” (Schneewind 1998, 302). The 
moral sense is what perceives which affections and passions are harmonious with the 
good of the species, and our approval or disapproval of particular passions and affections 
is what reveals to us what is objectively good or ill. Schneewind’s interpretation gets 
complicated not only by the fact that, as I have explained above, Shaftesbury also seems 
to say that it is through reason that we are aware of objective moral truths, but also 
because Shaftesbury claims that the judgements of the moral sense can be wrong, i.e. the 
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moral sense can have a false standard and approve what is not good for the species (see C 
174f.) Schneewind acknowledges that “[m]oral and aesthetic feeling can fail to reveal 
objective harmonies” and furthermore that “the capacity to appreciate moral harmony is 
as much in need of education or training as the capacity for aesthetic judgement” 
(Schneewind 1998, 305), but his explanation of Shaftesbury’s overall view in light of 
these positions is puzzling.  If we and/or the moral sense need to be educated and the 
judgements of our moral sense can be wrong, it isn’t clear how Schneewind thinks the 
judgements of the moral sense can be a reliable indicator of objective good. As 
Schneewind claims, for Shaftesbury “[t]he moral quality of actions depends on whether 
the set of passions that leads the agent to do them is morally approved or disapproved. 
The virtuous agent is the agent whose character elicits moral approval, and the right act is 
simply the act the virtuous agent does” (Schneewind 1998, 305). It is difficult to make 
sense of what Schneewind is trying to say here, but his view appears to be that it is the 
judgements of the already virtuous and well-educated moral sense that are reliable 
indicators of objective good, for Shaftesbury. If this is the case, however, there is no way 
for an individual to tell if their moral sense approves what is really good or if their moral 
sense is failing. Every individual with a moral sense will approve or will have an 
affection for those passions and affections which they believe to bring about the good of 
the species, and in that respect every individual will believe that what their moral sense 
approves and disapproves reveals objective moral good and ill. But as we have seen, 
because Shaftesbury wishes to preserve the idea of objective moral truth and because he 
believes the moral sense can be wrong, there must be some other source for our standard 
of moral good and ill, against which we can judge the affections of the moral sense. 
Schneewind’s interpretation, therefore, does not seem to be consistent with Shaftesbury’s 
view.13 
                                                
13 It is my impression that Schneewind is guilty of interpreting Shaftesbury in light of 
Hutcheson’s theory. As we will see, Hutcheson attempts to preserve the objectivity of the 
judgements of the moral sense in a different way from Shaftesbury, but for Hutcheson it is the 
judgements of the moral sense that have the final word on what is good or ill, not knowledge 
gained through reason.  
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 An alternative and, in my opinion, more plausible interpretation of Shaftesbury 
holds that it is not feeling, but reason and knowledge that has the last word on what is 
morally good and ill, and the judgements of the moral sense are compared to this 
standard. Klein, for example, states that Shaftesbury’s conception of the moral sense 
“was introduced not to elucidate the innovation … of founding human morals on sociable 
affections but rather to underscore a demand for self-consciousness … on the part of the 
moral actor” (Klein 1994, 57, my emphasis). The moral sense or our second-order 
affections, then, do not themselves ground judgements on what is objectively good and 
ill. This latter function is accomplished by reason. This view is shared by both Stephen 
Darwall and Gill, both of whom explain this interpretation in further detail. Darwall, for 
example, claims that Shaftesbury’s view of the moral sense “is far from the empiricist 
moral sentimentalism of Hutcheson and Hume” (Darwall 1995, 187). On the contrary, the 
moral sense “unquestionably involves feeling, for Shaftesbury, but it is more accurate to 
think of him holding a rationalist theory of moral sense. Moral sense involves the 
creative, framing power of reason, not the passive reception of sensations” (ibid., 187, 
original emphasis). What Darwall means by Shaftesbury holding a “rationalist theory of 
moral sense” here, and by his claim that Shaftesbury’s view is not about the passive 
reception of the sense, is that our moral judgements do not come, at least not solely, from 
our second-order affections alone, but involve a rational, “creative” component. Gill is 
even more clear about the nature of Shaftesbury’s view on the relation between moral 
sense and rational moral knowledge. 
 According to Gill, Shaftesbury was reacting to “overzealous enthusiasts” of 
religion who believed that they each had “privileged, private access to the word of God” 
(Gill 2006, 93) and for this reason “Shaftesbury did not want his moral sense theory to 
collapse into the chaotic and violent subjectivism such enthusiasm induced” (ibid., 93). 
Shaftesbury therefore wanted to ground moral goodness in something objective, “against 
which we can measure everyone’s moral sense” (ibid., 94). According to Gill, this 
standard of goodness cannot therefore be issued by the moral sense, nor even 
Shaftesbury’s very own, presumably well-educated, moral sense (see ibid., 94). On the 
contrary, this standard is something “discovered through the use of reason alone” (ibid., 
94 and see also Irwin 2008, 354f. and 408). 
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Although the above seems to be the better way of understanding Shaftesbury’s 
view, Gill acknowledges there are problems with it. If moral judgement is ultimately 
grounded in reason, not second-order affection, it becomes questionable exactly what 
function the second-order affections of the moral sense performs. As Gill states, the 
problem seems to be that, even though moral judgement is ultimately grounded in reason, 
Shaftesbury presents his view as if people should also and at least sometimes rely on the 
pronouncements of their moral sense as well (see ibid., 97). Klein could be correct that 
the idea of the moral sense is merely meant to emphasize that there is or ought to be a 
reflective element to moral judgement, but I do not wish to resolve this issue in 
Shaftesbury at this point in time. Gill also merely identifies this problem in Shaftesbury 
and does not come up with a clear resolution, and even mentions that it is unclear if 
Shaftesbury was aware of the problem (see Gill 2006, 99). What I merely wish to have 
illustrated here is the following: first, Shaftesbury does not appear to hold an empiricist, 
sentimentalist view of the moral sense according to which the judgements of the moral 
sense are thought to be a reliable indicator of moral good. On the contrary, for 
Shaftesbury it is reason that seems to have the final say on what is morally good and ill 
and, the judgements of the moral sense need to be compared to this standard. Second, I 
wish to have pointed out a problem with this view, namely that it makes the purpose of 
the moral sense unclear.  
1.1.3 Conclusion 
 In this section I have discussed those views of Shaftesbury’s most relevant for the 
remainder of my project. First, we have seen that humans are always moved by passions 
and affections, for Shaftesbury, and that the “good” affections are the natural affections, 
which have the public good or good of the system as their immediate object. Second, we 
saw that Shaftesbury’s conception of the moral sense involves not only having an 
affection of an affection, but also involves our knowledge of the eternal and immutable 
truths of morality. In the next section I turn to a discussion of those aspects of 
Hutcheson’s moral philosophy that will be important for the coming chapters. As we will 
see, Hutcheson’s version of moral sense theory is both similar to and different from 
Shaftesbury’s in important ways. 
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1.2 Hutcheson 
1.2.1 Introduction 
 In this section I turn to the moral philosophy of Francis Hutcheson, the moral 
sense theorist who had the biggest impact on Kant’s thought. I focus on what might be 
called a particular version of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy, namely that presented in the 
two works that Kant owned (see Warda 1922, 50) and therefore likely read: the Inquiry 
Concerning the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (first edition: 1725) and the 
Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the 
Moral Sense (first edition: 1728). That Kant read these works is no surprise, for as 
William Frankena notes, “it was his [Hutcheson’s] earlier books … that were important 
for the time” (1955, 356). Not only do I focus on these two texts, but I focus on particular 
editions of these two texts, namely the 4th edition of the Inquiry (1738) and the 4th edition 
of the Essay (1756) because these are the editions that formed the basis of the translations 
that Kant owned.14 This is significant, for it is generally acknowledged that Hutcheson’s 
thought changed over time. One of the most significant events in Hutcheson’s intellectual 
development was his exposure to Joseph Butler’s Sermons, which appeared for the first 
time in 1726, i.e. directly between the publication of the first editions of the Inquiry and 
the Essay. For this reason William Scott argues that Hutcheson’s thought can be divided 
into at least two stages: that between 1723 and 1726, and that after 1726, i.e. before and 
after Hutcheson’s exposure to Butler (see Scott 1900, 185 and 196, and also Raphael 
1947, 17). What this means is that any edition of the Inquiry appearing after 1726 (i.e. all 
of them except the first) differ significantly in that Hutcheson edited the text in light of 
the development of his thought after reading Butler. Indeed, some argue that this caused 
there to be inconsistencies in later editions of the Inquiry (see Scott 1900, 184-5). In any 
event, it is important to realize that the picture I paint of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy in 
                                                
14 See Klemme and Kuehn (2001, vol. 4, v) and Hutcheson (1760, 2). 
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this section reflects only one particular version of it, namely that present in the editions of 
the two texts that Kant read.15 
 In the following, I focus on those positions of Hutcheson’s that were important for 
Kant’s reception of it. More specifically I focus on those views that will be important for 
the coming chapters. In general, these correspond to the views that Hutcheson himself 
thought most significant in moral philosophy. In Hutcheson’s first publication, the 
Reflections on the Common Systems of Moral Philosophy (see Hutcheson 1993, 95), his 
purpose is to discuss what will be the focus of his coming book, i.e. the Inquiry, namely 
the ideas that properly moral motivation cannot be reducible to self-interest (see ibid., 
98), and that morally right conduct consists in our duties to others, as opposed to our 
duties to our self or God (see ibid.,105-6). Although he does not discuss the moral sense 
in this text, Hutcheson at least hints towards the idea that it is those actions that are 
performed to assist others that we judge to be morally correct. Hutcheson is even clearer 
about the issues he regards as most important in moral philosophy in the Introduction to 
Treatise II of the Inquiry. There Hutcheson claims that his intention is to argue two 
things: 1. that we perceive an immediate goodness and experience a particular kind of 
pleasure when we contemplate certain actions “by a superior Sense, which I call a Moral 
one” (I4 110), and 2. that what excites us to virtuous action is not the desire for pleasure, 
nor reward or sanction, “but an entirely different Principle of Action from Self-Love, or 
Desire of private Good” (I4 110). 
 Hutcheson therefore believed that two questions were central to moral 
philosophy: 1. the question of what qualifies as moral motivation, and 2. the question of 
the origin of our moral ideas and of the criterion of moral evaluation. In the following, 
Hutcheson’s answer to these two questions will be my focus, as well as his answer to 
what I will call in the remainder of this project the “pleasure problem.” Although I ignore 
some debates in the literature that are not important for my purposes (such as the question 
                                                
15 This should not, of course, be taken to mean that the picture painted below is not representative 
of Hutcheson’s view. I only mean to make the reader aware that slightly different views than 
those described below may be present in different editions, and that if one’s aims were different 
from the ones I have here, one would need to take these different editions into account, not to 
mention Hutcheson’s later thought. 
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of whether Hutcheson was a moral realist or not, see below note 28) I do discuss some 
interesting interpretive questions that arise and that are related to the positions more 
directly relevant to my overall project. 
 I begin with a discussion of Hutcheson’s conception of moral motivation in the 
Inquiry and the Essay. In the case of this topic, Hutcheson’s discussion is different and 
much more detailed in the Essay, therefore it makes sense to discuss the views expressed 
in each text separately. I then move on to a discussion of Hutcheson’s conception of the 
moral sense. I describe how exactly the moral sense works for Hutcheson so as to see 
how it is different from Shaftesbury’s understanding of the idea. As for Shaftesbury, 
reason interacts with the moral sense, for Hutcheson, but I illustrate that, as opposed to 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson’s moral sense is indeed the final criterion of moral evaluation. I 
take the time here to explain the role reason nonetheless plays in moral evaluation as well 
as the extent to which Hutcheson’s conception of moral evaluation can be classified as 
subjectivist or objectivist. I then turn to a discussion of the relation between the moral 
sense and motivation, and to Hutcheson’s distinction between exciting and justifying 
reasons before finally turning to Hutcheson’s stance on the “pleasure problem.” In 
general, this should provide a relatively comprehensive picture of Hutcheson’s moral 
theory that will prove essential for the coming chapters. 
1.2.2 Motivation 
At the beginning of Section II of Treatise II of the Inquiry, Hutcheson admits that 
“[t]he Motives of human Actions, or their immediate Causes, would be best understood 
after considering the Passions and Affections” (I4 132). This is what he accomplishes in 
the Essay, but here in the Inquiry Hutcheson states that his task is only to “consider the 
Springs of the Actions which we call virtuous” (I4 132). Before moving on to the more 
detailed account of motivation Hutcheson presents in the Essay, I first discuss what he 
says about motivation in the Inquiry.  
Although Hutcheson’s account of motivation in the Inquiry is less detailed than 
that of the Essay, Hutcheson does make a general distinction similar to one Shaftesbury 
made. According to Hutcheson: “external Motions, when accompany’d with no 
Affections toward God or Man, or evidencing no Want of the expected Affections toward 
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either, can have no moral Good or Evil in them” (I4 133). Although the distinction does 
not become a central theme for Hutcheson, he makes a basic distinction here between 
mere “external motions,” and external motions accompanied by an affection toward 
either God or other human beings. The first point to notice about Hutcheson’s account of 
motivation, then, is that, just as for Shaftesbury, Hutcheson believes it is the external 
motions of a subject that are intended towards other beings that are capable of moral 
evaluation. Put differently, the external motions of a subject that cannot be attributed to 
that subject as the author of such motions are excluded from moral evaluation. With this 
basic distinction in hand we can now ask: what are the affections that are morally good 
and evil? 
As I mentioned above, one of Hutcheson’s main goals in the Inquiry is to argue 
that virtuous action is motivated by something other than self-interest. What this means, 
of course, is that, first, self-interest is one of the central motives of human nature and, 
second, self-interest is not the only motive Hutcheson attributes to human beings. In 
general, Hutcheson believes that “[t]he Affections which are of most Importance in 
Morals, are commonly included under the Names Love and Hatred” (I4 134). On the one 
hand, Hutcheson distinguishes between three distinct kinds of motive: self-interest, 
benevolence, and malice. Self-interest or “self-love” is simply the “Desire of private 
Interest” (I4 134). Benevolence is the desire of another’s interest, but what is essential 
about benevolence, for Hutcheson, is that it is “disinterested” (I4 136). When we desire 
the good of another, such a desire is only true benevolence when we desire their good as 
an end in itself and not as a means to our own pleasure. Falling on the side of hatred is 
malice, i.e. “a sedate ultimate Desire of the Misery of others” (I4 152), and this is 
supposed to be disinterested as well, although Hutcheson claims that such an affection is 
something “Human Nature seems scarce capable” (I4 152). In most circumstances, our 
reason for hating another is self-interest, i.e. we hate others because their interests are 
opposed to our own, meaning our hate is usually “interested” as opposed to 
“disinterested.” For this reason, Hutcheson believes that human nature has two main 
affections: self-interest and benevolence. 
As one might suspect from someone following Shaftesbury, Hutcheson claims 
that benevolence is the properly virtuous motive (see I4 159). Only actions flowing from 
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purely disinterested benevolence are virtuous, for Hutcheson, meaning self-interested 
actions or any seemingly benevolent actions that are actually “interested” are excluded 
from being moral. Hutcheson believes benevolence can take many forms. He claims, for 
example, that “[t]here are nearer and stronger Kinds of Benevolence, when the Objects 
stand in some nearer Relations to ourselves” (I4 218). Examples of these are natural 
affection, i.e. love towards predominantly one’s children but also towards one’s wider 
family (see I4 218-9), gratitude, and esteem.16 Interestingly, Hutcheson believes that 
natural affection extends only from parent to child and not vice versa, and that the 
affection of children towards the good of their parents is better understood as gratitude 
because it is not founded in nature (see I4 219). Much of the Inquiry is spent arguing for 
the existence of a disinterested motive of benevolence, i.e. that benevolence cannot be 
reduced to self-interest. This is because one group of Hutcheson’s main opponents in the 
text are authors like Mandeville (who is mentioned on the title page of the first edition of 
the Inquiry, see Klemme and Kuehn 2001, vol. 4, v) who believe all human motivation 
can be reduced to self-interest. In any event, of the two affections central to morals, i.e. 
love and hatred, it is, of course, love that is the affection of virtue and is central to 
morals.17 It should be noted, however, that Hutcheson understands the love central to 
virtue in a particular way. 
                                                
16 In the literature there is a lack of clarity as to whether benevolence is simply a genus of 
affection which includes various species, e.g. gratitude, natural affection, etc., or whether 
benevolence is simply one kind among many other affections included in the class of affections 
that are disinterestedly concerned with the good of others. Schneewind, for example, speaks as if 
there is only one virtuous motive, i.e. benevolence (see Schneewind 1998, 334). T.A. Roberts 
(1973, 10 and 15) and Gill (2006, 183), however, claim it is unclear if benevolence is a genus or a 
species. I do not wish to resolve this issue here, but it is worth pointing out that this issue gets 
slightly clarified in the Essay once Hutcheson goes into more detail regarding the level of 
generality that benevolence can have (see E4 29ff.). In this respect, one might speak of 
benevolence in general, i.e. disinterested concern for the well-being of as many possible rational 
agents as possible, and more particular instances of benevolence that have their focus on less 
general groups, e.g. family (natural affection), friends (gratitude), and individuals with whom we 
are not closely acquainted (compassion) (see I4 221). In this respect, benevolence could refer to 
both a genus, under which is subsumed all the more particular kinds of benevolence, as well as a 
species, i.e. the most general kind of disinterested concern for others. 
17 At the same time, there are two senses in which hatred can be considered a part of morality as 
well. First, it should be noted that there is a kind of hatred that is relevant to moral judgement, 
19 
 
As we have seen, the type of love relevant to morality is not self-love, and 
Hutcheson goes on to explain, neither is it sexual love that is morally relevant (see I4 
134). Rather, it is the love of others that is central to morality. At the same time, 
Hutcheson makes yet another distinction between two kinds of love central to his moral 
theory. According to Hutcheson, our “Love toward rational Agents” (I4 134) can be of 
two kinds: “Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Benevolence: And Hatred is 
subdivided into Hatred of Displicence or Contempt, and Hatred of Malice” (I4 134-5). 
Love of complacence or esteem Hutcheson also calls “Good-liking” (I4 135) and this, 
along with the hatred of displicence, is “intirely excited by some moral Qualitys, Good or 
Evil, apprehended to be in the Objects; which Qualitys the very Frame of our Nature 
determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the moral Sense” (I4 135). Love of 
complacence, therefore, is our approval and “liking” of benevolent actions, which we will 
see is the function of the moral sense.18  
Love of benevolence, on the other hand, is a bit more complicated. According to 
John D. Bishop, this type of love can be called “responsive benevolence” (Bishop 1996, 
3). This kind of love is our love of benevolent actions, i.e. our love of someone who has 
                                                                                                                                            
 
and this is the hatred equivalent to disapproval or disapprobation. In connection with the two 
kinds of love discussed below, i.e. love of complaisance and love of benevolence, Hutcheson 
claims there is “Hatred of Displicence or Contempt, and Hatred of Malice” (I4 134-5). Hatred of 
malice is disinterested hatred of others as a desire, which, again, Hutcheson believes is not 
possible (see I4 152). As I discuss below, love of complaisance is our moral approval of 
benevolence, therefore hatred of “displicence” is, in a similar fashion, our disapproval of non-
benevolent actions. As such, it should be kept in mind that Hutcheson believes that this kind of 
hatred has a positive and necessary role in morality as the disapproval of vice. Second, a related 
question is whether Hutcheson believes certain kinds of hatred as a motive, even if reducible to 
self-interest, are worthy of moral approbation, such as the hatred involved in desiring the 
suffering of those who perform a morally vicious action. Hutcheson does not address this 
question directly, but insofar as he argues that degrees of self-love are compatible with 
benevolence, especially insofar as an agent  “may be, in part, an Object of his own universal 
Benevolence” (I4 178-9), presumably certain types of interested hatred are compatible with 
benevolence in the same way. 
18 This understanding of Hutcheson’s notion of love of complacence is supported by Thomas 
Mautner’s claim that, at the time Hutcheson was writing, complacence meant “tranquil pleasure 
or satisfaction” (Hutcheson 1993, 100 note 13). 
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performed a benevolent action, and this can occur whether we are the recipient of the 
benevolence or not in that our approval of benevolence is disinterested. This benevolence 
is “responsive” because it is a kind of love that responds to performed benevolence, i.e. it 
is reactionary. According to Bishop, Hutcheson’s distinction between kinds of love can 
also be cast as a distinction between a perception and a desire: love of complacence is a 
perception accompanied by a feeling of pleasure and approval, whereas love of 
benevolence is a desire, i.e. an affection to bring about the good of another (see ibid.). In 
this sense, love of complacence is not necessarily a motive to action, but love of 
benevolence is. Hutcheson confirms such a reading when he claims that complacence “is 
rather a Perception than an Affection, tho the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily 
subsequent to it” (I4 135). Indeed, although interesting, Bishop states that “[w]hat is not 
clear is the connection between the two phenomena of responsive benevolence and 
feelings of approval” (Bishop 1996, 3). I discuss the relation between approval and 
motivation below, after I have discussed the moral sense directly.  
Before moving on to motivation in the Essay, it is important to make clear what is 
implied by Hutcheson’s claim that the motive of virtue is disinterested benevolence and 
not self-interest. Most importantly, Hutcheson’s position implies that reason is not a 
potential source of action. As Hutcheson states, those who claim that “Virtue should 
wholly spring from “Reason”” speak “as if Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition 
could ever move to Action where there is no End proposed, and no Affection or Desire 
toward that End” (I4 195). As such, Hutcheson denies that reason is capable of moving us 
to act on its own. In addition, as Henning Jensen points out, Hutcheson does not make 
room for the sense of duty as a permissible motive as Adam Smith, for example, will go 
on to argue (see Jensen 1971, 86 and TMS 229).19 
Another essential element to Hutcheson’s theory of motivation is the following: in 
that self-interest and benevolence are the two central motives of human nature, i.e. in that 
Hutcheson considers only these to be the candidates for moral motivation, this means that 
we have only these two kinds of “ultimate desire,” as Hutcheson calls them (see I4 
                                                
19 I discuss Smith’s notion of the motive of the “sense of duty” in detail in chapter four. 
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152).20 In that one of Hutcheson’s main goals is to show that benevolence cannot be 
reduced to self-interest, this means he wants to argue that benevolence is a fundamental 
or ultimate affection. In other words, Hutcheson wants to argue that benevolence is the 
desire for the good of others as an end in itself, or that we desire this end for no other 
reason. This is the sense in which the good of others is an “ultimate end” of ours. 
The above is the core of what Hutcheson states in the Inquiry. As one might 
notice, although he speaks in terms of affections, passions, and sometimes desires, he 
gives no definition of these terms in the Inquiry. This changes in the Essay where 
Hutcheson provides a more detailed picture of his understanding of motivation, and it is 
to this text that we now turn. 
 In the Essay Hutcheson defines and distinguishes what Scott claims are the three 
types of springs of action: affection, passion, and desire (see Scott 1900, 201). On the 
first page of the Essay Hutcheson defines affections and passions collectively as “those 
Modifications, or Actions of the Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of certain 
Objects or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil” (E4 1). 
Affections in particular are “Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain, not directly raised by the 
Presence or Operation of the Event or Object, but by our Reflection upon, or 
Apprehension of their present or future Existence; so that we expect or judge that the 
Object or Event will raise the direct Sensations in us” (E4 28). Affections are therefore 
expectations of pleasure upon the attainment of an object or event. Passions, on the other 
hand, are “a sub-class of Affections” (Scott 1900, 201), Hutcheson’s general definition of 
them being the following: 
a strong brutal Impulse of the Will, sometimes without any distinct notions of 
Good, public or private, attended with “a confused Sensation, either of Pleasure or 
Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions, which keeps the 
Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of everything else, 
                                                
20 As mentioned, Hutcheson does not seem prepared to claim that malice or disinterested hatred is 
in fact an ultimate end of ours. Rather, as I suggested above, he seems to believe that it is 
reducible to self-interest (see I4 152). It is also worth mentioning that Hutcheson seems to adopt 
the language of “ultimate ends” and “ultimate desires” only from the first edition of the Essay 
(1728) onwards, meaning this language appears in the Inquiry only in additions subsequent to 
1728. See (E4 222) for a section directly on ultimate ends. 
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and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to 
prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct.” (E4 28-9) 
In contrast to affections, therefore, passions are impulsive and without forethought (see 
Jensen 1971, 26), and importantly they are operative without a notion of public or private 
good involved.  
 In the Essay, Hutcheson also discusses desire in addition to affection and passion. 
He defines desire as follows: 
Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of 
Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for ourselves or others the 
agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy 
Sensation, when it is evil. (E4 7)  
As one can see, Hutcheson understands desire as very similar, if not identical, to 
affection. Both seem to involve “[t]he Apprehension of Good, either to ourselves or 
others, as attainable” (E4 62). The only difference between them seems to be that 
affection is in general a positive or negative attitude towards something, whereas desire 
implies an inclination to obtain what is positive, and aversion to avoid what is negative. 
In that affection and desire are for the most part similar, this means that desire is distinct 
from passion for the same reason that affection is, namely because both affection and 
desire involve a degree of reflection or involve a notion of good or evil, whereas passion 
does not.  
 How desires work for Hutcheson is an interesting question. As we saw above, 
desires arise seemingly after the apprehension of a good, aversion after that of an evil. As 
Darwall points out, however, this does not mean that we do not already desire, for 
example, private and public good. We do already desire these things, even if not 
occurently, but the idea is that once we apprehend wherein such goods lie, it is then that 
we desire the things that lead to such goods (see Darwall 1995, 225-6). For Hutcheson, it 
is reason that is responsible for determining, or inferring, wherein the goods we desire 
might lie. As he states in the Essay, for example, reason is responsible for “presenting the 
natures and relations of things, antecedently to any Act of Will or Desire” (E4 219). 
Consequent to this operation by reason, therefore, there is an act of will or desire and 
“[t]he Will, or Appetitus Rationalis” refers to “the disposition of Soul to pursue what is 
presented as good, and to shun Evil” (E4 219). Accordingly, and due to the role reason 
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plays here, it is important to realize that Hutcheson’s theory of desire is his theory of 
rational desire and therefore his theory of the will. 
 Although Hutcheson claims “[t]he Sensation accompanying Desire is generally 
uneasy” (E4 16), he makes it clear that desires do not arise from whatever uneasiness 
may accompany them. He makes this claim above all because in order for this uneasiness 
to exist at all, the desire must already be operative, therefore this uneasiness itself cannot 
be responsible for raising desire (E4 16). Desires can surely arise from the experience or 
expectation of pain or uneasiness, i.e. a desire to avoid or be rid of uneasiness or pain can 
be raised by the experience of such things, but the sensation of pain to be avoided is 
distinct from the uneasiness accompanying desire itself, says Hutcheson. Indeed, it is 
only the latter that logically cannot raise a desire (see E4 15-16). It is also important to 
point out that desires cannot be raised by the expectation of the pleasure associated with 
the gratification of a desire (E4 16-7). Again, Hutcheson distinguishes between an 
apprehended good or means to pleasure (E4 16), which can bring about a desire for such 
things, and the pleasure associated with desire satisfaction itself, regardless of whatever 
object is desired (E4 16-7). Hutcheson argues that this latter kind of pleasure cannot be 
responsible for raising a desire that does not yet exist, especially when this pleasure has 
never before been experienced. If this were to happen, we would simply desire anything 
under the sun associated with the most intense pleasure of gratification, Hutcheson’s 
example being “the turning of a Straw” (see E4 17). Rather than the pleasure of 
gratification being both what raises a desire and what constitutes the object of desire, it is 
rather the apprehended good or means to pleasure that is the object of a desire and only 
this can properly raise a desire in us. 
 In the secondary literature, some commentators are not clear as to whether 
pleasure itself is the only object of desire or whether desires can have objects other than 
pleasure. In Hutcheson’s classification of desires and aversion,21 three of these five are 
                                                
21 In the Essay Hutcheson distinguishes between five different “classes” of desire: 1. “The Desire 
of sensual Pleasure,” 2. “The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination,” 3. “Desires of the 
Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the Misery of 
others,” 4. “Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice,” and 5. “Desires of Honour, and Aversion to 
Shame.” (E4 7-8) 
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explicitly directed towards pleasure, namely the desires directed towards sensual 
pleasure, the pleasure of the imagination, and the pleasures arising from the public sense. 
Interestingly, it is not clear if the “Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice” (E4 8) have 
pleasure as an object or not. Presumably, the object of this desire is not pleasure, for as 
we have seen, this desire is supposed to be disinterested. However, it is an interesting 
question whether the fact that this desire has the happiness of others as its object makes it 
such that the object of the disinterested desire for the happiness of others is still pleasure 
as well, albeit the pleasure of another. Jensen, for example, argues that Hutcheson does 
indeed argue that desires can have objects other than pleasure in the way I have just 
suggested, but he also claims that Hutcheson is ambiguous on the issue (see Jensen 1971, 
20-1 and 87-8, and compare Irwin 2008, 401f.). Alternatively, Darwall claims that all 
desire and affection is aimed at natural good, i.e. pleasure, whether it is our own or that of 
others, but he claims that passions are not aimed at a good at all (see Darwall 1995, 224). 
This is an interesting suggestion and seems to fit Hutcheson’s description of the passions, 
according to which they are “sometimes without any distinct notions of Good” (E4 28).22 
At the very least, it is clear that private or personal pleasure is not the only object of 
desire. Indeed, this seems to be implied by Hutcheson’s claim that one of our ultimate 
ends is the happiness, and therefore the pleasure, of others. 
 Before ending the discussion of motivation and turning to Hutcheson’s discussion 
of the moral sense, it is necessary to draw attention to one aspect of Hutcheson’s 
understanding of our “ultimate ends.” As mentioned above, in the Essay Hutcheson 
argues that our “ultimate ends” are those things we desire for their own sake and in 
themselves, i.e. what we desire “with no further view” (E4 222). His main argument is 
that “Men have many ultimate ends” (E4 222), but what this means is simply that we 
have more than one ultimate end, i.e. that we do not just desire our own private advantage 
as an end in itself. Rather, we also desire the good and happiness of others as an ultimate 
end. As mentioned, Hutcheson is at the very least hesitant to say human beings are 
                                                
22 Due to the fact that the passions do not seem to have an object, and therefore do not seem to be 
aimed at pleasure, and because of the role Hutcheson assigns to reason in desire, Darwall claims 
that “Hutcheson’s hedonism is more a rational than a psychological hedonism” (Darwall 1995, 
224). 
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capable of disinterested hatred towards either themselves or others (see I4 152), therefore 
he does not want to claim that the misery of others is an ultimate end of ours.23 Our 
ultimate ends therefore correspond to our two foundational desires or affections, i.e. the 
desire for private advantage and the desire for public good. This is the case because our 
ends are a function of, or are dictated by, our affections, for Hutcheson. In other words, 
we can only have as an ultimate end that which is the object of our ultimate desires. This 
is significant, for this means that reason cannot assign ultimate ends. It can surely 
propose means and ends subordinate to our ultimate ends, but reason cannot propose an 
ultimate end itself. This makes it clear why Hutcheson denies that “Reason, or the 
Knowledge of the Relations of things, could excite to Action when we proposed no End, 
or as if Ends could be intended without Desire or Affection” (E4 219). This will be of 
importance once we turn to the differences between Kant’s and Hutcheson’s 
understanding of motivation in chapter three. 
 Now that we have covered the central aspects of Hutcheson’s theory of 
motivation in both the Inquiry and the Essay, I turn next to Hutcheson’s conception of the 
moral sense, i.e. his theory of the origin of our moral ideas and the foundation of moral 
judgement. As we will see, moral approval and motivation are intimately linked, for 
Hutcheson. 
1.2.3 The Moral Sense 
 Although Hutcheson was not the first to posit the existence of a moral sense, he is 
the first to develop a comprehensive moral sense theory. In this section I venture to 
explain both what the moral sense is as well as how exactly it functions, i.e. how 
judgements of moral approval and disapproval are made, for Hutcheson. I also illustrate 
the precise role that reason plays in moral judgements and I show that it is ultimately our 
feelings of approval and disapproval that decide which actions are morally good and evil, 
                                                
23 For this reason Gill classifies Hutcheson as a British moralist who provides a “positive answer” 
to the guiding question of his book, namely “Are human beings naturally good or evil?” (see Gill 
2006, 1) 
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as opposed to, say, reason. I also discuss in what sense moral judgements are both 
subjective and objective for Hutcheson. 
Hutcheson’s conception of the moral sense is based on his more general 
psychological theory. In order to understand the precise nature of the moral sense, 
therefore, it will be beneficial to understand how Hutcheson thinks of “senses” in general. 
The senses are faculties responsible for the production of sensations, and how Hutcheson 
describes sensations reveals how he thinks of senses in general. Sensations, for 
Hutcheson, are perceptions or ideas that are raised in the mind involuntarily such that 
“the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception 
or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be 
acted upon by the external Object” (I4 2). As such, the senses, as the origin of sensations, 
are faculties that make it possible to be affected by certain external objects in particular 
ways, such that we cannot control the perception or idea that arises in us when we 
perceive such an object. Sensations do not consist in merely passively received 
perceptions or ideas, however. Rather, they are often accompanied by feelings of pleasure 
and displeasure. Hutcheson states that “[t]here is scarcely any Object which our Minds 
are employ’d about, which is not thus constituted the necessary Occasion of some 
Pleasure or Pain” (I4 xii). Hutcheson stresses the fact that the senses and sensations often 
involve pleasure when in the Preface to the Inquiry he defines the senses in general as 
“Determinations to be pleas’d with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our Observation” 
(I4 xiii).  
As one might expect, Hutcheson believes in the existence of more than the five 
external senses. He claims: “When two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, 
or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving 
those different Perceptions, different Senses” (I4 2). It is when perceptions are of distinct 
kinds, then, that we are warranted in positing an additional sense that is responsible for 
explaining our ability to have such perceptions. Accordingly, in addition to the external 
senses, Hutcheson claims that, because of the distinctness of the perceptions produced by 
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them, two other senses exist.24 First, there is what Hutcheson calls the “Internal Sense” 
(I4 xiii). This has a technical meaning for Hutcheson, for it does not simply refer to a 
reflective capacity to perceive the happenings of our minds. Rather, Hutcheson calls the 
“internal sense” our sense of beauty. He does this because the sense of beauty, i.e. our 
determination to be pleased by beautiful objects, can have not only external objects as its 
objects, but also internal ideas (see I4 8). Our ability to perceive beautiful objects, i.e. our 
ability to perceive them as “beautiful” or “harmonious” as opposed to merely brown, 
square, etc., as well as the fact that we experience a particular kind of pleasure when 
perceiving such things justifies positing the existence of a different sense, namely the 
internal sense, which makes such perceptions possible. In addition to the “internal sense,” 
in the Inquiry Hutcheson posits the existence of another sense which can have both 
external and internal objects, and this is the moral sense. 
Just like the internal sense of beauty, Hutcheson believes we are warranted in 
positing the existence of the moral sense because of the distinctness of the perceptions we 
seem capable of having. According to Hutcheson, the moral sense makes us capable of 
perceiving moral good as opposed to natural good. A natural good is what is 
advantageous, i.e. is in our private advantage or is in our self-interest (I4 111). The 
attitude we take towards natural goods is that we desire to possess them (see I4 112). 
Examples that Hutcheson gives of natural goods are: a fruitful field (I4 111), houses, 
lands, gardens, strength, and wealth (see Hutcheson 2008, 89ff.). Moral good, on the 
other hand, is not associated with private advantage or self-interest, but is rather what is 
good independent of what is in our personal interest. The attitude we take towards such 
goods is approbation, love and admiration (see I4 112). Examples of moral goods are: 
kindness, friendship, generosity, and benevolence (see I4 111-2). 
What is also central to this distinction is the idea that moral goods are actively 
produced by a rational agent, whereas natural goods are not. As Hutcheson states, we 
have a different way of evaluating those things which have an “Intention of Good to us” 
                                                
24 In the Inquiry Hutcheson only introduces the two other senses I discuss here, but in the Essay 
he introduces a number of others, such as a sense of honour and the “publick” sense (see E4 4-6). 
These other senses are not important for my discussion, so I do not discuss them in this project. 
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(I4 112) and those that do not. We do not approve of, say, a fruitful field and a 
benevolent agent for the same reason, e.g. because they are both to our advantage. When 
we approve of or have a liking towards a rational agent who disinterestedly desires the 
happiness of some third party, for example, there does not seem to be any way in which 
we could benefit from this and therefore our approval of such action must have a 
different standard than its relation to our happiness. The goodness we see in such actions 
must be of a different sort. Examples like this, Hutcheson claims, are evidence that there 
is a “moral good” which is a good independent of the fact that it might contribute to our 
advantage. This moral good is something disinterestedly caused by a rational agent, and 
this is a main reason why Hutcheson identifies moral goodness with benevolence (see I4 
112). Hutcheson even refers to benevolent actions as “absolutely good” (I4 275) in 
contrast to natural good, which is good only because it is in one’s personal interest. At the 
same time, it is important to point out that one can approve of both our own actions as 
well as the actions and characters of others as morally good. 
As mentioned, that we perceive moral good as distinct from natural good, and 
indeed that we experience pleasure when we perceive such goods, is evidence, Hutcheson 
believes, of a distinct sense that makes it possible for us to receive such sensations. If we 
did not have a moral sense then we would not distinguish between the goodness of a 
fruitful field and a benevolent friend – they would be good for the same reason (see I4 
111). Since this is not the case, i.e. since there seems to be something like moral good 
and since we seem to perceive it and have a distinct kind of idea of it, there must be a 
sense which makes this possible, and this is the moral sense, for Hutcheson. Accordingly, 
the moral sense allows us to be affected by certain objects, either external objects or 
internal ones, and these are benevolent actions, affections, or characters.25 Sensing such 
things involves experiencing a particular kind of pleasure, and as a result of this 
experience we judge such things to be morally good. Not only this, but because the moral 
                                                
25 According to Scott (1900, 190), although Hutcheson fairly clearly stresses that it is the 
affection or motive we approve of as morally good, he claims that Hutcheson is at times 
ambiguous whether it is one’s character that we approve, or the properly motivated actions. I take 
Hutcheson to be claiming that actions, characters, as well as affections are capable of being 
morally good. 
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sense is a sense, i.e. a passive faculty, when it is presented with and passively senses a 
particular kind of object, it necessarily approves or disapproves of it.26 
Hutcheson’s moral sense is “universal” (see I4 200) in the sense that everyone 
possesses this sense, meaning everyone is capable of making judgements of moral 
approval and disapproval. Hutcheson is committed to this, for he believes morality should 
be within the reach of every human being alike. As he claims in the Inquiry: “Unhappy 
would it be for Mankind, if a Sense of Virtue was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity 
for such Metaphysicks” (I4 120). This passage is actually making two related claims. The 
first is the one already mentioned, i.e. that morality and a sense of virtue is something all 
human beings should possess or be capable of. The second but related claim is an 
argument against those who claim a “sense of virtue,” i.e. a capacity for making moral 
judgements and acting accordingly, depends upon highly abstract philosophical thought. 
Hutcheson therefore believes that making moral judgements and acting accordingly does 
not depend on any specialized, complex knowledge. If this were the case, only a small 
handful of people would be capable of making correct moral judgements. Despite this 
claim, Hutcheson nonetheless assigns a particular role to reason in this context.  
Hutcheson understands reason instrumentally, i.e. as a faculty “requisite to find 
the proper Means of promoting public Good, as private Good” (I4 196). More 
specifically, reason is a logical capacity to infer, for example, means to ends. At the same 
time, this does not deny that reason plays an essential role in moral judgement. According 
to Mark Strasser, for example, moral evaluations are made in the following way, for 
Hutcheson: 1. The moral sense perceives, i.e. is presented with and has sensations of 
actions, characters, and affections. 2. Reason takes this information and infers the extent 
to which, for example, actions tend to the public good, as well as the extent to which such 
actions are evidence of benevolent motives. 3. The moral sense then takes what reason 
has inferred (i.e. that an action was benevolently motivated and tends to the public good) 
                                                
26 It is perhaps important to note here that, as Darwall points out (see 1995, 213), it is 
apprehending a quality that necessarily causes approbation; the quality itself does not cause 
approbation. This is an important point with respect to the question of Hutcheson’s moral realism. 
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and either approves or disapproves (see Strasser 1990, 13 and 29).27 Importantly, 
however, it is possible for reason to re-evaluate the inferences it previously made after 
the moral sense has already approved or disapproved in step 3. Indeed, as Fowler notes 
(see 1882, 186), reason’s first inference regarding the character and tendency of an action 
is often quick, meaning it is often necessary for it to come back and more carefully infer 
so that the moral sense can make an accurate approval or disapproval.  
If this is how moral evaluation works, for Hutcheson, some questions can be 
raised and deserve clarification. First, although on the one hand reason seems to play only 
an instrumental role, if reason can re-evaluate the facts after the moral sense has already 
approved or disapproved, we need to determine if this means that reason and not the 
moral sense is the final judge of what is morally good and evil. Second, that Hutcheson’s 
conception of moral evaluation functions in the above way means that the moral sense is 
fallible in a certain sense, i.e. that it can be wrong with respect to what it approves or 
disapproves. This seems to imply that there is an objective aspect to the judgements of 
the moral sense. This is puzzling, however, especially if moral evaluation is done on the 
basis of a seemingly subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Indeed, whether or not 
Hutcheson’s theory of moral judgement is best characterized as subjective or objective 
depends on whether reason or sense makes the final judgement. In the following I discuss 
both of these questions in an effort to clarify Hutcheson’s position. I begin by discussing 
the question of the ultimate criterion of moral evaluation in Hutcheson’s moral theory,  
1.2.4 The Ultimate Criterion of Moral Judgement 
 As we saw above, for Shaftesbury it was not clear whether reason or the moral 
sense provided the ultimate ground of moral judgements. As has become clear in the last 
section, although on the one hand it seems to be the moral sense that is what I will call 
the ultimate criterion of morality, once one starts to think about the role Hutcheson 
assigns to reason in moral judgement this becomes less clear. Scholars disagree about 
how to read Hutcheson on this issue. Scott, Fowler, and Raphael, three of the traditionally 
                                                
27 Fowler (1882, 186) also has a description of this process but is less detailed that Strasser’s.  
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most influential writers on Hutcheson, for example, all claim that Hutcheson is 
ambiguous and that he seems to assign the role of providing the final criterion to both the 
moral sense and to reason at different times to suit his purposes (see Scott 1900, 209; 
Fowler 1882, 188 and 192-3; and Raphael 1947, 25). On the other hand, other interpreters 
argue that although he is unclear at times, ultimately it is the moral sense that is the final 
criterion. Schneewind, Blackstone, Frankena, Jensen, Turco, and Gill all take this line of 
interpretation. In the following I explain why I take this latter interpretation to be the 
most convincing.28 
 Gill and Frankena argue in a similar fashion for why the moral sense must be the 
final criterion of moral judgement, for Hutcheson. According to them, it is important to 
realize that although reason infers the tendency of actions and one can say the moral 
sense approves or disapproves of actions, characters, etc. on this basis, there is no reason 
to think this makes reason the final decision maker (see Gill 2006, 159 and Frankena 
1955, 374). Gill makes this clear by drawing attention to an analogy Hutcheson makes 
between the moral sense and our other senses. Similar to how I have presented the issue 
here, Gill points out that the question of whether reason is the final criterion gets raised 
when we realize that reason can correct the initial judgements made by the moral sense 
(see Gill 2006, 159). Gill helpfully notes that Hutcheson believes “that when we correct 
our moral judgements we are doing something that is fundamentally the same as when we 
correct our color judgements” (Gill 2006, 159). Gill draws attention to the fact that, 
similar to how the initial judgements of the moral sense can be deceitful or mistaken, 
Hutcheson believes “our Sight and Sense of Beauty is deceitful, and does not always 
represent the true Forms of Objects” (E4 234), and Hutcheson says the same of our sense 
of taste as well (ibid.). In light of this, Hutcheson states the following:  
                                                
28 It should also be noted that some interpreters claim that early on, i.e. in the Inquiry, Hutcheson 
believes the moral sense is the ultimate criterion of moral evaluation, but as of the first edition of 
the Essay (1728) Hutcheson starts to lean in the direction of reason being this criterion and in his 
later works more explicitly lands on the side of reason (Raphael makes this claim, see 1947, 16). 
In the following, I restrict my claim that Hutcheson believes the moral sense is the final criterion 
of moral evaluation to both the Inquiry and the Essay, and furthermore only to the later editions 
of these texts that were the basis for the translations Kant used (i.e. the 4th edition of each, 
published in 1738 (Inquiry) and 1756 (Essay)). 
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But must we not own, that we judge of all our Senses by our Reason, and often 
correct their Reports of the Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Taste of Objects, and 
pronounce them right or wrong, as they agree or disagree with Reason? This is 
true. But does it then follow, that Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste, are not 
Sensible Ideas, but only denote Reasonableness, or Agreement with Reason. Or 
that these Qualities are perceivable antecedently to any Sense, by our Power of 
finding out Truth? (E4 239-240)  
Hutcheson’s point in this passage is that, like the way reason might correct our other 
sense perceptions, this does not make reason into the originator of these ideas, and this is 
why reason cannot be regarded as the final criterion of moral judgement. As the full title 
of Hutcheson’s first work makes clear (Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue), one of Hutcheson’s main aims is to determine the origin or original of our 
moral ideas. His answer to this, as he states in the introduction to the second Treatise of 
the Inquiry, is that the moral sense is that whereby we “perceive” moral goodness (see I4 
110), and as such it is the moral sense that is the origin of our ideas of moral good and 
evil. Frankena puts this idea in a helpful way when he claims that, for Hutcheson, what 
the moral sense does is provide the final “proposition,” as it were, at the end of the 
process of answering the question “why is this action good?” As Frankena states:  
What he [Hutcheson] is arguing is that in the process of justification we sooner or 
later head up in a proposition which is the end of the road so far as justification 
goes … and that this proposition is not a deliverance of reason (e.g., a self-evident 
truth) but a commitment of the moral sense. (Frankena 1955, 362)  
The moral sense is the final criterion in the sense that the justification process ends when 
we come upon the proposition “the moral sense caused us to feel pleasure/displeasure 
upon perceiving the object in question and therefore approves/disapproves of it.” For 
Hutcheson, therefore, an action, character, or affection is ultimately never morally good 
or evil because of a judgement of reason (i.e. that it accords with the principle of utility, 
for example), and this is because reason is not the origin of our moral ideas, just as reason 
is not the origin of any ideas of sense. 
 If it is the case that the moral sense and therefore a feeling of pleasure or pain is 
the ultimate criterion of moral evaluation, does this make Hutcheson’s conception of 
moral evaluation subjectivist? In a sense, yes, but in another sense Hutcheson neither 
wants to be committed to such a claim, nor does he think his position commits him to 
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such a view. In the following section I therefore discuss the extent to which moral 
judgements are subjective and objective, for Hutcheson. 
1.2.5 Subjectivity and Objectivity 
As mentioned, Hutcheson believes that the moral sense is universal in the sense 
that all human beings possess such a sense, and he is also committed to the view that 
human beings judge the same things to be morally good and evil. On the one hand, this is 
relatively clear: according to Hutcheson, in that all human beings have the moral sense 
they all approve of benevolence and disapprove of its opposite, malice. In a sense, then, 
we all seem to have the same standard of judgement. But Hutcheson is not naïve and 
acknowledges that there seems to be much variation among human beings with respect to 
what they judge to be benevolent. Hutcheson makes an effort to show that this does not 
mean that all moral evaluation is relative to each individual’s subjective feelings of 
approval or disapproval. According to Hutcheson, our feelings of approval and 
disapproval are linked to the simple ideas raised in us by various objects (see I4 4). What 
this means, for Hutcheson, is that if the same simple ideas were raised in each individual 
by the same objects, we would all judge these objects the exact same way. In the case of 
moral judgements, if the same action, character or affection always raised the same 
simple idea in us, we would all judge such things as either morally good or evil. 
However, it is often the case that many other simple ideas come to be associated with 
others, whether through education, custom, etc., and this causes us to judge things 
differently both between individuals, and even the same individual can have different 
judgements at different times. Hutcheson’s position is therefore an interesting one in that, 
on the one hand, the principle moral evaluation is objective, but variation does occur 
given the various ways in which different ideas become associated with one another. 
This picture becomes more complicated once we take into account what was 
discussed above, namely that both the various simple ideas and what our reason infers to 
be the case about the objects we are perceiving are relevant to what we judge to be 
morally good and evil. Things get even more complicated depending on whether one 
reads Hutcheson as a moral realist or not, i.e. whether or not one takes him to claim that 
the moral sense perceives moral qualities existing objectively and independently of the 
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mind in the external world.29 I do not wish to weigh in on this debate here for it is not 
directly relevant to my project. I do, however, wish to mention how a few commentators 
have made sense of the way in which Hutcheson is either a subjectivist or an objectivist 
for it helps illustrate the way in which he thinks about moral judgements. 
Scott has a relatively simplistic reading of Hutcheson, according to which the 
moral sense’s judgements are subjective in the sense that moral evaluation is simply 
relative to each person’s individual feelings (see Scott 1900, 187). Scott argues that while 
this position is not especially clear in the Inquiry, Hutcheson begins to lean this way in 
the Essay, and claims that in his later works Hutcheson was forced to concede this was 
his position given he made pleasure the mark moral evaluation. Whether this ended up 
being Hutcheson’s mature position aside, as stated this interpretation seems to be too 
simplistic, especially with respect to the editions of the Inquiry and Essay I am dealing 
with here. This is the case because, as discussed above, Hutcheson clearly seems to think 
that moral judgements are at least in some sense objective. The key, I think, is to 
determine in what sense Hutcheson thinks they are objective.  
I believe Gill has the most charitable and plausible interpretation of this issue. 
According to Gill, moral distinctions originate in the moral sense and do not correspond 
to anything in the external world, but there is a sense in which there is a real distinction 
between virtue and vice (see Gill 2006, 169). Gill claims that those who reject “mind –
independent realism” can be either personal subjectivists or transpersonal subjectivists 
(see ibid., 297). According to Gill, “[t]ranspersonal subjectivists hold that morality is 
determined by the responses of people in general” whereas personal subjectivists “hold 
that morality is relative to each individual” (ibid., 297). Interestingly, Gill claims that 
Hutcheson is indeed a personal subjectivist, but that his personal subjectivism is 
“cognitivist” in the sense that Hutcheson still believes moral judgements can be correct or 
incorrect, although still without corresponding to external reality (see ibid., 299-300). In 
that moral judgements are not grounded in anything external, against which we can judge 
their truth or falsity, Gill notes that in order to preserve real moral distinctions, 
                                                
29 Some of the central articles in this debate are Kail (2001), Norton (1985), and Frankena (1955). 
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Hutcheson must believe, for example, that “mistake-free moral conflict is logically 
possible but psychologically impossible” (ibid., 174). This seems to fit well with 
Hutcheson’s claim that we all already do or would judge in the same way on the basis of 
the same moral ideas, while at the same time preserving no strong moral realism. For this 
reason, Gill claims that although it might be best to say Hutcheson is a subjectivist, what 
Hutcheson tried to accomplish was the “practical equivalent” of objective moral 
judgements.30 
 Hutcheson might therefore be a subjectivist in the sense that moral judgements 
rest on the feelings of each individual person, but because Hutcheson believes it is 
psychologically unlikely that there is much variation between the feelings of each 
individual he can preserve the idea that moral judgement can be right or wrong and that 
this distinction is real in some substantive sense. 
1.2.6 The Relation Between the Moral Sense and Motivation 
 Now that we have seen how motivation works, for Hutcheson, as well as how the 
moral sense functions, it will be important for later chapters to note how the moral sense 
and motivation relate to one another. Most important to point out is that Hutcheson often 
speaks as if the moral sense itself motivates. For example, while discussing obligation, 
Hutcheson claims we are naturally obligated to benevolence and therefore feel bad when 
we do not so act. Hutcheson says here that “this internal Sense, and Instinct of 
Benevolence, will either influence our Actions, or make us very uneasy and dissatisfy’d” 
(I4 268).31 Here the moral sense itself is an “instinct” and “influences our actions.” In the 
preface to Treatise II of the Inquiry as well, it is through the moral sense that we “are 
determin’d to love the Agent” (I4 110). In other places as well Hutcheson states that God 
                                                
30 It is worth noting that, as Gill suggests (see 2006, 300-1), it seems to be unhelpful to use the 
terms subjectivism and objectivism when describing Hutcheson’s position because one could 
describe him as either depending on the meaning these terms are meant to have. 
31 Darwall claims that how this passage is worded in the fourth edition “allows the interpretation” 
that by this point Hutcheson had moved away from thinking that the moral sense itself motivates 
(see Darwall 1995, 222-3). He points out that the first edition is clearer on the fact that Hutcheson 
believes the moral sense motivates. In any event, I think it is also clear from how the passage is 
worded in the fourth edition that Hutcheson believes the moral sense itself might motivate. 
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has given us “a Moral Sense to direct our Actions” (I4 128-9). Although some if not all of 
these quotations can also be interpreted in a way such that the moral sense itself does not 
motivate but only contributes in some way to motivation, at the very least these passages 
are ambiguous such that it is possible to read them as stating that the moral sense motives 
itself. Such a reading is strengthened, however, by the fact that Hutcheson often contrasts 
self-interest not with benevolence, but with the moral sense (see for example I4 269). In 
any event, I am not alone in reading Hutcheson this way,32 and it seems especially true 
that Hutcheson thought the moral sense itself could motivate in his earlier works, even if 
he abandoned the idea as his thought developed.33 
 A different but related point is the question of how the judgements of the moral 
sense motivate, or in other words what the relation is between approval, on the one hand, 
and benevolence, on the other. In the Inquiry, Hutcheson discusses this issue in 
connection with his distinction between the love of complacence or esteem (i.e. approval) 
and the love of benevolence. Speaking of the love of complacence, he claims that “the 
Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it” (I4 135) and also that complacence 
“raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters” (I4 137). 
Indeed, understanding the love of benevolence as “responsive” benevolence seems to 
imply that our approval of benevolent actions can cause us to act benevolently towards 
those we approve of in turn, and indeed that we are more likely to be benevolent towards 
the individuals we approve of than any other. Hutcheson does not provide much detail on 
the relation between approval and motivation in the Inquiry34, but this issue receives 
more explicit attention in the Illustrations where Hutcheson makes the distinction 
between exciting and justifying reasons. 
                                                
32 See Raphael (1947, 22 and 31), Darwall (1995, 221-2), Roberts (1973, 25), Strasser (1990, 81), 
Frankena (1955, 358-9), and Jensen (1971, 83-6). 
33 On this point see Frankena (1955, 358-9) and Darwall (1995, 223 and 229-231). 
34 It is worth noting that in other editions of the Inquiry, but not in the fourth, Hutcheson 
discusses this issue more explicitly. See, for example, the second edition where Hutcheson has a 
section on how “Benevolence presupposes esteem” (Hutcheson 1726, 142f.). As Wolfgang 
Leidhold notes (see Hutcheson 2008, 223 note 33), this section is not in the third or fourth 
edition. 
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 Acknowledging his debt to Hugo Grotius’ distinction between the various reasons 
for war (see E4 218 and Grotius 2005, 389ff.), Hutcheson distinguishes between two 
types of reason of action. He claims that when we ask for a reason of action we 
sometimes mean: “What Truth shews a Quality in the Action, exciting the Agent to do it?” 
(E4 217). Alternatively, we might be seeking a reason that shows “the Truth expressing a 
Quality engaging our Approbation” (E4 217). Hutcheson calls the first kind of reason, 
i.e. the reason why we perform an action, the exciting reason, and the second kind of 
reason, i.e. the reason why an action is approved, the justifying reason (see E4 218 and 
also Irwin 2008, 411ff.). After making this distinction Hutcheson proceeds to argue that 
“all exciting Reasons pre-suppose Instincts and Affections; and the justifying pre-suppose 
a Moral Sense” (E4 218). With this distinction between exciting and justifying reasons 
Hutcheson is therefore describing the two views which he believes are central to his 
moral philosophy, and which he described as such in both his early Reflection and in the 
Inquiry, namely the views 1. that we are always motivated by our passions and affections 
(and never reason), and 2. that the moral sense provides the ultimate criterion for our 
approval and disapproval of actions. Once Hutcheson makes the distinction between 
these two types of reason of action, however, it allows him to more clearly explain how 
he conceives of the connection between the two. 
 We have already seen that, at least sometimes, our approval can motivate us, e.g. 
in the case where we approve of a person who themselves acts benevolently and then are 
benevolent to them in response. In this case, we might say that a justifying reason 
becomes an exciting reason, i.e. our approval is our reason for acting benevolently. As 
Hutcheson points out, however, “[w]e often do Actions which we do not approve, and 
approve actions which we omit” (E4 209). This means, therefore, that not all justifying 
reasons are exciting reasons, and this must be the case for, as Hutcheson also points out 
(see E4 209), we can approve of the actions of others where there is simply “no room for 
our Election,” for example when we approve others’ past actions. Part of Hutcheson’s 
position must also be that not all exciting reasons are morally approved. As mentioned, 
exciting reasons are simply our motives for action, and these are the passions and 
affections, both the self-interested and benevolent ones. Since we only approve of the 
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benevolent affections, the self-interested ones are therefore those exciting reasons, of 
which we do not morally approve.35  
 Determining how exactly justifying reasons can become exciting reasons depends 
largely on whether one believes Hutcheson is a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist with 
respect to moral judgements, which is to say: whether he believes our judgements of 
moral good and evil are best described as propositions of some sort or as expressions of 
some sort of emotional state.36 Engaging with this debate in the literature directly and at 
length will take me too far away from my main aims in this chapter and is also not 
essential for the remainder of my project. I do wish to make clear, however, that I agree 
with Frankena that Hutcheson is a non-cognitivist in this respect (see Frankena 1955, 
372), i.e. that judgements of moral approbation are emotional rather than propositional 
states. I also believe that this follows from the reading I have provided of Hutcheson 
above. I have argued that the ultimate criterion of morality is the moral sense’s feeling of 
approval or disapproval and not reason. This means, therefore, that my judgement “this is 
morally good” is an expression not of some cognitive state such as I “know” this to be 
morally good, but is rather an expression of my feeling of pleasure upon perceiving the 
object I judge to be morally good.37 As Frankena puts it:  
in passing moral approbation as such on an action I am not cognizing and 
ascribing any indefinable property of goodness, etc., in or to the action, and I am 
not cognizing or asserting any fact about the actual or possible reactions of any 
spectators to the action. I am simply feeling a unique sort of pleasure in 
contemplating the action, and I am expressing this feeling by my verbal utterance, 
perhaps also expressing (but not asserting) a conviction that others will feel this 
pleasure if similarly situated, and almost certainly intending to evoke similar 
                                                
35 If we do in fact have disinterested malicious affections, these would of course not only be 
unapproved but disapproved exciting reasons. 
36 Although related, this use of cognitivism and non-cognitivism is distinct from the way Gill uses 
these terms, as mentioned above in relation to Hutcheson’s subjectivity/objectivity. For the 
discussion of whether moral judgements are cognitive or non-cognitive for Hutcheson, see above 
all Frankena (1955). 
37 The judgement itself “this is morally good” is indeed a proposition of sorts, but it is important 
to distinguish between being able to express a judgement in a proposition, and the judgement 
itself, which may or may not be cognitive in nature. 
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feelings in my hearers. That is, my moral approbation as such is wholly non-
cognitive. (1955, 372) 
If we therefore accept that moral judgements are non-cognitive, for Hutcheson, how do 
such judgements move us to action? Jensen puts this question as that of asking how 
“morality is practical,” that is, “how the same reason which gave us knowledge of moral 
distinctions could also move us to action” (Jensen 1971, 6). Another way of putting this 
question is to ask what our exciting reason would be to perform an action we morally 
approve of. A problem arises here, however, once one starts to think about what exactly 
this would involve. We have seen that moral approval involves a feeling of pleasure upon 
the sensing of a morally good object. Such a view becomes problematic, therefore, 
because it seems to present the possibility that, upon approving an action and feeling the 
concomitant pleasure, our reason for acting in a similar fashion might be to experience 
this pleasure again once we ourselves act benevolently and, upon reflection of our own 
action, approve of it. This is what I will refer to as “the pleasure problem,” and it is to 
Hutcheson’s answer to this problem that I now turn before returning to the issue of how 
our approval can motivate. 
1.2.7 The Pleasure Problem 
 As we have seen, the moral sense, for Hutcheson, is the faculty whereby we 
perceive moral objects (benevolent actions, characters, affections) and a central part of 
our “sensations” of moral objects is a feeling of pleasure or pain. Recall, for example, 
that this element of pleasure and pain is so important that Hutcheson defines senses in 
general as “Determinations to be pleas’d with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our 
Observation” (I4 xiii). The approval of benevolent actions, whether our own actions or 
those of others, is therefore accompanied by feelings of pleasure, and its opposite pain. 
Not only this, but Hutcheson argues both that the pleasures and pains of the moral sense 
are different in kind from other pleasures, and that such pleasures are the highest in kind. 
According to Hutcheson, the pleasures “of the external Senses” (I4 245) are short-lived 
and do not give us any kind of durable pleasure or satisfaction (see I4 245ff.). The moral 
sense, however, “gives us more Pleasure and Pain, than all our other Facultys” and the 
morally good objects which give “Pleasure from Reflection”, i.e. what he also calls 
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“moral Pleasures”, “are the most delightful Ingredient in the ordinary Pleasures of Life” 
(I4 244).38 The pleasure we experience when we perceive and reflect on moral objects, 
i.e. moral pleasure, is therefore distinct from as well as superior in kind to the pleasures 
of the external senses.39 As mentioned briefly above, the doctrine claiming we experience 
pleasure when perceiving moral objects becomes problematic, and this specifically in the 
case of our perceiving and approving/disapproving of our own actions. 
 If we experience pleasure when perceiving our own benevolent actions, this 
creates a problem for the possibility of acting truly disinterestedly and therefore morally, 
for Hutcheson. Hutcheson expresses this problem as follows: 
Now the principal business of the moral Philosopher is to shew, from solid 
Reasons, “That universal Benevolence tends to the Happiness of the Benevolent, 
either from the Pleasures of Reflection, Honour, natural Tendency to engage the 
good Offices of Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for our Happiness in this 
World; or from the Sanctions of divine Laws discover’d to us by the Constitution 
of the Universe;” that so no apparent Views of Interest may counteract this 
natural Inclination: but not to attempt proving, “That Prospects of our own 
Advantage of any kind can raise in us the virtuous Benevolence towards others.” 
(I4 270) 
Put simply: in that we experience pleasure when we ourselves reflect on the virtuous 
actions we perform, Hutcheson must show that this pleasure is not our true motivation to 
perform virtuous actions, thereby reducing benevolence to self-interest.  
 Hutcheson responds to this worry directly in two main ways. First, he points out 
that “Desire of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alleged to be 
voluntarily raised from Prospect [sic] of any Pleasure accompanying the Affection itself: 
for ‘tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with Pleasure; nay, ‘tis 
often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress” (I4 140). Hutcheson’s first 
response is thus simply to point out that acting virtuously is sometimes accompanied by 
pain, for example when we are helping someone in distress, and therefore it is in fact not 
clear that self-interest would always motivate us to benevolence. Hutcheson’s second 
                                                
38 Hutcheson also calls these “nobler Pleasures” (I4 129). 
39 See Scott (1900, 200) and Darwall (1995, 214) for a discussion. 
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response to this problem is much more interesting, however, and it will be of the most 
importance once when I discuss Kant’s answer to this problem in chapter 5. 
 According to Hutcheson, the objection stating that we act benevolently out of 
self-interest implies that we are able to raise an affection or desire in ourselves at will, for 
to say that we act benevolently only so that we may experience the pleasure associated 
with the approval of such action implies that we can choose to act benevolently at will, in 
order to experience the concomitant pleasure. Hutcheson denies the possibility of this and 
states that “neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or Desire can be directly raised 
by Volition” (I4 139). In essence, Hutcheson disagrees with what this objection implies 
about our psychology. He claims it is simply not true that we can raise a desire or 
affection in ourselves at will, in this case as a means to experiencing the concomitant 
pleasure of its operation. Such a view would imply, for example, that we could be bribed 
not only to perform good acts for other people, but to love them as well, i.e. to praise and 
esteem others, for example as a means to an end. Hutcheson believes, rightly I think, that 
this is psychologically impossible. Hutcheson does, however, importantly qualify this 
answer. He states:  
The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us from having any Affection, may 
indeed turn our Attention to those Qualities in the object, which are naturally 
constituted the necessary Causes or Occasions of the advantageous Affection; and 
if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus 
indirectly the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these 
Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no Volition of ours, nor 
Desire, will ever raise any Affection in us. (I4 140)  
What this means is that, in principle, it is possible to indirectly, out of self-interest, raise 
benevolence in ourselves by turning our attention to the objects that necessarily raise 
such affections in us. Remember that the love of benevolence can be understood as a kind 
of “responsive” benevolence such that when we view benevolence in others, for example, 
and experience love of complacence or esteem, i.e. approval, we then often desire the 
happiness of this person in turn, which would then cause us to approve of and feel the 
pleasure of reflection in ourselves for having such an affection. What this means is that if 
we were selfishly motivated, we could seek out the benevolent objects themselves as a 
necessary means to experiencing the pleasures attached to experience the benevolence 
brought into being as a result. As such, there seems to be a way in which Hutcheson 
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grants that self-interest can, indirectly, bring about the moral pleasures attached to 
benevolence. Such situations are limited, however, and because Hutcheson believes 
benevolence is a fundamental desire of ours, he certainly believes that benevolence can 
also arise when it is not indirectly raised by self-interest, and indeed it is likely that it 
arises in such situations primarily. 
 Now that we have seen Hutcheson’s response to what I have called the “pleasure 
problem,” we can return to the question of how he thinks moral approval motivates. The 
worry was that the nature of moral approval, for Hutcheson, as involving pleasure, could 
only motivate us by means of this associated pleasure. We have seen, however, that 
experiencing the pleasures of benevolence from self-interest implies the possibility of 
raising an affection in ourselves at will, something which Hutcheson denies is possible. If 
approval does not motivate via self-interest, then, how does it motivate? The answer to 
this question can be clarified if we remember that the happiness of others is an “ultimate” 
end of ours, i.e. we desire the happiness of others for its own sake and as an end in itself 
and not solely as a means to our own pleasure (although it turns out that desiring this as 
an end in itself also makes us more happy, thanks to God benevolently granting us a 
moral sense). We can say, therefore, that the moral sense, justifying reasons, or moral 
approval motivates simply because the things we morally approve of are things that we 
already desire. When we morally approve of an action, affection, or character, we are 
essentially at the same time becoming aware of how to satisfy our benevolent desires. 
Approval can motivate, therefore, in that the perceptions and reasoning involved in 
judgements of moral approval can also serve to help us determine how to best satisfy our 
desire to bring about the happiness of others. We antecedently desire what we approve, 
for Hutcheson, and approval shows us what this desire consists in and how we can go 
about satisfying it. 
1.2.8 Conclusion 
 In the second section of this chapter I have presented the central ideas of 
Hutcheson’s moral theory that will be important for the following chapters dealing with 
Kant’s engagement with moral sense theory. We have seen that benevolence is the moral 
motive for Hutcheson, the moral sense is the ultimate criterion of moral evaluation 
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(which is different from Shaftesbury’s position), and that in one sense it is indirectly 
possible to be benevolent solely for the purpose of experiencing the pleasure that 
accompanies acting in this way. We have also seen that reason has a role to play in both 
desire and moral evaluation, but that it is never reason that motivates, sets an end, or 
judges what is morally good or evil. Kant profoundly disagrees with Hutcheson on these 
points, but as we shall see, there are some aspect of Hutcheson’s moral theory that are 
preserved in Kant’s own moral philosophy. Without further delay, I turn in the next 
chapter to Kant’s engagement with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in the early stages of the 
development of his moral philosophy, i.e. during his pre-Critical period. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Adjudication and Execution: Moral Feeling in Kant’s 
Pre-Critical Moral Philosophy 
 In the previous chapter I illustrated that moral sense theory, especially 
Hutcheson’s version thereof, involves an answer to two questions seen as fundamental in 
moral philosophy: 1. The question of what motivates us to perform morally good actions, 
and 2. The question of on what basis we distinguish morally good actions from those that 
are morally bad. As we saw, at least on one interpretation the moral sense plays a role in 
the answer to both of these questions, and therefore the moral sense has a function in both 
judgement and in motivation. I now turn to the main question of my dissertation and 
discuss the role of moral sense theory in Kant’s moral philosophy, focusing in this 
chapter on Kant’s “pre-Critical” moral philosophy, i.e. his moral philosophy before the 
1781 publication of the first Critique. More specifically, in this chapter I explain Kant’s 
various discussions of “moral feeling” during this period and use this as a basis to 
determine the extent to which the moral sense theorists influenced Kant during this stage 
of his development.40 I show that the nature of this influence changes during this period, 
taking distinct forms before and after Kant’s so-called “great light” of 1769. This 
influence persists after 1769 as well, and it is my additional aim in this chapter to 
                                                
40 One might reasonably ask why I focus in this chapter on moral feeling in particular, rather than 
focus more generally on Kant’s engagement with moral sense theory during this period. First, I 
do not exhaustively discuss the ways in which the moral sense theorists influenced Kant during 
this period because this could be a book-length project on its own. The main reason why I focus 
on moral feeling, however, is that I will be focusing in the next chapter on how the moral sense 
theorists might have influenced Kant’s mature conception of moral motivation, and given moral 
feeling plays a central role in that discussion, discussing this concept in his pre-Critical writings 
will clarify Kant’s use of the concept later on. Also, given “moral feeling” as a concept is 
equivalent to the moral sense (as I discuss below, “moral feeling [moralisches Gefühl]” simply is 
how “moral sense” was first translated into German), analysing this term in particular is a good 
way to assess Kant’s engagement with moral sense theory in general. Furthermore and as we shall 
see below, how the moral sense theorists approached issues of moral judgement and of moral 
motivation are the primary ways in which they influence Kant, and given moral feeling 
encompasses both of these ideas, analysing how Kant understood moral feeling is to analyse 
Kant’s uptake of the most central elements of moral sense theory itself. 
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illustrate the nature of this influence from 1770 up until the beginning of Kant’s 
“Critical” period. 
2.1 Introduction 
Kant’s critical conception of “moral feeling” [moralisches Gefühl] has received a 
considerable amount of attention in the secondary literature. This is in large part due to 
the fact that many disagree about what sort of function moral feeling plays in moral 
motivation. There are two traditional approaches to take: 1. While moral feeling is the 
affective side of what Kant calls respect for the moral law, “it is the intellectual aspect 
which is active in motivating moral conduct” (Reath 1989, 287). 2. Although motivation 
initially arises from an intellectual recognition of the moral law, “it also depends on a 
peculiar moral feeling of respect for law” (McCarthy 1993, 423) and this moral feeling is 
therefore the decisive, active element in motivation.41 Given this apparent confusion 
concerning the precise role of Kant’s conception of moral feeling, in attempting to 
understand this concept it has rightly been the strategy of some scholars to carry out what 
Antonino Falduto describes as a “conceptual-historical analysis, dedicated to the 
influence of the moral sense school on Kant’s ethics” (Falduto 2014, 204). This approach 
makes sense, for “moral feeling,” i.e. moralisches Gefühl, is how “moral sense” was 
translated into German by Francis Hutcheson’s early translator.42 In addition to the 
attempt to understand this term historically, others have also turned to Kant’s discussion 
of this term over the course of his development. As Dieter Henrich claims, for example:  
the concept and the problem of moral feeling still retains a considerable, if 
naturally transformed, significance within the context of the later and definitive 
formulation of Kant’s moral philosophy. This is only really intelligible if we also 
                                                
41 Since the publication of these classic interpretations of Kant’s conception of moral motivation, 
numerous attempts have been made to argue in favour of one over the other, or even to find some 
sort of middle ground. These various approaches will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
42 For example, Hutcheson’s An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, 
with Illustrations on the Moral Sense was translated as Abhandlung über die Natur und 
Beherrschung der Leidenschaften und Neigungen und über das moralische Gefühl insonderheit 
(emphasis added). 
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acknowledge the important role that the problem of moral feeling already played 
in the development of Kant’s systematic thought. (Henrich 2009, 53, note 19)  
Although Henrich and others discuss Kant’s mention of moral feeling during his pre-
Critical period, their remarks are often made for the purpose of showing that “feeling” in 
general was significant in Kantian ethics during the pre-Critical period, and rarely if at all 
are Kant’s views from the 1770s discussed. This is no accident, of course, for the 1770s 
are often referred to as Kant’s “silent years.”43 Nonetheless, as Falduto notes, “for a 
better understanding of the development of Kant’s ideas on feeling in general and moral 
feeling in particular, a study of the student’s notes of Kant’s lectures on anthropology … 
plays a capital role” (2014, 206-7).44 
Given the importance of the concept of moral feeling for Kant’s Critical ethics 
and the usefulness of consulting Kant’s pre-Critical views on moral feeling to help shed 
light on this concept, what I wish to do in this chapter is outline Kant’s views on moral 
feeling during the 1760s and 1770s in order to paint a picture of how his understanding of 
this concept changed during the pre-Critical period. Until now, discussions of Kant’s pre-
Critical views of this concept have focused on the 1760s. Now that there is a relatively 
reliable set of student notes on moral philosophy from the 1770s, however45, together 
with Kant’s reflections from the 1770s it is possible to reconstruct what Kant thought 
about “moral feeling” over the course of the pre-Critical period. As I hope will become 
clear during this chapter, Kant’s thoughts on this concept during this period show not 
only that taking account of Kant’s early conceptions of this concept help clarify his 
mature, Critical conception of it, but it also helps clarify the precise nature and extent of 
                                                
43 See for example Kuehn (2001, 188ff.). 
44 Falduto is right to point out the importance of the lecture notes here, but as I will show in the 
following it is not the Anthropology notes (whether from the critical or the pre-Critical period) 
but the notes on moral philosophy that contain Kant’s most significant remarks on moral feeling. 
45 The Kaehler lectures notes. See Stark (1999 and 2004), and below note 66 for a discussion of 
their reliability as a source for Kant’s thought during the 1770s. Before the availability of the 
Kaehler notes, reference was usually made to the Collins notes stemming from this same period, 
but Stark (2009) has shown the superiority of Kaehler over all other versions of the notes 
stemming from the 1770s.  
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the influence that the moral sense theorists had on Kant during this important period of 
his development. 
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. First (2.2), I discuss 
Kant’s mention of moral feeling during the 1760s. During this time Kant was still 
developing a position of his own in moral philosophy and at the very least expresses 
interest in Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s idea of the moral sense. This assessment of the 
concept changes in the latter half of the 1760s, and around the time of the Inaugural 
Dissertation Kant’s appraisal of the idea of a moral sense changes significantly.  In 
section (2.3) I therefore discuss Kant’s conception of moral philosophy both around and 
sooner after what has been called his “great light” of 1769. In section (2.4) I turn to 
Kant’s understanding of moral feeling during the 1770s. Here I look at Kant’s reflections 
and lecture notes on moral philosophy to piece together exactly how Kant altered his 
view of moral feeling after the Dissertation. I illustrate how moral feeling is no longer 
considered an option for what Kant now calls the “principle of adjudication,” but it does 
play the role of the “principle of execution.” In the final section (2.5) I discuss what 
Kant’s shifting understanding of moral feeling during his pre-Critical period means for 
our understanding of the development of his pre-Critical moral philosophy in general. I 
illustrate, first, that Kant is undecided with respect to the question of how we distinguish 
moral good from evil prior to 1769/70, but in the 1770s he is convinced we do so 
intellectually and not based on any feeling or sense. Second, I illustrate that Kant’s 
conception of motivation during the pre-Critical period is tied to a different use of “moral 
feeling,” and that his understanding of motivation evolves throughout this period, getting 
its most detailed treatment in the 1770s. In anticipation of the next chapter, I briefly 
discuss what is missing from Kant’s mature conception of motivation in the 1770s. In 
general, I conclude that the way in which Kant thinks of moral feeling during his entire 
pre-Critical period means the moral sense theorists had a significant influence on Kant 
both before and after the “great light” of 1769, contrary to what many commentators 
have claimed. I illustrate that the moral sense theorists are important for understanding 
not only Kant’s conception of moral judgement, but of moral motivation as well. I 
nonetheless support the idea that the year 1769 marks a shift in Kant’s thinking, as 
suggested by many scholars in the past, but I suggest that precisely what this shift 
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consists in, especially with respect to moral philosophy, can be gleaned by Kant’s 
varying discussions of moral feeling.  
2.2 Moral Feeling in the 1760s 
2.2.1 The Prize Essay 
 According to Henrich, “[t]he first explicit account of ethical problems that comes 
down to us from Kant’s hands was written in the last months of 1762” (Henrich 2014, 
15), and this is contained in Kant’s Prize Essay or Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of 
the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality. Not only this, but Paul Menzer claims 
that this is the first text in which we can see the effect of English moral philosophy on 
Kant (1898, 302). The Prize Essay was written in response to a question posed by the 
Berlin Academy, the question being announced in June of 1761 and the deadline for 
submitting the essay Dec. 31 1762 (see Kant 2002, lxii). We know that Kant wrote the 
essay sometime in 1762, most likely towards the end of that year, given his letter to 
Formey dated June 28, 1763 confirms that the Academy received his submission by the 
deadline (see AA 10:41ff.), and Kant’s remarks in the essay itself suggest he wrote it 
hurriedly and therefore perhaps finished it close to the deadline (see PE 2:301). 
 Kant’s main purpose in the section of this essay dealing with moral philosophy is 
to argue that moral philosophy is currently incapable of achieving the certainty it must be 
capable of achieving, evidence for this being that the concept of obligation is still unclear. 
This leads Kant to put forward some of his own views on obligation. He claims, for 
example, that there is a fundamental distinction between what he calls here “the necessity 
of the means” and “the necessity of the ends” (PE 2:298), where the former is conditional 
necessity, i.e. the necessity of an action under condition of an assumed end one wishes to 
achieve, and the latter is absolute necessity of an action in itself. 
 In addition to this, Kant puts forward a view of which he claims to have 
convinced himself “after long reflection” (PE 2:299). At this point Kant believes that 
“[t]he rule: perform the most perfect action in your power, is the first formal ground of 
all obligation to act. Likewise, the proposition: abstain from doing that which will hinder 
the realization of the greatest possible perfection is the first formal ground of the duty to 
abstain from acting” (PE 2:299). Kant is therefore at least partially endorsing Christian 
49 
 
Wolff’s conception of obligation here.46 At the same time, he finds this principle 
problematic, for he states that “no specifically determinate obligation flows from these 
two rules of the good, unless they are combined with indemonstrable material principles 
of practical cognition” (PE 2:299). What does Kant mean by this? 
 Immediately following this criticism of Wolff’s principle of perfection, Kant 
states that “[i]t is only recently, namely, that people have come to realize that the faculty 
of representing the true is cognition, while the faculty of experiencing the good is feeling, 
and that the two faculties are, on no account, to be confused with each other” (PE 2:299). 
For “feeling” to be the faculty of experiencing the good means that this faculty provides 
us with “an unanalyzable feeling of the good (which is never encountered in a thing 
absolutely but only relatively to a being endowed with sensibility)” (PE 2:299). Kant 
claims we have “simple” feelings of the good, which means that “the judgement: “This is 
good,” will be completely indemonstrable” (PE 2:299). This is so because the judgement 
that something is good “will be an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of 
pleasure combined with the representation of the object” (PE 2:299). In other words, if 
representing an object immediately brings with it the feeling of pleasure, the object is 
judged to be good, and this judgement is indemonstrable because it is based on an 
unanalysable feeling. Kant claims that to immediately represent an action as good means 
that “the necessity of this action is an indemonstrable material principle of obligation” 
(PE 2:300). As stated above, such a principle is precisely what the Wolffian principle 
needed in order for “specifically determinate” obligations to flow from them. We are now 
in a position to understand what Kant means by this. 
 As stated, in this text we have Kant endorsing the idea that human beings possess 
a faculty of “feeling” which makes them capable of having simple feelings of the good, 
which in turn lead to the “immediate effect” of a judgement of the kind “This is good” 
(PE 2:299). In other words, feeling here is a faculty for judging what is indemonstrably 
good and evil. Because Kant states that obligations “cannot be called obligations as long 
as they are not subordinated to an end which is necessary in itself” (PE 2:298), feeling 
provides us with the information of what is indemonstrably good, i.e. good in itself. In 
                                                
46 See Schneewind (2003, 335). 
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claiming that no determinate obligations follow from Wolff’s two principles, Kant was 
essentially saying they were indeterminate, or as he’ll later say, tautological (see esp. Kae 
60), i.e. the principles do not specify what perfection means, and we need to know what 
perfection means in order to know what contributes towards our perfection and what does 
not. At this point in time Kant appears to think that “feeling” is a viable way of knowing 
what is indemonstrably good, and therefore of knowing what perfection might mean. 
Kant is therefore suggesting here that pairing the doctrine of feeling, according to which 
it is through feeling that we are made aware of what is morally good and evil, can 
overcome the “indeterminacy” or “tautology” problem pertaining to Wolff’s principles, 
and by pairing the principles of perfection with “feeling” we are able to know what our 
determinate obligations are. 
The doctrine of feeling Kant discusses here, as one according to which feeling is 
the source for our knowledge of what is immediately good, sounds similar to the moral 
sense theory espoused by Hutcheson in particular. It is for this reason that Kant claims 
here that, with respect to the problem of determining what is unconditionally necessary, 
“Hutcheson and others have, under the name of moral feeling [des moralischen Gefühls], 
provided us with a starting point from which to develop some excellent observations” 
(PE 2:300).47 At the same time, however, it is important to point out that Kant does not 
seem to be outright endorsing or agreeing with Hutcheson and others that we have a 
moral sense. Indeed, in the final paragraph of the section just following the above 
statement, speaking of the fundamental principle of moral philosophy Kant claims “it has 
yet to be determined whether it is merely the faculty of cognition, or whether it is feeling 
(the first inner ground of the faculty of desire) which decides its first principles” (PE 
2:300, my emphasis). Not only this, but Kant even criticizes those who claim the moral 
sense can tell us what is indemonstrably good in that they might be “taking for 
                                                
47 Schilpp (1938, 33) claims that Kant’s reference to feeling in this text as a capacity to become 
aware of what is immediately good should not be taken to “mean precisely the same thing that the 
British moralists meant by their “moral sense” or “sentiment,”” and furthermore that it would be 
“absurd” (ibid., 32) to jump to this conclusion. While Schilpp might be right to say Kant is not 
referring to the exact concept of the moral sense used by Shaftesbury or Hutcheson, I think it is 
obvious, and therefore not absurd to say, that Kant at least has a similar idea in mind, especially 
given his reference to “Hutcheson and others” and “moral feeling” shortly afterwards. 
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indemonstrable that which in fact is capable of proof” (PE 2:300). What this means, 
therefore, is that although Kant seems to think that Hutcheson and others, with the idea of 
the moral sense, have provided a good option with respect to accounting for the origin of 
our judgements of immediate, indemonstrable goods and therefore have provided a viable 
conception of material principles of practical cognition (which, again, is essential for 
determining our concrete obligations), his mind is still not made up at this point as to 
whether Hutcheson and others have it right. Although it is clear to Kant at this point that 
we need first principles of morality that determine what is indemonstrably good and what 
actions are unconditionally necessary in themselves as ends, and he therefore seems 
interested in moral sense theory as an option, he is not fully convinced that the moral 
sense is the faculty that provides such information. 
2.2.2 Negative Magnitudes 
 Although published before the Prize Essay, Kant’s essay on Negative Magnitudes 
was likely written after the Prize Essay, given Negative Magnitudes was published in 
1763 and, as stated above, the Essay was completed by the end of 1762. As such, this text 
is, chronologically speaking, the next text in which, as we will see, Kant discusses moral 
feeling.  
As the full title of this text suggests (Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in 
die Weltweisheit einzufuhren), Kant’s task in this text is to introduce the concept of a 
negative magnitude into philosophy. After a general discussion of the nature of negative 
magnitudes in the first section, in the second section Kant provides examples of the 
application of the concept within various disciplines, the third example focusing on the 
discipline of moral philosophy. Before turning to this example, however, it will be 
helpful to introduce the concept of a negative magnitude as well as two distinctions, of 
which Kant makes use in the section on moral philosophy, namely the distinction 
between logical and real opposition, on the one hand, and the distinction between a 
deprivation and a lack, on the other. 
Kant makes the idea of a negative magnitude clear by drawing a distinction 
between logical opposition and real opposition. “Logical” opposition is contradiction, i.e. 
opposition in the sense of negation, while “real” opposition is opposition in the sense of 
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two forces that are positive in themselves but in conflict with one another. A negative 
magnitude, Kant explains, is not to be understood as a negation, i.e. it is not negative in 
the sense of logical opposition. A negative magnitude, rather, should be understood as 
negative in the sense of real opposition. This means that a negative magnitude is itself 
something positive, and thus the term “negative magnitude” is somewhat of a misnomer 
because it is not negative in itself but only in relation to another, opposing force.  
As an example, take the force of attraction. The magnitude that is the negative of 
attraction is not rest, but repulsion. Rest is rather the absence or lack of both attraction 
and repulsion. Repulsion, on the other hand, is a positive force in itself but is opposed to 
attraction and is for this reason negative. Repulsion can therefore be called a negative 
magnitude. At the same time, a lack should be distinguished from a deprivation, 
according to Kant. A deprivation is a negative result of two opposed forces, for example 
when a negative magnitude outweighs a positive magnitude the result is a deprivation. A 
lack, on the other hand, is, as mentioned, simply an absence in the sense that there simply 
are no positive forces at work, an example being the state of rest. 
When it comes to Kant’s application of the concept of a negative magnitude to 
moral philosophy, Kant declares that vice is not a negation in the sense of logical 
negation or opposition, but is rather a negative virtue in the sense that it has to do with 
real opposition. Kant claims that “vice can only occur in so far as there is in a being an 
inner law (either simply conscience or consciousness of a positive law as well) that is 
acted against” (NM 2:182, translation modified). More specifically, vice takes place when 
this inner law is counteracted by an opposing force or inner law. What this means, says 
Kant, is that vice is a deprivation-like result, i.e. it is the negative result of the positive 
inner law compelling a being to virtue being counteracted by a (morally) negative 
magnitude. It is worth noting here that this seems to result in either of two situations: 1. 
The inner positive law impelling humans to virtue is counteracted and simply made 
ineffective, or 2. The counteracting law is so strong that the positive law is both made 
ineffective and the counteracting law is made effective. In this sense, vice is therefore not 
a lack, but a deprivation.  
Although vice is not a lack in humans, it is important to note that both virtue and 
vice are “lacking” in this technical sense in non-human animals. Kant claims that animals 
53 
 
are incapable of or lack virtue and vice because they do not have the inner positive law 
encouraging them to good action, and therefore do not partake in the struggle of forces 
that comprises living the moral life, nor do they partake in the results of it, i.e. virtue and 
vice. This means that when animals “omit” performing virtue they are not vicious. This is 
because, in the first place, an animal “was not driven by inner moral feeling [inneres 
moralisches Gefühl] to a good action” (NM 2:183). Humans, on the other hand, are quite 
different. As opposed to animals, Kant claims that “[t]here is a positive law to be found in 
the heart of every human being … it commands that we love our neighbour” (NM 2:183). 
Although he does not say so explicitly, Kant seems to identify the positive law in human 
beings commanding that we love our neighbour with “inner moral feeling”; animals do 
not have this inner moral feeling, but humans beings do have a law leading them to good 
actions, i.e. humans seem to have what the animals lack, and this is inner moral feeling.  
It should be mentioned here that, assuming vice is not solely a matter of resisting 
the positive law of moral feeling, there is presumably at least one force that could act as 
the “negative magnitude” impelling us to vicious action. Although Kant does not mention 
what kind of force or forces these might be, a likely candidate based on Kant’s later 
thought would be self-interested desires or inclinations. These details aside, in this text 
we find Kant referring to moral feeling as a force impelling human beings to good actions 
and as a positive law seemingly unique to humans that makes them capable of virtue and 
vice. This is notably quite different from the discussion of feeling in the Prize Essay, and 
indeed seems to be a different sense of the term “moral feeling.” In the Prize Essay, 
“feeling” enabled us to judge moral good and evil, whereas here “moral feeling” is a 
force impelling us to action. As we will see in the following, both of these ideas, under 
the term of “moral feeling,” recur in many of Kant’s pre-Critical writings.  
2.2.3 The Observations 
 The next text in which Kant discusses moral feeling is his Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, published in 1764 but completed by the end of 
1763 (see Kant 2002, lxvii). Appropriately given its title, Kant begins this text with a 
discussion of the “feeling” of the beautiful, and it becomes clear here that Kant 
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understands “feeling” as a capacity to feel certain kinds of pleasure and displeasures.48 In 
this text we also begin to see Kant thinking of morality in terms of principles. He claims, 
for example, that “true virtue can only be grafted upon principles” (O 2:217). He makes 
this claim in the context of discussing sympathy and complaisance as “good moral 
qualities that are lovable and beautiful and, to the extent that they harmonize with virtue, 
may also be regarded as noble, even though they cannot genuinely be counted as part of 
the virtuous disposition” (O 2:215). Kant argues that grounding virtue on sympathy and 
complaisance is not the most reliable way to do so, for although they often “harmonize” 
with virtue, they do so only contingently and not necessarily, meaning following them is 
no sure way to act virtuously. It is for this reason that, speaking of complaisance in 
particular, “unless higher principles set bounds for it and weaken it, all sorts of vices may 
spring from it” (O 2:217). For example, Kant claims that from “affectionate 
complaisance” one “will be a liar, an idler, a drunkard, etc., for he does not act in 
accordance with the rules for good conduct in general, but rather in accordance with an 
inclination that is beautiful in itself but which in so far as it is without self-control and 
without principles becomes ridiculous” (O 2:217). These are interesting claims, for Kant 
foreshadows here two aspects of his Critical moral philosophy: first, the importance he 
will later place on generality and universality, and how these qualities are reliable ways 
of determining what is necessarily and not just contingently good, and second, the idea 
that sympathy or benevolence is only contingently moral. This aside, it is important to 
specify how Kant thinks of moral principles or the “rules for good conduct in general” at 
this point in time.  
 In this text Kant claims that the rules or principles for good conduct 
are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every 
human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of 
sympathy and complaisance. I believe that I can bring all this together if I say that 
it is the feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature. The first is a 
ground of universal affection, the second of universal respect, and if this feeling 
had the greatest perfection in any human heart then this human being would 
                                                
48 See especially O 2:208: a feeling is that “which makes them [human beings] capable of 
enjoying gratification after their fashion.” 
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certainly love and value even himself, but only in so far as he is one among all to 
whom his widespread and noble feeling extends. (O 2:217) 
Importantly, the feeling that Kant is talking about here is what he calls a few lines later 
“universal moral feeling [das allgemeine moralische Gefühl]” (O 2:217). Thus although 
Kant emphasizes the importance of principles in virtuous conduct, the content of the 
principles relies on a particular kind of feeling, namely “universal moral feeling” or the 
feeling of the beauty and dignity of human nature. This feeling, therefore, is at the 
foundation of the “rules for good conduct in general” and it seems to be the basis of 
acting virtuously in a reliable way.  
In addition to feeling being the basis of moral principles, although it is not 
necessarily explicit from his discussion above, Kant is also focusing here on what moves 
us to perform virtuous actions. He claims that it is because this moral feeling has “little 
power … over most hearts” (O 2:217) and human nature is weak that the drives that are 
“supplements for virtue”, i.e. sympathy, complaisance, honour, and shame (see O 2:218), 
are placed in us, and he speaks of sympathy and complaisance in this text as “inclination” 
(2:217) and also “drives … which move some to beautiful actions” (O 2:217). The 
feeling of honour and shame, for example, “is fine and moves us” and “can also balance 
cruder self-interest and vulgar sensuality” (O 2:218) and in general is an “impulse” (ibid.) 
to action. In that these are the supplements to virtue that “providence has placed” in us 
due to “the weakness of human nature and the little power that the universal moral 
feeling exercises over most hearts” (O 2:217), we can conclude that universal moral 
feeling here is understood as a power of the human heart as well, i.e. a spring to virtue or 
a drive or impulse to virtuous action, and that acting on the basis of this feeling 
constitutes the true virtuous disposition as opposed to acting on the supplements to virtue. 
Indeed, it should be mentioned here that Kant states that the “adopted virtues nevertheless 
have a great similarity to the true virtues, since they contain the feeling of an immediate 
pleasure in kindly and benevolent actions” (O 2:218). This means that true virtue also 
contains this feeling of pleasure in benevolent actions and, as discussed, true virtue is 
acting on the basis of universal moral feeling. 
 As one can see, Kant’s language in this text and the way in which he seems to 
think of moral feeling brings in many elements of the moral theory of Shaftesbury and 
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Hutcheson. Interestingly, in this text we seem to have talk of moral feeling as both the 
source for our moral principles, i.e. as the source of what is morally good and evil and of 
what we ought and ought not to do, as well as mention of moral feeling as a drive or 
impulse to action. These are the two functions of moral feeling present in the texts 
already discussed and, as I will show, these functions appear in Kant’s other texts prior to 
1769 as well.  
2.2.4 The Remarks 
 Kant’s Remarks to his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 
written shortly after the Observations in 1764-5 (see Kant 2011, ix) also contain a few 
references to moral feeling. He says, for example, that “[a]ll evil action would never 
happen if it were sensed through moral feeling with as much aversion as it deserves” (AA 
20:85). This implies that moral feeling is, again, an important element in action, not 
necessarily in judging. As we will see, this remark also anticipates a view Kant develops 
in his lectures on moral philosophy during the 1770s, namely that although moral 
judgement is important, we need to feel aversion towards evil action if we are to actually 
avoid it. For example, Kant claims here that “[t]he understanding brings about no 
increase of the moral feeling; in this sense, he who ratiocinates only has rather cooled-off 
affects and is more cool-minded, consequently less evil and less good” (AA 20:135).49 
What this seems to imply is that even if we have a correct understanding or judgement of 
what is evil, because the understanding can bring about no increase of our moral feeling, 
evil action can only be prevented by feeling aversion towards what is evil. This brings 
about a problem that will come up again when I turn to Kant’s lectures during the 1770s, 
namely that such a view makes moral judgement or the understanding of moral good and 
evil unimportant or inessential, and that being a good person only has to do with the 
nature of one’s feelings. This problem aside for the time being, here I only wish to call 
                                                
49 This quote and the interpretation I offer of it here suggest that Kant’s claim earlier in the 
Remarks that “Das Gefühl, wovon ich handle …” should be translated as “The feeling, from 
which I act is so constituted that I do not need to be taught (to ratiocinate) in order to feel it,” and 
not as “The feeling I am dealing with is so constituted …” (AA 20:4, and see Kant 2011, 66, note 
4). 
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attention to the fact that moral feeling plays a decisive role in action in the Remarks as 
well, and that Kant appears to be developing a theory of motivation, whereby he is 
clearly starting to think about how moral knowledge and motivation are compatible with 
one another.  
2.2.5 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer50 
 The conception of moral feeling as a force that drives us towards good action 
appears again in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer where Kant contrasts two forces that “move the 
human heart” (Dr 2:334). One force has as its objective “the advancement of self-interest 
or the satisfaction of private need,” an objective lying within the human being, so to 
speak, and the other force has its focal point outside ourselves and is located in other 
rational beings (Dr 2:334). These two forces, of egoism and altruism as Kant calls them 
(Dr 2:334), conflict and the result is that we are concerned primarily with either ourselves 
or with others. Interestingly, therefore, we see Kant speaking of human motivation in 
terms of battling forces.51 
 In this text, Kant talks of how, when we act to satisfy our own needs, our attention 
is often drawn to a kind of “alien will” that is operative within us. Kant says that “[a] 
secret power forces us to direct our will towards the well-being of others or regulate it 
[our will] with the will of another. Although this often happens contrary to our will and in 
strong opposition to our selfish inclination” (Dr 2:334). Here Kant calls “moral feeling” 
the sensed “constraining of our will to harmonize with the general will” and also the 
“sensed dependency of the private will on the general will” (Dr 2:335). Kant’s 
incorporation of the idea of the “general will” here clearly reflects the influence of 
Rousseau, according to whom the general will is, as Nicholas Dent puts it, “the will of 
the whole body of the people” (Dent 2005, 135). Just after making this link between the 
                                                
50 Published in 1766, there is reason to believe Kant’s Dreams were composed during 1764/5 (see 
Kant 2002, xlvii). 
51 As I discuss in the next chapter, Kant ultimately rejects a “battle of forces” model of human 
action, and there is even evidence that he rejected this model later in the pre-Critical period as 
well. 
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general will and moral feeling, Kant goes on to speak of moral feeling in terms of the 
“moral impulses in thinking natures,” claiming that both these things, moral feeling and 
the moral impulses, are effects “of a genuinely active force, in virtue of which spirit-
natures exercise an influence on each other” (Dr 2:335). The link Kant makes between 
the general will and moral feeling therefore makes sense, for both the general will and 
moral feeling represent that which is meant to move us to do what is good for, or is in the 
interest of, humanity as a whole. We therefore have indication in this text as well, then, 
that moral feeling is, perhaps as a particular feeling, a force driving us toward moral 
action, and understood as a capacity it could mean the capacity to experience such a 
force. 
2.2.6 The ‘Announcement’ 
 In ‘M. Immanuel Kant’s Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the 
Winter Semester, 1765-1766’ we find Kant starting to explicitly criticize moral sense 
theory. Kant claims that moral philosophy only has the appearance of being a science and 
of being thoroughly grounded when in fact it is not. Part of the reason for this state of 
affairs is that many believe “[t]he distinction between good and evil in actions, and the 
judgement of moral rightness, can be known, easily and accurately, by the human heart 
through what is called sentiment [Sentiment], and that without the elaborate necessity of 
proofs” (Ann 2:311). In other words, Kant is claiming here that he thinks it is problematic 
to judge actions as good or evil without any proof, and presumably, therefore, that moral 
sense theory is mistaken in thinking it can do so. Indeed, as discussed above, Kant 
expressed reservations about moral sense theory in this regard when he cautioned against 
“taking for indemonstrable that which in fact is capable of proof” (PE 2:300). On the 
basis of this appraisal, Kant claims in the ‘Announcement’ that “[t]he attempts of 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, although incomplete and defective, have nonetheless 
penetrated furthest in the search for the fundamental principles of all morality” (Ann 
2:311, emphasis added). Kant adds that the attempts of these authors lack “precision” and 
“completeness” and that he will supplement their attempts in his lectures (see Ann 2:311). 
As such, what is new in the text in comparison to the Prize Essay is that Kant is explicit 
about the attempts of these authors being “incomplete and defective,” whereas before he 
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seemed to be on the fence about this. Josef Schmucker, therefore, is likely right to claim 
that it is wrong to think Kant shared Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s view of the moral 
sense at this time (see Schmucker 1961, 154). It is important to note, however, that this is 
Kant’s view of moral sense theory only with respect to its stance on judging which 
actions are morally good and evil. The moral sense or moral feeling as a capacity that 
plays a role in motivation has not been called into question. 
 Before moving on to the decisive turn in Kant’s thinking, known as the “great 
light,” in the remainder of this section I wish to discuss the Herder lecture notes. 
Originating from sometime between 1762 and 1764, i.e. the time during which Herder 
was enrolled as a student in Königsberg (see Irmscher 1964, 7ff.), there is much about 
Hutcheson and the moral sense in these notes. At the same time, one must use these notes 
very carefully. As J.B. Schneewind notes: “Partly because he may have allowed his own 
thoughts to interpret Kant’s, Herder’s notes are not altogether reliable. He worked them 
over at home, and he may have put words into Kant’s mouth” (Kant 2001, xiv). Gerhard 
Lehmann states further that “Herder – much too independent to be a mere “copier” – 
gives his particular diction and indeed also intellectual re-shaping to everything that was 
not immediately taken down in the lecture which is to say is noted in key words” (AA 
28:1353). More specifically, Lehmann claims that “we do not have the guarantee that the 
examples, possibly even the justifications, provided by him always originate from Kant” 
(AA 28:1354). At the same time Lehmann is also careful to note that “[n]othing is 
dispensable from Herder’s records and transcriptions, not only because for this time 
(1762-4) aside from his published works (2:165-301) only few reflections … are 
available, rather also because Herder’s level is incomparably higher than that of other 
lecture participants” (AA 28:1354-5). Ultimately, what this means is that, as will be my 
practice in the following, what is to be found in the Herder lecture notes should be taken 
with a grain of salt and any conclusions drawn from the notes should be tentative, while 
at the same time taken seriously. Luckily, the essential point to be gleaned from these 
notes about Kant’s understanding of moral feeling during the 1760s is expressed in his 
published writings as well, and which I have analysed above; the Herder notes merely 
confirm this. Discussing the Herder notes is nonetheless essential in order to give a 
complete picture of Kant’s pre-Critical discussion of moral feeling. 
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2.2.7 The Herder Lecture Notes 
Near the beginning of the Herder lectures notes we find statements that moral 
feeling is “unanalysable” and for this reason the judgements it provides regarding what is 
good and evil are “basic” (H 27:5).52 These claims echo what Kant said in the Prize 
Essay, namely that the doctrine of the moral sense can provide us with the 
indemonstrable, unanalysable, and basic judgements concerning what is good and evil, 
from which specific duties and obligations can be inferred. Again, therefore, we see the 
idea of the moral sense as the origin of our judgements of good and evil in the notes. 
 In addition to the above function of moral feeling as a faculty for representing 
what is indemonstrably good, we find claims here that moral feeling is “universal.” Not 
everyone has this feeling to the same degree, but everyone nonetheless has this feeling, 
even if to very varying degrees (H 27:3).53 Moral feeling is also represented here as 
“unequivocal” or “unanimous” [einstimmig] (H 27:5). Although he doesn’t elaborate on 
the meaning of this second quality, Hutcheson’s moral sense had a similar quality. 
Hutcheson believed the moral sense had the property of “universality” (Hutcheson 2004, 
136 ff.), i.e. in every human being the moral sense finds the same things worthy of 
approbation and disapprobation, namely benevolent actions and malevolent actions 
respectively. Presumably Kant has something similar in mind with the idea of moral 
feeling as “unanimous.” 
In these lecture notes we also find claims that moral feeling is what allows us to 
become aware of moral goodness as something distinct from physical goodness (H 
27:5).54 This distinction is made because “[f]ree actions may be immediately good (give 
pleasure), not as means to consequences, so that their value is not to be measured by the 
results, and they are not equivalent to the physical causes that produce the same effect” 
(H 27:4). Free actions are therefore physically good in virtue of their consequences, and 
                                                
52 See Hutcheson (2004, 86). 
53 See (I4 200). 
54 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hutcheson distinguishes between moral and natural good 
as well (see I4 111ff.). 
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they are morally good in virtue of their intention (H 27:5).55 Free actions, as issuing from 
the intentions of the agent are for this reason immediately good, rather than mediately, 
e.g. good as a means to another end. Most important is that “[t]he feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure concerns either that with respect to which we are passive or else ourselves as 
an active principium of good and evil through freedom. The latter is moral feeling” (AA 
20:146). In other words, moral feeling is that through which we experience pleasure or 
displeasure in actions that are caused by free agents. Moral feeling is therefore what 
allows us to be aware of actions that are morally good or evil, as a particular kind of 
action caused by an agent’s active benevolent or malevolent intentions respectively. On 
the other hand it is our “physical feeling” which allows us to become aware of actions 
that are “physically good” (H 27:5), i.e. actions that have good consequences.56  
The above features of “moral feeling” hold true for what is called in the Herder 
notes our “natural” moral feeling as opposed to our “artificial” moral feeling. Our 
artificial moral feeling is custom or mores. The examples Kant provides are: “Spartan 
children went naked up to 14 years old; Indian women never cover up the breasts, in 
Jamaica they go stark naked … marriage with a sister is artificially abhorred; but sacred 
with the Egyptians” (H 27:6). Our natural moral feeling is our judgement of what is good 
and evil independently of custom and education, i.e. as natural, unsocialized human 
beings. In order to determine what our natural moral feeling is, Kant claims we would 
have to investigate the natural human being outside of society and socialization, and Kant 
claims Rousseau has looked into this (H 27:6). Indeed, the distinction between natural 
and artificial moral feeling is an important one in these notes, for it is claimed that “[m]y 
reason can err; my moral feeling, only when I uphold custom before natural feeling; but 
in that case it is merely implicit reason; and my final yardstick still remains [natural] 
moral feeling, not true and false; just as the capacity for true and false is the final 
                                                
55 Actions are morally good by virtue of their intention for Hutcheson as well (see I4 112). 
56 It should be noted that Kant anticipates his mature moral philosophy here when he claims that 
what matters is our intention, not necessarily having the ability or power to realize those 
intentions, i.e. it is better to have a good will and never accomplish anything than it is to have a 
mediocre or small will and the ability to accomplish a lot (cf. H 27:4 and GMS 4:394). 
Interestingly, this is also a view shared by Hutcheson (see 2004, 117). 
62 
 
yardstick of the understanding, and both are universal” (H 27:6). That natural and 
artificial moral feeling are always mixed and we may not be able to distinguish a moral 
judgement as coming from one or the other without “investigating the natural human 
being” could be problematic, but these issues are not discussed any further. Moral feeling 
is nonetheless presented as a reliable guide in moral matters and it is even claimed here 
that “[t]he sole moral rule, therefore, is this: Act according to your moral feeling!” (H 
27:16) 
If we take these lectures notes seriously, there is much in them that parallels 
Hutcheson’s discussion of the moral sense in particular. At the very least, we find 
mention of the moral sense as a capacity to distinguish moral good and evil, but we also 
see it referred to as playing a role in motivation as well, albeit only very briefly. For 
instance, arguments are presented for the existence of a benevolent motive in human 
beings in addition to self-interested ones, with Hobbes and Epicurus being named as 
opponents (see H 27:3-4). In addition to this, later in the notes moral feeling is identified 
with “the love of humanity” (H 27:74). Although the textual evidence is minimal here, 
there is therefore at least the small suggestion that moral feeling is present in these notes 
as playing a role in both judgement and motivation as well. 
In this section I surveyed Kant’s various discussions of moral feeling during the 
1760s, in both his published works and a set of student lecture notes. As I have shown, 
there are two senses of moral feeling operative during this time: 1. Moral feeling as the 
source of our judgement of moral good and evil, and 2. Moral feeling as a force, drive, or 
principle of action in human beings inclining them towards virtuous action. I have 
suggested that Kant at least shows interest in moral feeling in the first sense, paired with 
some reservation, but I have also illustrated that Kant seems to adopt the conception of 
moral feeling in the second sense and that this seems to be a part of his moral psychology 
at this point in his development. In the following section I show that Kant explicitly 
criticizes moral feeling in the first sense after 1769. What I argue later (2.4), however, is 
that the second sense of moral feeling is something that Kant did not abandon, and 
certainly not at the same time that he abandoned the idea of the moral sense as the source 
for moral judgements. Before making this claim and turning to Kant’s lecture notes and 
reflections from the 1770s, however, I first discuss the important shift or turn that took 
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place in Kant’s thinking around 1769 and that is reflected in his reflections and the 
Inaugural Dissertation. 
2.3 The “Great Light” of 1769 
In a reflection dated between 1776 and 1778, discussing what appears to be his 
“discovery” of the antinomies, Kant states: “I saw this doctrine at the beginning in a 
twilight, as it were. I attempted quite seriously to prove propositions and their contraries, 
not because I wanted to institute scepticism, but because I suspected an illusion of the 
understanding, and I wished to discover its source. The year 69 gave me great light” (AA 
18:69, translation from Kuehn 1995, 373). Not only did the year 1769 mark an advance 
of Kant’s thinking on the antinomies, but it was a shift in his thinking as a whole. 
According to Kuehn, 1769/70 marks the important point where Kant began to reject what 
he calls the “continuity thesis,” i.e. the thesis that holds “the sensitive and the intellectual 
form a kind of continuum” (1995, 376). More specifically, the continuity thesis states that 
“the only difference between intellectual and sensitive cognitions is their degree of 
distinctness” (1995, 376).57 In contrast to this view, in the Inaugural Dissertation Kant 
argues that sensation and intellect are two entirely different faculties, that they are 
independent and irreducible, i.e. that sensation and intellect are different sources of 
cognition, and that they are therefore different in kind, not degree. This has the 
consequence that sensitive cognitions can be distinct, and intellectual ones confused, 
rather than it being the case that intellectual cognitions are always distinct, and sensitive 
ones always confused. What is important for my purposes, of course, is how this change 
in Kant’s thinking might have altered the way in which he thinks of moral concepts at the 
time of the Inaugural Dissertation.  
As stated, at the time of the Inaugural Dissertation Kant believes that cognitions 
are different in kind based on their origin, i.e. whether they come from the senses or 
whether their origin is in the intellect. In this text Kant states explicitly that moral 
                                                
57 In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant identifies the “Leibniz-Wolffian school” 
as maintaining what Kuehn calls the continuity thesis, but claims “Leibniz was actually to blame” 
(Anth 7:140-1n). 
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concepts “are cognised not by experiencing them but by the pure understanding itself” 
and furthermore that they can “belong to the understanding, even though they are 
confused” (ID 2:395). Indeed, just as metaphysics can be confused despite it being “the 
organon of everything which belongs to the understanding” (ID 2:395), just because a 
discipline is currently confused does not mean it is a system of sensitive concepts. 
Therefore even if the concepts of moral philosophy are currently confused, as Kant 
thought at the time of the Prize Essay, this does not mean these concepts originate from 
sensibility. The question we need to ask here is: what exactly does Kant mean by the 
claim that moral concepts are cognised by the understanding and why does he decide to 
hold this view? Answering these questions is easier once we look at Kant’s discussion of 
moral feeling in some reflections dating from around the time of the Dissertation. 
The only references to moral feeling that we have around the time of this turn in 
Kant’s thinking are from his reflections, and in them we find Kant critical of moral 
feeling and of Hutcheson. In a reflection dated from the late 1760s, for example, we find 
Kant saying that “[t]he principle of Hutcheson is unphilosophical because it introduces a 
new feeling as a basis for explanation. Secondly, it views the laws of sensibility as 
objective reasons” (AA 19:120, R 6634). Among other things,58 we therefore see Kant 
objecting to the objectivity of the moral sense at this time. As he states in a further 
reflection from around the same time: “The doctrine of moral feeling is more a 
hypothesis to explain the phenomenon of approval that we give to some kinds of actions 
than one that could determine maxims and first principles which hold objectively, how 
one should approve or disapprove, commit or omit something” (AA 20:116-7, R 6626). 
On the one hand this criticism is easy enough to understand: a moral sense or moral 
feeling as a source of moral knowledge is, as belonging to sensibility, incapable of 
issuing objective maxims and principles. On the other hand, however, it might seem 
strange that Kant calls the objectivity of sense into question here, for it is precisely at the 
time of the Dissertation that Kant explicitly develops his theory of the forms of 
sensibility, forms which hold objectively for all beings endowed with sensibility and 
                                                
58 Kant will object to moral sense theory on the grounds that it is “unphilosophical” again during 
his Critical period. I discus this in more detail in chapter 3. 
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therefore hold objectively at least in this sense. As we saw in the last chapter as well as 
briefly above, there is a sense in which the moral sense is objective in precisely this way, 
especially for Hutcheson. According to Hutcheson, the moral sense is “universal” (see I4 
200) in the sense that everyone with a moral sense finds the same things worthy of 
approbation and disapprobation, namely benevolent and malevolent actions respectively, 
and Hutcheson supposes that there is no reason to suppose that human beings are so 
different from person to person such that one person would be able to perceive the 
benevolence in an action, feel pleasure, and judge it to be good yet another would not 
(see I4 4 and Hutcheson 2004, 70ff.). If Kant read Hutcheson closely, Kant surely would 
have been aware of this “objective” status of the “form” of the moral sense, to put it into 
the language of the Dissertation. Why, then, we might ask, does Kant claim that the 
moral sense or moral feeling is incapable of providing moral judgements, but sensibility 
in general is nonetheless objective? 
This is a difficult question to answer and Kant does not discuss this issue directly. 
As I discuss in detail in the next chapter, what must be noticed in order to answer this 
question is that although for Hutcheson and others the moral sense was a proper “sense 
[Sinn],” Kant understood das moralische Gefühl as a feeling. The important difference is 
that sensibility, as discussed in the Dissertation, is a source of knowledge or cognition, 
and feeling is not. Kant’s division of the faculties into the faculty of cognition, the faculty 
of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire reflect this – feeling 
and pleasure is something different in kind from cognition. The important role that 
pleasure has to play in the judgements issued by the moral sense is likely one of the main 
if not the major reason why Kant classifies moral feeling as a “feeling” to begin with 
(another reason could have its roots in the translation of moral sense as moralisches 
Gefühl). Therefore perhaps Kant’s doubts concerning the objectivity of moral feeling and 
his trust in a kind of objectivity belonging to sensibility can be explained by Kant’s 
understanding of the division between the nature of the faculties in general. As Falduto 
explains (see 2014, 120ff.), there is both a sensible and intellectual element to each of 
Kant’s three faculties, but sensibility, as discussed in the Dissertation, is in relation to 
knowledge and the faculty of cognition, and only as such does sensibility have both a 
form and a matter, the form of sensibility being what lends it a kind of objectivity. Kant 
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does not speak of feeling as having a form and although it seems that his understanding 
of feeling as a faculty was not yet fully developed at this point in time,59 he did have 
much to say about the faculty of cognition, and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is 
not a part of it. Not only was Kant becoming clear about the fundamental distinction 
between sensible and intellectual cognition, but perhaps he was becoming more clear 
about the distinction between the faculties as well, and this may explain why sensibility 
can maintain a kind of objectivity but moral feeling cannot, especially as a source of 
moral knowledge or judgement. 
It appears, therefore, that Kant’s initial interest in the idea of the moral sense as 
the origin of moral judgement has faded by the late 1760s. Kant appears to reject the idea 
of a moral sense as a capacity capable of issuing objective judgements of approval and 
disapproval that could function as principles or maxims. Not only this, but we also see 
here the direction in which Kant’s thinking is going. He says, for instance, that “[v]irtue 
can only be judged in accordance with concepts and therefore a priori. Empirical 
judgement in accordance with intuition in images or experience gives no laws, but only 
examples which demand a concept a priori for judging. … All morality is based on ideas” 
(AA 19:108, R 6611). As was clear from his criticism of moral feeling, Kant is seeking a 
source for moral judgement that holds objectively, and we can see here that Kant 
therefore thinks that moral judgements must be a priori and not empirical. Indeed, this is 
the position we find Kant upholding in the Dissertation. 
Kant’s view in the Dissertation is that: “Moral philosophy … in so far as it 
furnishes the first principles of adjudication [principia diiudicandi], is only cognised by 
the pure understanding and itself belongs to pure philosophy” (ID 2:396, translation 
modified). Shortly after making this claim he distances himself from those he earlier 
admired, claiming that “Epicurus, who reduced its [moral philosophy’s] criteria to the 
sense of pleasure or pain, is very rightly blamed, together with certain moderns, who 
                                                
59 That Kant was still thinking through his understanding of the faculties at this point in time is 
clear from the fact that the earliest notes we have from Kant’s anthropology lectures (the notes by 
Collins from the winter semester 1772/3, see AA 25:1-238) do not contain sections devoted 
exclusively to the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure as is done in later versions of 
the his anthropology courses.   
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have followed him to a certain extent from afar, such as Shaftesbury and his supporters” 
(ID 2:396). In other words, as we saw above in Kant’s reflections, the significant turn that 
takes place in Kant’s thinking at this point is that he believes the attempts of Shaftesbury 
and his followers (i.e. Hutcheson) to furnish the first principle of judgement or 
adjudication empirically, i.e. from a moral sense, are misguided. Kant seems to have 
made up his mind about this issue at this point in his development and is no longer 
expressing the (reserved) interest in the idea of the moral sense as the foundation of 
moral judgement that is evident in his thinking during the majority of the 1760s. Indeed, 
Kant’s above-cited reflections explain why he changed his mind in this way and why he 
thinks the attempts of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are misguided: “sense” or “feeling” is 
incapable of making objective, i.e. universal and necessary, judgements of moral good 
and evil and is therefore an inadequate source for properly moral, i.e. unconditional 
obligation. For this reason Kant now thinks moral concepts must be a priori, i.e. that 
“[a]ll morality is based on ideas” (AA 19:108).60  
The Dissertation is of course the beginning of what has been called Kant’s “silent 
decade” where he published virtually nothing. In order to gain a more complete picture of 
how Kant conceives of moral feeling after this shift in his thinking, we therefore need to 
turn to Kant’s unpublished lectures notes and reflections from the 1770s. Luckily, there 
are a large number of lecture notes on moral philosophy that have been preserved. There 
are, in fact, 13 distinct sets of notes known to have existed at one time, all dating from the 
1770s (see Stark 1999, 97-99). Research has shown, however, that all of these sets 
originate from one original set, and that the relatively recently published Kaehler notes is 
the most true to the original set of notes (see footnote 64 below for a fuller discussion of 
the details concerning the Kaehler notes). In addition to the reflections on moral 
philosophy dating from the 1770s, this set of notes is therefore the best way of 
determining Kant’s thinking on moral philosophy during this decade. In the following, I 
                                                
60 Indeed, Kant’s new emphasis on the a priori and on the importance of intellectual ideas stressed 
throughout the Dissertation has been explained by some as having been inspired by a reading of 
Plato’s Phaedo, a translation and commentary of which was published by Mendelssohn in 1767, 
as discussed in detail by Klaus Reich (see 1935 and 1939). For this reason, the shift in Kant’s 
thinking expressed in the Dissertation has also been called Kant’s “Platonic turn.” 
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analyse what Kant says about moral feeling in this set of lecture notes as well as his in his 
reflections dating from this period. After explaining Kant’s distinction between principles 
of adjudication and principle of execution, I argue that although Kant rejects the moral 
sense or moral feeling as a principle of adjudication, as is clear from both his reflections 
around 1769 and the Dissertation, he preserves a function for moral feeling as performing 
the role of the principle of execution. What exactly this means I hope to clarify in the 
following section, but it will show that although the influence of moral sense theory 
changes after Kant’s “great light,” it does not disappear entirely, as most commentators 
have claimed in the past. 
2.4 Moral Feeling in the 1770s 
2.4.1 Adjudication and Execution 
 Clemens Schwaiger claims that in “close connection” to Kant’s turn towards a 
pure moral philosophy there stands “the distinction between an adjudication and an 
execution principle of moral good” (1999, 91-2). This distinction first appears in the 
lecture notes on moral philosophy from the 1770s and as Stark notes it is extremely 
important for understanding “the course of argumentation of the lecture” (2004 55, note 
35). In Kant’s terms this is the distinction between “the principle of the adjudication of 
obligation [das principium der Diiudication der Verbindlichkeit]” and “the principle of 
the execution or performance of obligation [das principium der Execution oder Leistung 
der Verbindlichkeit]” (Kae 55-6).61 This amounts to the distinction between “guiding 
principle [Richtschnur]” of action and the “incentive [Triebfeder]”62 or spring of action. 
Kant explains this distinction by saying the following: 
If the question is what is morally good or not, then that is the principle of 
adjudication, according to which I assess the goodness and badness of action. But 
if the question is, what moves me to live according to these laws, then that is the 
principle of incentive [Triebfeder]. The approval of action is the objective ground, 
                                                
61 All translations from the Kaehler notes are my own. 
62 I discuss the difficulties with the translation of this term as well as the concept in more detail in 
the next chapter 
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but not yet the subjective ground. That which drives me to do that, concerning 
which the understanding says I should do it, they are the subjectively moving 
motives [motiva subjective moventia]. (Kae 56)  
Schwaiger claims that this distinction is a “new-coinage [Neuprägung]” of Kant’s 
(1999, 92) and indeed Schwaiger is right to note that Kant himself seems conscious of 
this, for he offers this distinction as a way of differentiating modern groundings of ethics 
from those of the ancients (Schwaiger 1999, 92). As Schwaiger also notes, Kant mentions 
a “principia diiudicandi” only once in his printed writings (i.e. in the Inaugural 
Dissertation at ID 2:396) but never mentions a principium executionis in his published 
writings (1999, 93). It is also important to note that this distinction “is missing entirely 
from the writings important for moral philosophy from the 60s as well as from the 
Remarks. In this respect it is an anachronism to bring up the later distinction already 
when discussing these earlier texts” (1999, 93).63 Schwaiger therefore claims that 
because Kant first makes use of this distinction in the 1770s, it must be “the result of 
considerations that maybe have been employed for the first time on the basis of the 
Platonic turn” (1999, 93). 
It is important to note that, as Schwaiger and others have pointed out (see 1999, 
94), this distinction likely goes back to Hutcheson’s distinction between justifying and 
exciting reasons discussed in the previous chapter. Stark notes, however, that Adam 
Smith might be another possible historical source (see Kae 55-6 note 35). It is possible 
Kant had read Smith by this point in time as well,64 but there are many similarities 
between Hutcheson’s and Kant’s versions of this distinction.65 Schwaiger argues, 
however, that there is reason to believe that Hutcheson is not the correct historical source 
for this distinction, namely because “the Kantian terminology is first conceived in the 
                                                
63 It is for this reason that, although the distinction is important for my overall argument in this 
chapter, I did not employ this distinction when discussing Kant’s texts from the 1760s. 
64 The first German translation of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments was published in 1770, 
and in chapter four I discuss the reasons we have for believing Kant read Smith soon after the 
publication of this translation. 
65 As mentioned in the last chapter, however, Hutcheson himself drew inspiration from Grotius 
when making this distinction. See Hutcheson (2002, 138n). 
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seventies, and therefore at a time when Kant’s greatest enthusiasm for British moral sense 
theory was long passé” (1999, 94). As I hope to argue, however, Kant’s interest in, or at 
least inspiration from Hutcheson especially, was not over after 1770, and therefore 
Hutcheson may indeed still be a likely historical source for the distinction. This question 
aside for the time being, now that I have introduced this distinction, I wish to take a 
closer look at the Kaehler lecture notes and the reflections from the 1770s in order to 
determine what Kant thought of moral feeling during this time. As we shall see, in these 
lecture notes Kant discusses the psychology of motivation for the first time, and even 
discusses what moral education consists in. These lecture notes therefore contain perhaps 
Kant’s first attempt at outlining a complete moral theory. 
2.4.2 The Kaehler Notes66 
Perhaps the first important change that is evident from this set of notes is evident 
in the following claim: “But since we must all have a principle of moral adjudication, 
according to which we can unanimously judge concerning what is morally good or not 
good, so do we see that there must be one principle that flows from the ground of our 
                                                
66 The manuscript with the title “KANT/PHILOSOPHIAE/PRACTICA/VNA CUM ETHICA” 
and containing the name “Joanne Friderico/ Kaehler” (see Stark 2004, 371ff.) was acquired by the 
Marburg Kant Archive in 1997 from a private collection of an individual living in Münster (see 
ibid., 372). Kaehler matriculated at the Albertina University in Königsberg on April 10th, 1772, 
and there is a record indicating Kaehler attended Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, moral 
philosophy, and anthropology in the winder semester of 1777/8 (Stark 1999, 75). Given there is 
an inscription of “Summer 1777” on the manuscript itself (Stark 2004, 372), Stark claims it is 
likely Kaehler either made a copy of or acquired a previously existing set of notes (Stark 1999, 
75). This means that the lectures, on which the notes themselves are based, date from the winter 
semester of 1776/7 at the very latest (ibid.), i.e. the last time Kant lectured on moral philosophy 
before the Summer of 1777 (see Arnoldt 1909, 335). As Stark notes (2004, 378) these notes are 
the 13th set of notes that are based on Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy from the 1770s (see 
Stark 1999, 97-99). The Kaehler notes are particularly important because they seem to be the 
most reliable set of notes (see Naragon 2015). Stark illustrates this by comparing the Kaehler 
notes to Menzer’s 1924 attempt to reconstruct a reliable set of notes from the group of 12 (now 
13) notes stemming from the 1770s, as well as the various printings of the notes in the Akademie 
edition (see Stark 1999, 89-97). As Stark shows, the Kaehler notes often provide meaningful 
alternatives to statements from these two other editions that do not seem to make much sense and 
they even confirm one variation over another when there are conflicting versions of statements in 
more than one edition. Additionally, the Kaehler notes often supply further and more detailed 
descriptions than any other set. For these reasons, the Kaehler notes are clearly the most reliable 
set to use when trying to gain a picture of Kant’s thought during the 1770s. 
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will” (Kae 21). In contrast to the view of the Prize Essay, for example, according to 
which there are both formal and material principles of morality that are needed in order to 
determine our obligations, in the 1770s Kant believes there is only one, single principle 
of morality. This principle takes a particular form at this point in time and Kant contrasts 
what he believes the principle must consist in with various other attempts at defining such 
a principle. It is over the course of providing this contrast that Kant cites some problems 
he sees with the doctrine of the moral sense or moral feeling. 
As Stark claims (Kae 22, note 19), Kant’s classification of other moral theories in 
the Kaehler notes is almost exactly the same as the table he provides in the second 
Critique (see KpV 5:40). Kant begins the classification of moral theories into those based 
on empirical grounds or principles, and those based on intellectual grounds or principles 
(Kae 21-2). Moral theories based on empirical grounds are, Kant states, “those that are 
derived from the senses, in so far as our senses are thereby gratified. Intellectual grounds 
are those, where all morality is derived from the agreement of our actions with the laws 
of reason” (Kae 22). With respect to empirical moral theories, they are based on inner or 
outer grounds, or have to do with the “objects of the inner and outer senses” (Kae 22). 
Those theories deriving moral principles from inner sense grant there to be a particular 
sense, namely physical or a moral feeling. According to Kant, “[p]hysical feeling consists 
in self-love, which is two-fold, of conceit [Eitelkeit] and of self-interest [Eigennutz]; it 
[self-love] aims at one’s own advantage and is a selfish principle, whereby our senses are 
satisfied” (Kae 22). Kant identifies Epicurus, Helvetius, and Mandeville as 
representatives of this kind of theory. The other kind of empirical moral theory that bases 
its principles on inner sense accepts a moral feeling rather than a physical feeling. 
According to such a theory, the principle of morality is based on a ground placed in 
moral feeling, by means of which “one can distinguish between what is good and evil” 
(Kae 23). Here Kant identifies Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as the “chief authors” (Kae 
23). 
Empirical systems can also be based on external grounds, and this can either be 
education or government, with Montaigne identified as a representative of the former, 
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and Hobbes the latter (Kae 24-5).67 According to intellectual moral theories, on the other 
hand, “the philosopher judges that the principle of morality has a ground in the 
understanding and can be realized completely a priori” (Kae 26). Intellectual theories are 
again of two kinds. First there are those that base the principle of morality “on the inner 
constitution of actions, in so far as we view them through the understanding” (Kae 27). 
Second, it can be an external principle “in so far as our actions have a relation to another 
foreign being” (Kae 27). The latter is a divine command theory, according to which right 
and wrong are determined by God’s will. As one might guess given the discussion of 
Kant’s view at the time of the Dissertation, in these lecture notes Kant favours the first 
kind of intellectual theory.  
Over the course of providing this classification, Kant criticizes all the approaches 
he feels are unsatisfactory. Whereas Kant merely asserts rather than argues, at this point, 
why the theological principle is “erroneous” (see Kae 27), he explain why a moral 
principle based on physical feeling is incorrect. He claims that such a principle is based 
on a “contingent [zufälligen] ground” (Kae 25). This principle is based on contingent, 
rather than necessary, grounds in the sense that it is contingent which quality of an action 
brings me an advantage. In other words, what is advantageous is different from person to 
person, or even for the same person at different times. Kant argues similarly with respect 
to a principle of morality based on moral feeling: 
If the principle is based on a moral feeling, where one assesses actions according 
to the pleasure or displeasure, according to aversion or in general according to the 
feeling of taste, then it is also based on a contingent ground. For if someone is 
comforted by something, so can others have aversion for it. (Kae 25) 
Indeed Kant makes the same claim with respect to the rest of the empirical moral 
theories; they are all based on contingent grounds (Kae 26). Interestingly enough, Kant 
even provides the example of the obligation not to lie to make his point (see Kae 26). 
                                                
67 Although Stark is right to claim that Kant’s classification is “almost exactly” (Kae 22, note 19) 
like the one found in the second Critique, there are important differences. In Kaehler, Mandeville 
is (in one sense rightly) grouped with Epicurus as a representative of the “self-love” theory of 
morality. In the second Critique, however, Mandeville takes the position Hobbes occupies here, 
i.e. as a representative of a subjective, externally grounded moral theory, and is therefore not 
grouped with Epicurus in the later classification.  
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According to the doctrine of physical feeling, one should only not lie if it brings injury, 
but it would be allowed if it brings advantage (see Kae 26). According to the doctrine of 
moral feeling, “the person who does not have such a fine moral feeling, which brings 
about for him an aversion towards lying, would be allowed to lie” (Kae 26). When it 
comes to moral judgement or the principle of adjudication, therefore, Kant believes moral 
sense theories are inadequate because the moral sense can only provide contingent, i.e. 
neither necessary nor objective, reasons for judging an action to be good or evil. As one 
can see, this is in line with the criticism of moral sense theory Kant expressed in his 
reflection around the time of the Dissertation as well. I show in the next chapter that Kant 
finds moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement problematic for the same 
reason during the Critical period as well. 
 As already discussed, even by the time of the Prize Essay Kant understood moral 
obligation to consist in absolute, unconditional necessity. By the time of the 1770s at the 
very latest, Kant had come to realize there is no way to get such an absolute necessity out 
of the doctrine of moral feeling, whether paired with the Wolffian principle of perfection 
or otherwise. If we possess a moral feeling, i.e. a capacity that makes it possible for us to 
distinguish between moral good and evil based on a particular feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure, we can only make such judgements and thereby be obligated to do those 
things, first, if we have a moral feeling, but second and more importantly only if our 
moral feeling enables us to feel the proper pleasure or pain for that particular action. 
Although it is not clear whether Kant thinks it possible for human beings to lack a moral 
feeling at this point, even if everyone were to have one, this would still make moral 
obligations conditional on the possession of such a feeling, and therefore not strictly 
necessary, and this is something Kant wants to avoid.  
 Although Kant believed the principle of morality must be intellectual in character 
by 1770, Kant does not formulate a principle of morality similar in presentation to the 
categorical imperative in the lecture notes. He does, however, specify that the principle 
must be intellectual, and one that is internal and not external, i.e. not based on the will of 
another being such as God (see Kae 27). Indeed, he spends more time saying what the 
principle is not rather than what it is: he claims it is not a pathological principle (Kae 58), 
it is not a rule of skill (Kae 59), and it is not tautological like Wolff’s and Cumberland’s 
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(see Kae 60). Kant does say that the intellectual, internal moral principle is one that 
commands an action ought to be done because the action is good in itself (Kae 64), and 
the inner goodness of the action must be cognized via the understanding (Kae 27), or by 
pure reason (see Kae 64).68 This is what makes it possible for us to perform actions 
because they are good, i.e. the moral disposition is one where we perform actions simply 
because the inner constitution of actions is such that they are good in themselves. Kant 
suggests the principle must be a universally valid law of the free will (see Kae 65), and 
the closest he gets to stating an explicit principle is when he says the following: 
“Morality is the agreement of action with a universally valid law of the free will 
[Willkür]. All morality is the relation of action to the universal rule” (Kae 64-5). 
 It is not my intent to discuss the nature of Kant’s principle of morality during the 
1770s and how it might be different from his mature moral theory – this is a task which 
would take me too far away from my aim in this chapter. What is most interesting for my 
purposes is that Kant claims that “[t]he highest principle of all moral judgement lies in 
the understanding, and the highest principle of all moral drive to do this action lies in the 
heart; this incentive is moral feeling” (Kae 57). Kant stresses that everything in morality 
would be false if one confused the principle of execution for the principle of adjudication 
(Kae 56), and he even repeats that one cannot confuse these two principles immediately 
after mentioning that the principle of execution is moral feeling (Kae 57). This is no 
accident. Kant just finished arguing that moral feeling cannot function as an adjudicator 
of moral good and evil, for its judgements would be contingent. His stress on the fact that 
the principles of execution and adjudication cannot be exchanged, therefore, is him 
explaining that his claim that moral feeling is the principle of execution should not be 
thought of as the principle of adjudication as well. Kant is therefore trying to preserve 
moral feeling as performing the function of the principle of execution, but not the 
principle of adjudication, and wants to make it absolutely clear that he is assigning only 
the one function to moral feeling and not the other. This is all well and good, but if Kant 
rejects moral feeling as adjudicator, what significance does him assigning a role to moral 
                                                
68 As is clear here, Kant does not appear to have made a distinction between understanding and 
reason at this point in his development. See Klemme (2006, 124). 
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feeling have here, if any, and what does it say about the influence of the moral sense 
theorists on Kant during the 1770s? Before answering these questions it will be important 
to outline the precise function of moral feeling as an incentive in the 1770s.  
 Kant’s distinction between adjudication and execution corresponds to objective 
and subjective grounds. This distinction amounts to reasons for action supplied by the 
understanding, and pathological reasons for acting, i.e. those grounds for action derived 
from the inclinations or from feeling (see Kae 57). As Kant states: “The approbation of 
action is the objective ground, but not yet the subjective ground” (Kae 56). What this 
means, as Kant states numerous times in these lectures (see Kae 57, 68, 71), is that 
knowing or judging what is morally good is only half the battle and is still a far cry from 
actually performing the action. Indeed, Kant calls it a “practical error” (Kae 57) if the 
judgement is there but the incentive is not. The decisive question, then, is the following: 
how do we get from judging an action to be morally good to actually performing that 
action?  
In response to this question Kant very interestingly claims the following in the 
Kaehler notes: 
nobody can or will see that the understanding is supposed to have a moving power 
to judge. The understanding can surely judge, but to give this judgement of the 
understanding force, and that it becomes an incentive to move the will to perform 
the action, this is the philosopher’s stone. (Kae 68-9) 
Kant’s view, then, is that nobody will understand exactly how making a judgement leads 
to action. At the same time, he does name that which makes us capable of acting in 
accordance with such a judgement. “Moral feeling” Kant claims, “is a capacity to be 
affected by a moral judgement” (Kae 68). “If I judge via the understanding that the action 
is morally good, much is still missing, that I were to do this action, concerning which I 
have judged. But if this judgement does move me to do the action, then that is moral 
feeling” (Kae 68). Although we will never be able to explain the mechanics of how this is 
possible, Kant therefore appears to believe that we can give the name of “moral feeling” 
to the capacity that allows us to be affected by a judgement in a way that causes us to act 
in accordance with it. This is therefore the other half of what is required if we are to act in 
accordance with the understanding’s/reason’s adjudication.  
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 One might say that calling the capacity to be subjectively affected by a judgement 
“moral feeling” does not explain much, and that it simply gives a name to that which we 
cannot explain. A few pages later, however, Kant says that “[t]hat sensibility, which 
agrees with the moving power of the understanding, would be moral feeling” (Kae 71, 
my emphasis). Although we do not base our judgements of what is morally good and evil 
based on how we feel, i.e. based on the particular pleasure or displeasure we may 
experience when perceiving ourselves and others, it still seems that Kant is ready to 
admit in the 1770s that we still do have these feelings and that they play a part in the 
motivational process. Indeed, what does Kant mean by these feelings “agreeing” with 
moral judgement? 
 Kant claims the understanding can oppose itself to an action if it finds the action 
to be against the moral rule (Kae 71). This opposition of the understanding can provide a 
Bewegungsgrund, i.e. a moving ground or reason for acting or refraining from acting. 
However, this is simply the objective ground, i.e. an objective, universally valid reason 
for acting or refraining from acting in a certain way and is not yet a subjective ground. As 
Kant states: “everyone can see that the action is abhorrent, but whoever feels this 
abhorrence has moral feeling. The understanding does not abhor, rather recognizes 
abhorrence and opposes itself to it, but sensibility only has to abhor, now if sensibility 
abhors that which the understanding recognizes to be abhorrent, this is moral feeling” 
(Kae 71, my emphasis). Moral feeling, therefore, is to feel a particular way about actions, 
namely in a way that is consistent or agrees with how the understanding judges these 
actions. Although Kant does not say so explicitly, it seems to be the case that it is only by 
virtue of also having the feelings that are consistent or agree with the understanding’s 
judgement that we can be moved by those judgements. The question then arises: how 
exactly does one gain these feelings?  
 In these notes Kant claims that we cannot come to feel pleasure or displeasure 
towards actions simply by understanding them to be morally good and evil. As he claims: 
“To bring human beings to feel the abhorrence of vice is completely impossible” (Kae 
71). We can explain moral good and evil to one another and share the reasons why an 
action is abhorrent and thereby bring each other to see or recognize the abhorrence in an 
action, but to cause another to feel abhorrence for a particular action simply by explaining 
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or bringing them to understand the abhorrence in an action is impossible. What we can do 
is train ourselves to feel certain ways about particular actions: “Indeed we can only 
produce a habit that is not natural but stands in for nature, which becomes a habit through 
imitation and frequent practice” (Kae 72). In particular, Kant claims that from a young 
age onwards it should be instilled in us to feel, for example, an “immediate abhorrence” 
(Kae 72) for certain actions that are bad in themselves. This is achieved through 
education and religion (Kae 73) and the way to do this is not to punish and reward for 
certain actions, but to make one feel shame for having done vicious actions, for example 
(see Kae 72 and AA 25:727). This is done so that we come to feel a certain way about the 
inner constitution of the action. If we are punished, we only see an action as bad because 
of its consequences. But if we are shamed for performing an action that is bad in itself, 
Kant claims we are taught that the action is in itself vicious and this is what we need to 
feel. Indeed, as Kant states, we must first try to “make moral feeling lively” (Kae 86) 
before we use punishments and rewards. Punishments and rewards should therefore be 
use only as a last resort to make us averse to evil action. 
 Although Kant seems to think that our moral feeling does not make us capable of 
feeling pleasure and displeasure about certain actions in a way consistent with the 
understanding from birth onwards, he does seem to think of moral feeling as a capacity 
possessed by all human beings. More than once in the Kaehler notes (see Kae 286 and 
357) Kant claims that even villains have moral feeling, that they are able to distinguish 
good from evil, and that they even have good will and therefore wish to be virtuous (Kae 
286).69 It is unclear what exactly Kant means here, but one potential way to make sense 
of Kant’s claims is to say that perhaps a villain has at least a small desire to be good, and 
knows what is good and evil, and presumably also knows what he or she does is evil. 
Although they might also possess the capacity for moral feeling, perhaps what they are 
lacking is the proper education of their feelings, such that the cause of their doing evil is 
that their feeling is not in agreement with their understanding. Indeed, because Kant 
claims “there is no villain who cannot distinguish good from evil” (Kae 286), the fact that 
                                                
69 This is of course reminiscent of Kant’s discussion of “the most hardened scoundrel” (GMS 
4:454) who knows examples of virtue and on some level also wishes to be virtuous himself. 
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he or she still commits evil might be explained by the fact that they don’t feel pleasure or 
abhorrence for those actions their understanding judges to be good or abhorrent, and this 
is the real cause of their vice.  
If this is the case, then educating moral feeling is decisive when it comes to 
becoming a virtuous person. Kant does state that, if there is an order in moral education, 
the beginning of becoming moral is to have the right understanding of moral good and 
evil, i.e. to have “a pure concept of morality” (Kae 357). Once one has this, “then one can 
first make moral feeling lively and make a start at becoming moral” (Kae 357). He claims 
that this start or beginning is a “wide field” (Kae 357) and furthermore that it must be 
negative. Making moral feeling lively is negative in the sense that becoming virtuous is 
about becoming “innocent” and “merely refraining from everything that happens through 
all sorts of activities that deter one from such an inclination” (Kae 357). In other words, 
at first moral education is about refraining from actions that prevent one from acting 
morally, i.e. acting according to moral feeling, rather than about positively performing 
good actions. If we constantly refrain from performing the actions that prevent us from 
acting morally, we thereby negatively clear the way for moral feeling to influence our 
actions. 
 The above has focused on what Kant says about moral feeling in the Kaehler 
notes, but the central points of the above are confirmed in Kant’s reflections on moral 
philosophy dating from the 1770s as well. First, the reflections confirm that by the 1770s 
Kant had given up on whatever appeal he saw in the idea of the moral sense performing 
the function of the adjudication of morality: “There must never be talk of moral feeling 
with respect to judgement (it is not a sense, rather choice), but merely with respect to 
actions or participations” (AA 19:233, R 7042).70 Indeed, the reflections also confirm 
that, although Kant rejects the adjudicatory function of moral feeling, he nonetheless 
considers there to be a use for the concept of moral feeling, and this lies in the practice of 
morality: “There is a moral feeling; but this is not a ground of judgement, rather of 
                                                
70 See also the following anthropology reflections: AA 15:280, R 640 and 15:384, R 876-7. 
79 
 
inclination” (19:135, R 6696).71 Kant even draws a distinction between the moral sense 
and moral feeling in the reflections on anthropology which corresponds to the principle 
of adjudication and of execution: “[a] moral sense is a contradiction; but moral feeling 
does not consists in a distinguishing power, rather in sensitive power of desire that is 
capable of such modifications” (AA 15:353).72  
With respect to how Kant thinks one becomes a virtuous person at this time, in a 
reflection dating from the period 1776-8 Kant says that one can acquire “proficiency 
[Fertigkeit]” in virtue “through frequent practice, not merely from instructions, rather 
though [one’s] own impetus” (AA 19:266-7). He even claims that “[t]he moral feeling can 
be educated by nothing better than by all signs of immediate aversion towards vice in 
education” (AA 19:137, R 6707). In other words, he states in the reflections as well that 
teaching virtue should be about teaching feeling the immediate good and evil in actions 
and not about punishment.73  
 It appears, therefore, that what Kant says about moral feeling in the lecture notes 
from the 1770s is confirmed in the reflections of the period. In the 1770s we can see that 
Kant has now officially dropped whatever appeal he saw in thinking of the moral sense as 
a faculty of judging moral good and evil or, as he puts it, performing the function of a 
principle of adjudication. What he preserves, on the other hand, is the idea of the moral 
sense as a principle of execution, or in other words moral feeling still plays a role in the 
performance of action, i.e. in motivation. Indeed he seems to think that feeling, under the 
name of moral feeling, is a necessary component of performing virtuous action, and 
without this subjective, sensitive component it is at least not clear how our adjudication 
of morality can bring about action in accordance with it. Not only this, but educating 
moral feeling plays a decisive role in becoming a virtuous person, not simply knowing 
                                                
71 Kant makes a statement of this kind more than once: “The moral feeling … is not the condition 
of judgement, rather of desire or inclination to the same” (AA 19:198, R 6894). See also the 
following anthropology reflection: AA 15:336, R 769. 
72 And again: “The moral sense for distinction; moral feeling for drive [Antriebe]” (AA 15:353, R 
806). 
73 See the following reflections on anthropology for similar claims: AA 19:318 and 19:719. 
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what is morally right and wrong. What I wish to do in the following section is draw some 
conclusions from the above discussion of moral feeling during the 1760s and 1770s about 
the development of certain aspects of Kant’s pre-Critical moral philosophy. 
2.5 Kant’s Pre-Critical Development 
 Clemens Schwaiger mentions how some have claimed there to be the 
development “from an initial intellectualism through the between-phase of a quasi-
empiricism onto a critical, no longer dogmatic variant of rationalism” in Kant’s pre-
Critical philosophy (1999, 24). Keith Ward, on the other hard, claims that “Kant’s early 
development may be divided into four main periods – the early rationalistic period of the 
Dilucidatio; then an increasingly sceptical period, culminating in the Dreams of 1766; 
after that, a brief return to a strongly rationalist position, in the Inaugural Dissertation; 
and finally the development of the Critical view that principles of reason are formal, 
regulative and heuristic, and have the function of making scientific and moral knowledge 
possible” (1972, 31). No matter how many periods into which one divides Kant’s pre-
Critical development, I agree with Schwaiger that these attempts to categorize Kant’s 
various phases are “serious simplifications” (1999, 24). Especially with respect to a 
period where Kant’s thoughts on a number of different issues are constantly changing, it 
stops being helpful to make statements about his development that are too general. When 
discussing the development of a thinker’s thought, it is perhaps best to restrict oneself to 
the development of a thinker’s changing views on a particular topic, for if one is to mark 
distinct stages wherein one belief is held and not another, how one characterizes a 
particular stage will likely vary given the particular concept one chooses as one’s focus. 
 The one division of Kant’s pre-Critical thought that certainly does make sense is 
the separation of Kant’s thought prior to the “great light” of 1769, and the period 
thereafter. The picture I have painted above seems to confirm this well-established claim 
that Kant’s thinking underwent, at the very least, a significant turn around 1769. Not only 
this, but it appears that Kuehn is correct to claim that “[t]he origins of Kant’s theoretical 
thinking are also the origins of his practical philosophy” and that “Kant’s critical 
philosophy begins with a revolution in both theoretical and moral contexts” (1995, 374). 
Kuehn also goes so far as to say that “no matter what else Kant’s great light of 1769 
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meant, it did mean the end of his doubts about the nature of moral principles” (1995, 
374). While it is surely true that after 1769 Kant thinks that moral principles must be 
intellectual, in particular this means that Kant believes the principle of adjudication must 
be intellectual, the principle of execution being another matter entirely.  
 In this chapter I have limited myself to focusing on Kant’s understanding of 
“moral feeling” in his pre-Critical moral philosophy, and therefore not on his pre-Critical 
moral philosophy as a whole.74 I am not, therefore, in a position to say anything about the 
development of Kant’s pre-Critical moral philosophy in general. But I am, I take it, 
capable of saying something about the development of Kant’s thinking on two particular 
issues: that of the adjudication of morality and that of the execution of morality.  
2.5.1 Adjudication in Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics 
 With respect to the adjudication of moral good and evil, one can recognize three 
stages of Kant’s thinking on this issue. First, beginning from at least around the time of 
the Prize Essay, it is clear that Kant is interested in determining not only how we are 
aware of what is morally good and evil, but also in determining how we are aware of 
what is morally good and evil in itself, i.e. what is unconditionally good and not good 
simply for a given purpose. Although Kant seems to have never wholeheartedly accepted 
the idea that human beings possess a moral sense understood as a capacity that makes us 
capable of distinguishing moral good from evil, in the early to mid 1760s he was at the 
very least interested in, albeit not fully convinced by, this idea. With his claim in the 
Prize Essay that “Hutcheson and others have, under the name of moral feeling, provided 
us with a starting point to develop some excellent observations” (PE 2:300), Kant appears 
to be saying that the idea of a moral sense is on to something with respect to explaining 
where our ideas of immediate, i.e. unconditional, goodness come from. The idea of 
unconditional goodness was important for Kant at this time because in order for certain 
actions to be unconditionally necessary, we need to first recognize them as 
                                                
74 Such a focus would require, as has been the case in the past, a dissertation or book-length 
project of its own. See, for example, the studies by Schmucker (1961), Ward (1972), Schilpp 
(1938), and Schwaiger (1999). 
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unconditionally or in themselves good. Hutcheson and others, therefore, with their way of 
explaining the immediate goodness of actions, explained an essential element required for 
explaining unconditional obligation.  
This initial interest in moral sense theory paired with some reservations was 
followed by a second stage where Kant was no longer interested in the idea of the moral 
sense and came to see the function of the moral sense as the principle of adjudication as 
problematic. In the late 1760s and into the early 1770s Kant is fairly convinced that 
distinguishing moral good and evil on the basis of feeling is undesirable. In a reflection 
dating from around 1772, for example, we find Kant claiming the following: 
feeling is the ground of the pleasurable and the displeasurable, of the capacity to 
be happy or unhappy. If there were a moral feeling, we would expect it to be a 
means to enjoy ourselves, it would be more a sense to enjoy oneself. … But there 
is something in morality previous to taste for judgement. This is because taste is 
something that relates to society … and herein there is nothing permanent. (AA 
19:149, R 6755) 
Kant is therefore explicit that feeling cannot provide universally valid and necessary 
judgements of moral good and evil, and for this reason it is not fit to act as the principle 
of moral judgement. At this stage, however, as Ward rightly notes, Kant “has not yet 
developed a clear alternative to ‘feeling’” (1972, 32-33). This stage is therefore distinct 
from a third stage, where Kant both rejects moral feeling as the principle of adjudication, 
as well as provides an alternative, namely an intellectual principle of adjudication. 
According to this first attempt at an alternative, actions are cognized to be good and evil 
in themselves by the understanding (or pure reason, see Kae 27 and 64) and actions are 
good when performed because they are good in themselves. Moral feeling as a principle 
of adjudication, therefore, is only briefly considered by Kant and relatively quickly 
rejected. As discussed throughout this chapter, however, from the early 1760s onwards 
moral feeling played a role in Kant’s conception of moral motivation as well.  
2.5.2 Kant’s Pre-Critical Conception of Motivation 
Although at first moral feeling was a term that stood in for a positive force or 
principle that drives us to morally good action, after 1770 we have Kant thinking about 
how such a subjective principle can be compatible or agree with the intellectual 
recognition of moral good. In the 1770s, his answer to this question seems to be that 
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moral feeling simply needs to drive us towards and away from the same things the 
“understanding” judges to be morally good and evil respectively. In other words, our 
intellectual understanding of the good and our sensitive and subjective motives to the 
good simply need to be consistent. At the same time, Kant recognized even at this point 
in time that the moral disposition is pure and involves performing actions because they 
are in themselves good. In a reflection dating from the late 1760s Kant states the 
following: 
We must pull out the moral motivations from the mixture of all the other (and 
from the agreeableness of the skill in execution); it has a pure and heavenly 
origin; we find ourselves right away ennobled when we notice it within us and see 
happiness only as a consequence of it. (AA 19:111, R 6615, translation from 
Kuehn 1995, 384) 
On the basis of this reflection, Kuehn states that although Kant “still had a long way to 
go,” with respect to his conception of moral motivation “the beginning was made in 
1769” (1995, 384). In a similar direction, Klemme states that Kant’s critical conception 
of moral motivation is first presented in the Groundwork (see Klemme 2006, 122), and 
therefore that “Kant seems to have first achieved final clarity concerning his ‘critical’ 
conception of moral motivation very late” (Klemme 2006, 123). According to Klemme, 
Kant’s Critical conception of motivation is inseparable from three claims: 1. Pure reason 
is practical on its own, 2. Pure reason effects a feeling of respect which is the incentive of 
moral action, and 3. The morality of action is calculated by the quality of will involved in 
action, i.e. an action is moral if respect is the motive of action (see ibid.). As we can see 
from the above reflection, and which is seen in the Kaehler notes as well (see Kae 74ff. 
and 79ff., for example), in the 1770s Kant had indeed become convinced that it was the 
quality of one’s will that was decisive for calling an action morally good, and that the 
moral disposition involves performing actions simply because they are good in 
themselves. Kant had therefore already started to formulate Klemme’s third point in the 
1770s.  
At the same time, in the reflections and lecture notes from this decade we do not 
see mention of pure reason being practical. Rather, as I have shown, we do not see talk of 
reason, but of the understanding supplying moral judgements and then our moral feeling 
being in accordance with these judgements when acting morally. Not only had Kant not 
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arrived at the idea of reason being practical on its own, but he also had not yet arrived at 
the idea that pure reason accomplishes this by effecting the moral feeling of respect 
[Achtung] in us. In other words, the first and second core elements of Kant’s mature 
conception of motivation are nowhere to be found in the 1770s, and for this reason his 
position on motivation during the 1770s is still unrefined. 
As I have shown above, Kant identifies moral feeling as the incentive of action, 
and claims this subjective ground is needed in addition to the objective ground if action is 
to be performed and not merely judged as morally good. The problem of motivation is 
getting from judgement to action. This is “the philosopher’s stone” in the Kaehler lecture 
notes and, as I show in the next chapter, this is the form this problem takes over the 
course of Kant’s Critical period as well.75 That moral feeling is needed as an incentive in 
order for action and not merely judgement to occur, however, is a position present in the 
1770s and, as I argue in the next chapter, remains constant in the Critical period as well. 
What is different, however, is that in the 1770s Kant believes one simply cultivates moral 
feeling separately so that it is in accord with the “understanding’s” judgements of moral 
good and evil, whereas in the Critical doctrine pure reason on its own effects this feeling. 
Although Kant may not have solved the problem of explaining how this happens, only 
after the 1770s did Kant come to think that it happened and that this needed to be an 
essential part of his moral theory. If it is the case, for example, that a moral feeling is 
needed in addition to moral judgement in order for action in accordance with this 
judgement to take place, this creates the problem that moral judgement is not essential in 
itself, and that the decisive step towards becoming a virtuous person simply involves 
training moral feeling to become habituated into approving and being averse to actions 
that are in themselves morally good and evil. To be sure, gaining the correct principles 
plays a part and is the first thing one must do (see Kae 357), but his view implies that the 
role of the intellect (at this point represented by the understanding) is demoted, to a 
                                                
75 As I discuss in the next chapter, in the ‘Incentives’ chapter of the second Critique, for example, 
Kant states that “how a law can be of itself an immediately a determining ground of the will … is 
for human reason an insoluble problem … What we shall have to show a priori is, therefore, not 
the ground from which the moral law in itself supplies an incentive but rather what it effects (or, 
to put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive” (KpV 5:72). 
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certain extent, and even makes its judgement superfluous. If Kant wants to claim both 
that moral judgements are essentially a priori and that it is not simply habit but a 
recognition of the moral law that is decisive when one is becoming a better person, he 
will need to find a way to make the recognition of the moral law a central and indeed a 
necessary element in motivation as well. We will see in the next chapter that this is 
accomplished by his mature moral theory. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 Based on all I have said above, I believe it is incorrect to suppose, as Schwaiger 
and others have done, that by the 1770s “Kant’s greatest enthusiasm for British moral 
sense theory was long passé” (1999, 94). This is certainly correct if one focuses on the 
idea of a moral sense as a principle of adjudication, but Kant did not give up on the idea 
of moral feeling performing a motivational function by the 1770s, nor does he abandon 
this sense of the term during after 1770 either. Although it might be correct to say that a 
shift took place around 1770 where Kant no longer thought highly of Hutcheson (see 
Henrich 2009, 30), one should not take this to mean that the moral sense theorists 
discontinued having any influence on Kant at all after this point. As I hope to have 
shown, in that Kant seems to preserve a place for the idea of moral feeling in his 
philosophy after 1770, even if he is not using this concept in the exact way Shaftesbury 
or Hutcheson used it, it is arguably the case that the influence of moral sense theory 
persisted into the 1770s as well, and therefore at least over the course of Kant’s entire 
pre-Critical development. In the next chapter, I explore the influence of moral sense 
theory on Kant’s mature moral theory. Although I discuss Kant’s Critical rejection of 
moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement, my focus is on the extent to which 
Kant’s mature conception of motivation reflects the influence of Hutcheson’s thought in 
particular. I thereby continue the investigation carried out in this chapter in that I seek to 
determine if “moral feeling” plays a role in the execution of action in Kant’s mature 
moral philosophy as well. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Moral Sense Theory and Kant’s Mature Moral 
Philosophy 
In the previous chapter I illustrated how Kant’s appreciation of moral sense theory 
changed over the course of his pre-Critical period. The most significant change was after 
his “great light” of 1769/70, when Kant began to think of moral concepts as rational, and 
thus comes to reject the possibility that moral judgement is rooted in a moral sense. 
However, I also illustrated that throughout the pre-Critical period and even after he 
understands moral philosophy as a rational enterprise, Kant nonetheless preserves a place 
for “moral feeling” in the execution of action. In this chapter I turn to Kant’s Critical 
period and investigate the way in which moral sense theory’s conceptions of moral 
judgement and motivation influenced his mature moral philosophy. In the first section 
(3.1) I summarize Kant’s Critical discussion of moral sense theory’s conception of moral 
judgement. Given the rational character of his mature moral philosophy, Kant’s 
considered opinion of Hutcheson’s conception of moral judgement in particular is largely 
negative, and in this part of the chapter I outline six main criticisms Kant makes against 
moral sense theory on this issue. My main focus in this chapter, however, is on the extent 
to which moral sense theory’s conception of moral motivation had an influence on Kant. 
In the past, interpreters have suggested that Kant adopts elements of the conception of 
motivation common to his English and Scottish predecessors, largely because of the role 
he assigns to feeling in moral action. Thus in section two (3.2) I present my interpretation 
of Kant’s conception of moral motivation, paying particular attention to the role of both 
feeling and desire therein. In section three (3.3) I survey what I take to be the dominant 
secondary interpretations of Kant’s conception of moral motivation, including those that 
claim it shares features in common with the “empiricist” view of action presented by 
Hume and others. However, in that it is Hutcheson’s view on motivation and not Hume’s 
with which Kant himself was most familiar, in this third section I also provide a detailed 
discussion of what features Kant’s view on motivation shares with Hutcheson’s. In this 
chapter I therefore hope to not only clarify Kant’s engagement with moral sense theory 
during his Critical period, but I also hope to shed light on Kant’s mature conception of 
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motivation by illustrating how it is both similar to and different from the view presented 
by Hutcheson, i.e. the eighteenth century empiricist moral philosopher with whom he 
engaged most extensively. 
3.1 The Mature Critique of Moral Sense Theory on Moral 
Judgement 
 Although at times exaggerated and misunderstood, Kant’s mature moral 
philosophy is undoubtedly a rationalist one. For instance, in the Groundwork Kant 
explains that moral philosophy in general should be understood as what he calls “a 
metaphysics of morals,” i.e. a kind of philosophy “which presents its doctrines solely 
from a priori principles” (GMS 4:388). Kant approaches specific topics in moral 
philosophy in much the same way, thus when it comes to the appraisal of action, i.e. 
judging whether an action is morally good or evil, he says it is required that “good and 
evil always be appraised by reason and hence through concepts” (KpV 5:58). Kant places 
so much importance on reason when it comes to moral judgement because he believes it 
is only via reason that we can achieve a proper level of objectivity and universality. For 
example, Kant says that we must use reason to determine moral good and evil because 
“[w]hat we are to call good must be an object of the faculty of desire in the judgement of 
every reasonable human being, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone” 
(KpV 5:61). It is because of commitments like these that Kant finds various aspects of 
moral sense theory problematic. In this section I outline six objections that Kant makes to 
moral sense theory, and specifically Hutcheson’s version therefore. As we shall see, 
many of them are either directly or indirectly related to the issue of moral judgement. I 
begin with what is arguably Kant’s most important objection and which is most clearly 
directed against Hutcheson’s conception of moral judgement, namely Kant’s problem 
with basing moral judgement upon feeling. 
3.1.1 Feelings Lack Universality 
What Dieter Henrich has rightly claimed is Kant’s most important objection to 
moral sense theory concerns the extent to which the moral sense can issue universal 
moral judgements (see Henrich 2009, 34). I briefly discussed this objection in the 
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previous chapter where I observed that after his “great light” of 1769/70, Kant was 
critical of the objectivity of the moral sense, i.e. Kant criticized the inability of the moral 
sense to make “objective,” i.e. universal and necessary, judgements. We saw there that 
one might think it strange that Kant makes this criticism, first, because Hutcheson 
conceived of the moral sense as capable of providing universal judgements, and second, 
because at least from around 1769/70 onwards Kant himself began to think of sensibility, 
at least the forms of sensibility, as universal and necessary. I argued that Kant’s criticism 
can be explained once it is made clear that it rests on the idea that the moral sense falls 
under the heading of the faculty of the feeling, rather than under the category of the 
faculty of cognition. During his Critical period, Kant both greatly clarifies why the moral 
sense should be understood as a feeling rather than as a sense proper, as well explains 
how this forms the basis of his objection that the moral sense cannot provide truly 
objective moral judgments. 
 Kant presents this objection in both the Groundwork and the second Critique 
during his classification of all other, i.e. heteronomous, moral theories. In the 
Groundwork, for example, Kant argues that all empirical moral principles, i.e. those that 
have a ground “taken from the particular arrangement of human nature, or the 
contingent circumstances in which it is placed,” are not fit to be moral laws because such 
principles cannot yield “universality,” i.e. they are principles that cannot hold “for all 
rational beings” (GMS 4:442).76 Kant classifies the principle of “moral feeling” as 
empirical, and it is not difficult to see why. As we saw in chapter one, Hutcheson 
believes that moral judgements are grounded in pleasurable and displeasurable feelings of 
approval and disapproval (see I4 111). As based on feelings, i.e. a feature of human 
nature, Hutcheson believes that moral judgements do not apply universally to all rational 
beings but only to all human beings with a moral sense. At the same time, if one is 
familiar with Hutcheson’s belief that the moral sense is indeed capable of grounding at 
least a certain kind of universal moral principle, the meaning of Kant’s objection might 
                                                
76 Kant makes the same argument in the second Critique at 5:41. 
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not be abundantly clear. In order to better understand this objection, then, we need to 
determine the precise way in which Kant understands the moral sense. 
I have already observed that Kant predominantly refers to the moral sense as a 
moralisches Gefühl, i.e. literally a moral “feeling,” in line with Hutcheson’s first German 
translator (Johann Heinrich Merck) even though he occasionally uses an alternate 
expression and refers to it as a moralischer Sinn, i.e. more literally a moral “sense.” 
Although part of the explanation for Kant’s dominant usage of moral feeling is surely that 
he is remaining consistent with the accepted terminology of his day, there are in fact 
philosophical reasons for Kant’s usage: Kant refers to the moral sense as a moralisches 
Gefühl rather than as a moralischer Sinn because he believes this capacity belongs under 
the heading of the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure rather than the faculty 
of cognition, to which sensibility and the senses (both inner and outer) belong (see e.g. 
Anth 7:153ff.). This is significant, for Kant conceives of the senses and of feeling as quite 
distinct, as can be gleaned from a remark he makes in the Critique of Judgement:  
If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation 
[Empfindung], then this expression means something entirely different than if I 
call the representation of a thing (through sense [Sinne], as a receptivity belonging 
to the faculty of cognition) sensation. For in the latter case the representation is 
related to the object, but in the first case it is related solely to the subject, and does 
not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject cognizes 
itself. (KdU 5:206) 
In this passage we see Kant making a distinction between the kind of sensation 
[Empfindung] in which a feeling [Gefühl] consists, and the kind of sensation that comes 
through the senses [Sinne]. As Kant says here, the senses belong to the faculty of 
cognition, and as such they are representations related to an object and provide cognition 
of the object. As Kant says explicitly in the Metaphysics of Morals: “by the word “sense” 
is usually understood a theoretical capacity for perception directed toward an object” 
(MdS 6:400). On the other hand, representations of the faculty of feeling do not relate to 
objects, but refer, as Julien Wuerth aptly puts it, “merely to how an object affects the 
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subject” (Wuerth 2010, 15).77 The essential difference between feeling and sense, for 
Kant, is therefore that only sense relates to objects and cognition, whereas feeling cannot 
ground cognition and relates only to the subject. 
This basic difference between sense and feeling results in there being an 
important difference between a moral “sense” and a moral “feeling,” for Kant. Kant 
acknowledges that Hutcheson seems to have understood the moral sense as a “sense” 
according to Kant’s technical understanding of the term. This is accurate given the moral 
sense, for Hutcheson, perceives a specific “object,” namely moral good and evil in 
contrast to natural good and evil (see I4 111).78 At the same time, Kant also appears to 
think that, whether Hutcheson realized it or not, the involvement of feelings of pleasure 
and displeasure in moral judgement is perhaps more essential to the nature of the moral 
sense than anything else. As Kant says in the Powalski lecture notes on moral philosophy 
(1782-3): “Nobody has explained the system of moral feeling more than Hutcheson. He 
says one can perceive many characteristics of objects through feeling [Gefühl] that one 
cannot cognize through the mere understanding” (AA 27:108, my emphasis). As is clear 
in this passage, Kant seems to think that, according to Hutcheson’s idea of the moral 
sense, it is ultimately a “feeling,” not sense, that cognizes things about objects that the 
understanding cannot.  
There is an element of truth in this, of course, in that the characteristic feature of 
the moral sense is that it allows us to feel pleasure or displeasure based on what we 
perceive, and we make judgements of moral good and evil on the basis of these feelings 
(at least for Hutcheson). Although Hutcheson says that the moral “sense” as a capacity 
allows us to perceive morally good and evil objects in the first place (see I4 110), what is 
central to this perceptive capacity, indeed what is central to any sense, for Hutcheson, are 
                                                
77 See also AA 25:559, 17:313, 25:1068, 28:246-7, and 15:288 for how feeling is distinct from 
cognition in this way. See McCarty (2009, 174-5), and Ware (2014, 734) for a discussion. Kant 
also explicitly says that moral feeling cannot bring about cognition of an object at AA 27:108. 
78 Indeed, that Hutcheson understood the moral sense as concerned with the cognition of objects 
and not only the state of the subject is why there is so much debate concerning his moral 
“realism.” See Frankena (1955), Norton (1985), Darwall (1995, 213), Gill (2006, 169, and 297), 
and Irwin (2008, 399ff.) for a discussion. 
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the feelings of pleasure and displeasure experienced when perceiving certain objects (see 
I4 xiii). What this means is that without the feelings of pleasure and displeasure that 
occur when perceiving morally good and evil objects, it seems accurate to say that we 
would not perceive these objects as good and evil at all and there wouldn’t be a moral 
sense. As such, one could say that it is ultimately these feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure that makes it possible for us to be aware of, i.e. cognize, morally good and 
evil objects, and thus Kant is at least in this sense correct to say that it is characteristic of 
Hutcheson’s conception of the moral sense that “feeling” makes it possible to cognize 
certain things about objects. 
 That it is ultimately feeling that makes us aware of morally good and evil objects 
is problematic, however, given Kant’s understanding of sense and feeling, according to 
which feeling can tell us nothing about the object of cognition. Perhaps for this reason, 
Kant claims that “[a] moral sense is a contradiction” (AA 15:353). If Kant is correct in 
thinking that Hutcheson’s moral sense should more properly be understood as a moral 
feeling, however, such that it can only provide us with information about the subject, this 
is where its unsuitability as the foundation of moral principles arises. As Kant claims in 
the Groundwork: “feelings, which by nature differ infinitely in degree from one another, 
can do little to yield a uniform measure of good and evil, and one by his feeling cannot 
validly judge for others at all” (GMS 4:442).79 Indeed, as concerned only with a given 
subject and not an object, feelings, for Kant, differ not only between themselves but from 
subject to subject. As Kant says in an early reflection on anthropology: “judgement 
concerning good and evil does not take place through feeling, because its [feeling’s] 
judgements have only private validity” (AA 15:237, R 541). This signals an important 
difference between Hutcheson’s and Kant’s understanding of feeling and sense: whereas 
Hutcheson believes that feelings of, for example, approval and disapproval are uniform 
across human nature because they are linked to the same simple ideas commonly raised 
in all human beings by the same objects (see I4 4), it clear from the above that Kant 
disagrees and believes that feelings relate only to each individual subject. In contrast to 
                                                
79 The same objection is made in the second Critique at 5:41. 
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Hutcheson, therefore, because Kant believes the moral sense is fundamentally based upon 
(subjective) feeling, the moral sense cannot issue judgements, principles, or laws valid 
for all human beings. Not only this, but even if the moral sense could issue judgements 
valid for all human beings, Kant disagrees with Hutcheson that the application of moral 
demands on all human beings is sufficient for universality. For Kant, moral laws must 
apply to all rational beings, and for this reason: 
the universality with which they [moral laws] are to hold for all rational beings 
regardless of differences … vanishes if their ground is taken from the particular 
arrangement of human nature, or the contingent circumstances in which it is 
placed. (GMS 4:442) 
As soon as laws are grounded on feelings of any kind, the universality and necessity of 
such laws are compromised. In this way, Kant argues that the moral sense, as moral 
feeling, is incapable of issuing sufficiently universal moral judgements, i.e. ones 
applicable to all rational beings, and for this reason the doctrine of moral feeling fails to 
meet his standards for a proper moral theory. 
3.1.2 Moral Obligation is Only Conditionally Binding 
 Kant’s second criticism of Hutcheson’s moral sense theory relates to its 
conception of moral obligation. It is a characteristic feature of Kant’s moral philosophy 
that moral obligation is unconditionally binding. For example, in the previous chapter I 
illustrated that even very early on in his development Kant distinguishes between two 
sorts of obligation. As he says in the Observations: “every ought expresses a necessity of 
the action and is capable of two meanings … either I ought to do something (as a means) 
if I want something else (as an end), or I ought immediately to do something else (as an 
end) and make it actual” (PE 2:298). These two kinds of obligation form the basis of 
Kant’s distinction between hypothetical imperatives, which “represent the practical 
necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else that one wants,” 
and the categorical imperative, which represents “an action as objectively necessary by 
itself, without reference to another end” (GMS 4:414). In relation to these two kinds of 
obligation or imperative, Kant argues that moral sense theory understands moral 
obligation in terms of conditional obligation only, and therefore that it is incapable of 
accounting for properly moral, i.e. unconditional, obligation (see Irwin 2009, 51f.). 
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 In chapter one I illustrated how Hutcheson believes that all human beings have at 
least two “ultimate ends,” i.e. ends they desire in and of themselves and not as the means 
to some further end, and these are our own private advantage and the happiness of others 
(see E4 222). I also argued there that the moral sense can only motivate us to act in 
accordance with what it approves because what it approves (disinterestedly desiring the 
happiness of others) is something we already desire. In essence, moral judgements bind 
us, for Hutcheson, i.e. we feel compelled to do what the moral sense tells us we ought to 
do, only because we already desire to do those same things, namely increase the 
happiness of others. Indeed, Hutcheson distinguishes between two types of obligation 
based on the desires standing at their basis. Hutcheson claims in the Inquiry, for example, 
that obligation can either mean “a Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to 
approve Actions, and to perform them” (I4 267), or it can mean “a Motive from Self-
Interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own 
Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions” (I4 268-9). According to the former 
kind of obligation, “there is naturally an Obligation upon all Men to Benevolence” (I4 
267) and what makes us act in such circumstances is the “Instinct of Benevolence” (I4 
268). Thus moral obligation, for Hutcheson, is what we our bound to do on condition of 
our having a particular kind of desire, namely the ultimate desire that the moral sense 
approves, i.e. our disinterested desire for the happiness of others. 
 Although Hutcheson distinguishes between moral obligation and the obligation 
placed on us to do what is in our self-interest, both of these kinds of obligation are of the 
same type in that they are conditional upon the existence of a desire. Because Kant 
believes moral obligation to be not simply conditional upon a different desire, but to be a 
different type of obligation altogether, namely one that is unconditional, Kant finds it 
problematic that moral sense theory equates moral obligation with conditional obligation. 
As a result, he believes moral sense theory does not account for properly moral 
obligation. Ultimately, then, Kant finds Hutcheson’s conception of moral obligation 
problematic for the same reason he finds all instances of conditional obligation unsuitable 
for moral obligation, namely because of the degree of universality and necessity inherent 
to conditional obligation. As conditional upon, say, a desire, conditional obligation is 
only valid for those who have such a desire. For Hutcheson, this means that moral 
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obligations bind all human beings, for all human beings desire the happiness of others as 
an ultimate end. As we saw above, however, this is not sufficiently universal for moral 
obligations, for Kant. Moral obligations, for Kant, must apply to all rational beings no 
matter what they desire.  
Kant criticizes Hutcheson’s conception of obligation on this score without 
mentioning him by name in the following passage from the second Critique: 
the happiness of other beings can be the object of the will of a rational being. But 
if it were the determining ground of the maxim, one would have to presuppose 
that we find not only a natural satisfaction in the well-being of others but also a 
need, such as a sympathetic sensibility [sympathische Sinnesart] brings with it in 
human beings. But I cannot presuppose this need in every rational being (not at all 
in God). Thus the matter of the maxim can indeed remain, but it must not be the 
condition of the maxim since the maxim would then not be fit for a law. (KpV 
5:34) 
The conditional nature of the obligation aside, Kant implies here that in order for the 
desire for the happiness of other beings to issue an obligation just as universal as a 
categorical imperative, i.e. a law, this desire would need to be attributed to all rational 
beings, including God. However, as Kant says in the above quotation, one “cannot 
presuppose this need in every rational being” and as such it cannot issue a maxim with a 
degree of universality sufficiently equivalent to a law. 
Hutcheson would probably grant that his conception of moral obligation is 
“conditional” in Kant’s sense, but he would also likely object to the possibility of an 
unconditional obligation in the first place given he seems to understand all obligation as 
conditional. Indeed, Hutcheson likely believed that all obligation must be conditional 
because of a problem associated with positing the possibility of unconditional obligation, 
namely the problem of how such an unconditional obligation can be binding if it does not 
provide the means to an end we already desire. Kant’s account of unconditional 
obligation is faced with explaining this and as we shall later in this chapter, his account of 
moral motivation is intimately related to precisely this problem. 
3.1.3 Moral Sense Theory Reduces Everything to the Desire for 
Happiness 
 I mentioned above that Kant classifies moral sense theory as an “empirical” moral 
theory because it grounds moral principles in experience, more specifically in the feelings 
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of pleasure and displeasure that accompany the perception of virtue and vice. Also falling 
under the heading of empirical moral theories is the principle of “physical” feeling or 
“the principle of one’s own happiness” (GMS 4:442), i.e. the view that virtue is 
equivalent to seeking one’s own happiness, and more specifically that seeking one’s true 
happiness brings about virtue. According to Kant, the core difference between the 
doctrine of physical feeling and that of moral feeling is that the principle of one’s own 
happiness “underpins morality with incentives that rather undermine it and annihilate all 
its sublimity” (GMS 4:442), i.e. it suggests that the incentives of virtue are self-interested 
incentives. On the other hand, the doctrine of moral feeling  
still remains closer to morality and its dignity because it does Virtue the honour of 
attributing to her immediately the delight and high esteem we have for her, and 
does not, as it were, tell her to her face that it is not her beauty, but only our 
advantage that ties us to her. (GMS 4:442) 
Although Kant praises moral sense theory here for insisting that virtue is good in itself 
and not solely because it is in our interest, he argues that the doctrine of moral feeling and 
that of physical feeling have something important in common and are equally 
problematic as a result. 
Kant claims that the view of “those who assume a certain special moral sense” is 
problematic because “everything is still reduced to the desire for one’s own happiness” 
(KpV 5:38). At first glance this objection is perplexing, for Hutcheson especially went to 
great lengths to argue that the desire for the happiness of others is disinterested and 
therefore not reducible to the desire for one’s own happiness. However, in claiming that 
moral sense theory reduces everything to the desire for happiness, Kant’s point is not that 
benevolence can be reduced to self-interest, rather his point is that moral sense theory 
reduces all desires to the desire for pleasure. In the Groundwork, shortly after discussing 
the doctrine of one’s own happiness, Kant turns to moral sense theory and says the 
following in a footnote: 
I class the principle of moral feeling with that of happiness because every 
empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness 
that something has to offer, whether this happens immediately and without a view 
to advantages, or with regard for them. (GMS 4:442n) 
Like the principle of physical feeling, although moral sense theory claims we 
disinterestedly desire the happiness of others, and therefore that we desire it immediately 
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and not as a means to our own pleasure, Kant’s claim here is that because the happiness 
of others is still an object we desire, it is still something that gives us pleasure and 
contributes to our happiness. For this reason, even though we desire the happiness of 
others disinterestedly or immediately, the happiness of others still gives us pleasure and it 
is in this sense that Kant believes “everything is still reduced to the desire for one’s own 
happiness” (KpV 5:38). 
Kant is not the only one to interpret moral sense theory in this way. As I 
illustrated in chapter one, interpreters in fact disagree over whether our disinterested 
desire for the happiness of others can still be construed as a desire for pleasure (see 
Darwall 1995, 224 and Jensen 1971, 87-8, 20-1). In chapter one I suggested that there is 
reason to believe that the disinterested desire for the happiness of others is not in fact a 
desire for pleasure and also that it is not even a desire for a good (see E4 28). I do not 
wish to settle this interpretive question here, nor do I wish to assess if Kant is ultimately 
correct in his interpretation.80 At the very least, Henning Jensen is correct to say that 
Hutcheson is ambiguous as to whether all desires are aimed at pleasure (see Jensen 1971, 
87-8 and 20-1) and for this reason Kant is at least not wrong to interpret Hutcheson as 
claiming that all desires aim at pleasure. For my purposes, what is most important to note 
is not whether Kant is correct to interpret Hutcheson in this way, rather only that he does 
interpret Hutcheson in this way. 
                                                
80 Lewis White Beck somewhat persuasively argues that Kant’s interpretation is in fact wrong. 
Beck says that Kant “confuses two very different things that the British philosophers had kept 
properly separate, viz., the disinterested pleasure we experience in doing something righteous or 
in contemplating a righteous action … and the interest we have in the pleasure accruing to us if 
we do or contemplate certain action” (1960, 105). As I discussed in chapter one in relation to the 
“pleasure problem,” Beck is right to point out here that although Hutcheson, for example, claims 
that acting benevolently gives us pleasure, our benevolent desires do not aim at the pleasure these 
desires cause us to feel, rather they disinterestedly aim at bringing about the happiness of others. 
As mentioned, however, I take Kant’s point to be that because our benevolent desires are still 
desires for an object and satisfying them brings us pleasure, they can be reduced to the desire for 
happiness. Thus perhaps Kant believes that even if it is not our intended goal when so acting, 
simply because satisfying these desires causes us to feel pleasure makes it is unavoidable that we 
act on these desires for the sake of their associated pleasure. I discuss these issues more directly 
in chapter five where I suggest Kant navigated the issues surrounding the pleasures associated 
with virtuous action better than Hutcheson. 
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In addition to believing that the disinterested desire for the happiness of others is 
reducible to the desire for pleasure as an object, Kant raises a related point that concerns 
how moral sense theory ultimately judges the goodness of action. Kant seems to believe 
that moral sense theory regards the immediate goodness of virtue as something we regard 
as good only in relation to our own pleasure or happiness. When Kant discusses “the 
principle of one’s own happiness” (GMS 4:442), for example, he claims it is false for a 
number of reasons aside from the fact that it places the moral motive in those of self-
interest. Among other things, Kant argues that the doctrine of physical feeling 
“contributes nothing whatsoever to the grounding of morality, as making a human being 
happy is something entirely different from making him good” (GMS 4:442). Kant’s 
argument against the doctrine of physical feeling is therefore against its standard of 
judgement: according to Kant, what makes us happy is no ground or indication of what is 
morally good. Interestingly, Kant appears to think that the same objection applies to 
moral sense theory.  
According to Hutcheson’s version of moral sense theory, the perception of virtue 
in others or ourselves gives us pleasure and therefore makes us happy. More importantly, 
it also claims that we rely on the pleasure and displeasure of the moral sense as an 
indication of the goodness of virtue. If this is the case, then not only does moral sense 
theory reduce all desires to the desire for pleasure, but the goodness of virtue, i.e. what 
Hutcheson called moral goodness (see I4 111-12), is in some sense reducible to natural 
goodness, i.e. the goodness of private advantage. This is problematic, for Kant, not only 
because it makes a feature of human nature, i.e. feelings of pleasure and pain, the 
criterion of moral goodness (as discussed above in relation to objection one), but such a 
view also results in a problematic conception of human action. As Kant states in 
Naturrecht Feyerabend:  
If moral feeling is the cause for human beings that they recognize action either as 
good or bad; then these feelings can be of different degrees. And since the moral 
feeling is not stronger than all other feelings, and since this cannot be proven, so it 
is the same with all physical feelings, and the human being will therefore choose 
among all feeling what seems to it the most satisfying. (NF 27:1325)  
What Kant therefore finds problematic here is the model of action implied by moral sense 
theory: if moral sense theory claims that all desires are desires for pleasure, then a human 
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being would only act on the desire that promises the most pleasure. Such a view implies 
that in order to choose what is morally good, virtue would have to promise the most 
pleasure. This is where Kant and Hutcheson disagree. As stated in Feyerabend, Kant 
believes it is clear that moral good does not promise the most pleasure, for if it did we 
would all be moral (see NF 27:1325 and also GMS 4:442). In contrast, Hutcheson 
believes that via the pleasures of the moral sense, acting morally does indeed promise the 
most pleasure (I4 244), although as I discussed in relation to the “pleasure problem,” the 
expectation of these pleasures can never be our reason for acting benevolently for this 
would make our motive self-interest rather than benevolence.81 Thus in addition to 
arguing that moral sense theory reduces all desires to the desire for pleasure, Kant argues 
that the “battle of forces” model of human action that this view implies is incorrect. As I 
illustrate later in this chapter, Kant believes that this model is problematic above all 
because it precludes the possibility of free action. 
3.1.4 God’s Will is an Unacceptable Source for the Standards of 
Morality 
A fourth objection is made only rarely in student notes and reflections and concerns 
moral sense theory’s conception of the ultimate source of the standards of moral 
judgement. In Mrongrovius II, for example, we find the following statement: “morality 
cannot be felt. All rules from feeling are contingent and only for beings who have such a 
feeling” (NF 29:625). This passage calls to mind the second objection above, according 
to which moral obligation only binds those beings who desire the happiness of others, but 
Kant’s point here is in fact slightly different. In the Naturrecht Feyerabend notes Kant 
mentions Shaftesbury and Hutcheson by name and claims that, for them, “the moral 
                                                
81 Hutcheson has an additional reason for denying that everyone acts morally in virtue of the fact 
that the moral sense promises the most pleasure. In the Inquiry, Hutcheson qualifies his claim that 
the moral sense “gives us more Pleasures and Pain, than all other Facultys” (I4 244) by saying 
that “the Corruption of Manner so justly complain’d of every-where” (I4 244) is the reason why 
so few human beings act benevolently. According to Hutcheson, the moral sense can be corrupted 
by custom, education, and habit (see E4 xv), and this means that we often feel the pleasures of the 
moral sense in the wrong cases, i.e. not in relation to truly benevolent action. For this reason, real 
virtue, i.e. benevolence, is not always connected with more pleasure, and as a result the pleasures 
of the moral sense do not necessarily result in everyone acting truly benevolently.  
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imperative is not categorical, for it assumes that only the being, to whom this feeling is 
imparted, has a worth in its moral actions” (NF 27:1325). Kant’s reference to the human 
being, as a being to whom the moral sense is “imparted [mitgetheilt]” calls to mind 
Hutcheson’s view that it is ultimately God who has given us “a Moral Sense to direct our 
Actions” (I4 128-9), and thus his view that God is the ultimate source of the standards of 
moral good and evil. In this way, the standard of judgement operative in the moral sense 
is ultimately one contingent upon the will of God. This is problematic, of course, for as 
Kant goes on to explain in Mrongrovius II, if this were the case “it would be all the same 
if God were to have given us a pleasure for vice and he could have done so for other 
creatures as well. For such laws are therefore merely arbitrary and merely a child’s game 
[Kinderspiel]” (AA 29:625). Kant’s fourth objection therefore targets the ultimate 
contingency and arbitrary nature of the standards employed by the moral sense. If God’s 
will is the ultimate source of these standards and the standards themselves do not 
constrain God’s will, then these standards are the furthest thing from objective, i.e. 
universal and necessary. Of course, Hutcheson believes in the rationality and inherent 
goodness of the standards of good and evil that God imparts to the moral sense because 
he trusts in God’s benevolence. Above all, Kant disagrees with divine command theory 
because he conceives of the view that moral principles have their origin in God’s will as a 
“heteronomous” moral theory, i.e. one that locates the source of these principles external 
to the will itself (see KpV 5:40ff. and GMS 4:443). Kant views this view as incompatible 
with the autonomy of the will, i.e. its capacity to legislate the moral law on its own, and 
thus Kant finds Hutcheson’s position on the ultimate origin of moral standards 
problematic insofar as it ultimately subscribes to a version of divine command theory.82 
3.1.5 Begging the Question on our Awareness of Moral Obligation 
A fifth objection that I will discuss again in my final chapter and which, to my 
knowledge, is rarely discussed in the secondary literature, concerns how Kant believes 
moral sense theory explains our awareness of moral obligations. Kant states he wishes to 
“note the deception going on” in the case of assuming that “consciousness of virtue is 
                                                
82 For more on Hutcheson and divine command theory see Irwin (2008, 407-8). 
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immediately connected with satisfaction and pleasure, and consciousness of vice with 
mental unease and pain” (KpV 5:38) and explains this deception in the following way: 
In order to represent someone vicious as tormented with mental unease by 
consciousness of his offenses they must first represent him as morally good, at 
least to some degree, in what is most basic to his character, just as they must 
represent someone who is delighted by consciousness of his dutiful actions as 
already virtuous. The concept of morality and duty would therefore have to 
precede any regard for this satisfaction and cannot be derived from it. … Thus 
one cannot feel such satisfaction or mental unease prior to cognition of obligation 
and cannot make it the basis of the latter. (KpV 5:38) 
What Kant is objecting to here is the logical, if not temporal, order of moral sense 
theory’s conception of how we first come to know of our moral obligations, at least 
according to how he sees it. Again, according to moral sense theory, what is morally 
good and evil and thus what we are obligated to do and omit is made known to us via the 
feelings of pleasure and pain we experience when we perceive benevolent and malevolent 
actions. Kant’s point in the above is that in order for us to experience the moral sense’s 
pleasurable and painful feelings of approval and disapproval in the first place, we must 
already be aware of what is morally good and evil, and therefore also of what we ought 
to do and omit, on some level already in order to make such a judgement. Kant’s charge, 
then, is that moral sense theory assumes what it sets out to prove: the pleasure and pain of 
the moral sense is both the cause and the effect of our awareness of moral obligation, and 
as such moral sense theory begs the question concerning our awareness of moral 
obligation (see Irwin 2009, 52).  
 There is a sense in which Kant’s objection is accurate: as we saw in chapter one, 
Hutcheson argues that we do not originally get our standards of moral appraisal from 
custom, education, or habit and that, on the contrary, all human beings possess the moral 
sense and its standards by nature (see I4 228). As such, Hutcheson believes that we are at 
least capable of knowing our obligations as soon as we are fully developed human 
beings. What this means, however, is that we are bound by morality as soon as we are 
capable of knowing our obligations. Hutcheson states we are “under its Influence, even 
when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this moral 
Sense leads them to Evil” (I4 268). Indeed, although Hutcheson argues that custom, 
education, and habit can alter our standards of moral judgement (see E4 xv) such that 
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what we believe our obligations are can change over the course of living our lives, what 
appears to be the core of the disagreement here is that Kant does not believe that we feel 
pleasure and pain in relation to our awareness of virtue and vice by nature, but rather 
only after we have acquired the virtuous disposition. As Kant states when discussing the 
process of moral education, for example:  
one must first value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the 
moral law, and the immediate worth that compliance with it gives a person in his 
own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in consciousness of one’s conformity 
with it and bitter remorse if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed it. 
(KpV 5:38) 
Kant therefore disagrees that we can feel the pleasures and displeasures of the moral 
sense simply by nature and in virtue of possessing the moral sense. For Kant, only once 
one has at least partially acquired the virtuous disposition is one capable of such feelings. 
 There is also a sense in which Kant’s criticism is slightly wrong-headed, however. 
As I briefly discussed in chapter one, although the issue is a matter of debate, there is 
reason to believe the pronouncements of the moral sense are “non-cognitive” for 
Hutcheson. In that it is ultimately feelings of pleasure and displeasure that decide what is 
morally good and evil, for Hutcheson, there is an important sense in which foundational 
moral judgements are not propositional or “cognitive” in character, but are rather 
equivalent to an emotive state. In other words, there is a sense in which moral 
judgements, at least at their most foundational and basic level, are not judgements at all, 
but rather consists in feelings of pleasure and displeasure. What this means is that Kant is 
wrong to assume that the moral sense presupposes some cognition of obligation; Kant 
only assumes that Hutcheson presupposes this because moral judgements, for Kant, are 
cognitive and thus if the moral sense feels pleasure or displeasure this is only because it is 
already cognitively aware, on some level, of what is morally good and evil. Kant’s 
objection therefore reflects an important disagreement between him and Hutcheson over 
the nature of moral judgement. If it is true that moral judgements are non-cognitive, for 
Hutcheson, then in the end Kant’s objection does not hold and Hutcheson is not 
presupposing what he sets out to prove (see e.g. Irwin 2009, 52). Rather, for Hutcheson, 
basic moral judgements simply consist in emotive or instinctual responses and are not, at 
least on this fundamental level, assuming any kind of cognition at all. Whether this 
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objection ultimately holds is therefore dependent on how one interprets Hutcheson’s 
conception of the nature of moral judgements. What is clear is that Kant takes Hutcheson 
to think of moral judgements as cognitive although still based on feeling, and in this way 
Kant takes him to be begging the question regarding our awareness of obligation. 
3.1.6 Positing a Moral Sense is Unphilosophical 
In the interest of completeness, Kant mentions one final objection, which is 
against the idea of positing a moral sense in the first place. As he says in an early 
reflection: “The principle of Hutcheson is unphilosophical, because it introduces a new 
feeling as a ground of explanation” (AA 19:120, R 6634). As Henrich states, this is an 
objection to Hutcheson’s “method of analysis” (2009, 38), according to which the 
existence of a moral sense is posited to explain certain phenomena. As we saw in chapter 
one, Hutcheson believes the positing of a separate sense is justified, for he believes that  
“[w]hen two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the 
general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, 
different Senses” (I4 2). Thus because we perceive moral good as distinct from natural 
good, and because we experience a particular kind of pleasure when perceiving the 
former, Hutcheson believes we need to posit the existence of the moral sense in order to 
explain how this is possible. In calling this approach “unphilosophical,” Kant’s objection 
is that positing such a sense in fact explains nothing and only gives a name to what lacks 
an explanation. The moral sense does not, for example, explain why we perceive moral 
good as distinct from natural good, it is simply the name for the fact that we seem to do 
so. Indeed, if the moral sense does in fact make us capable of feeling pleasure when 
perceiving benevolent actions, Hutcheson does not explain how the moral sense makes 
this possible, he simply states that it is the moral sense that makes this possible. In this 
way Kant is perhaps correct to say that Hutcheson is unphilosophical in the sense that his 
method of positing a sense to explain certain phenomena is explanatorily unsatisfying. 
 In light of these six criticisms, it is clear that Kant finds moral sense theory 
problematic. It should be emphasized, however, that the majority of the above objections 
concern moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement and not motivation. Aside 
from objection 6, which objects to Hutcheson’s philosophical method, the remaining 
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objections take issue with moral sense theory’s account of the ultimate origin and 
character of moral judgement, the obligations issuing from them, and the nature of moral 
good. Although these objections surely have implications for how motivation and action 
work, they do not target these issues directly. What this suggests is that although Kant 
finds moral sense theory’s conception of judgement problematic, he does not explicitly 
take issue with its conception of moral motivation. 
 As we saw with respect to Kant’ pre-Critical philosophy, the problems he had 
with moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement did not imply a rejection of the 
theory’s conception of moral motivation. In the remaining two sections of this chapter, I 
wish to investigate whether the same can be said of Kant’s Critical moral philosophy. My 
focus is on Kant’s mature conception of moral motivation and I wish to determine 
whether it shares features with Hutcheson’s understanding of the psychology of action. 
Whereas in making the above objections Kant more or less explicitly engages with moral 
sense theory, whether by mentioning Hutcheson by name or by referring or alluding to 
the doctrine of moral “feeling” as a particular approach to issues of moral judgement, the 
influence of moral sense theory’s conception of action on Kant’s mature view is much 
more implicit. As such, my approach will be to first sketch Kant’s understanding of moral 
motivation before going on to compare and contrast his view with that of Hutcheson. In 
between I evaluate the various interpretations of Kant’s position in the secondary 
literature, some of which claim his view on motivation shares features with his British 
predecessors. It is my hope that I am not only able to more clearly understand the 
similarities and differences between Kant and moral sense theory on this issue, but that I 
am also able to shed new light on Kant’s complex understanding of moral motivation as a 
result. 
3.2 Kant’s Critical Conception of Moral Motivation 
 Especially over the course of the last 25 years or so,83 Kant’s account of moral 
motivation has been the subject of intense scholarly debate.84 More than anything else, it 
                                                
83 Beginning with Reath (1989). 
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is the precise role that Kant assigns to “feeling,” particularly the feeling of respect for the 
moral law, that has been the focus of these debates, and some of those who claim that 
there is an important role for feeling to play in Kant’s account of moral action suggest 
that he assigns it this role because of the lingering influence of his English and Scottish 
predecessors. Melissa Zinkin, for instance, claims that the role Kant assigns to feeling in 
moral action illustrates that he “is making a concession to the philosophers of moral 
sense” (2006, 32). Similarly, A.T. Nuyen argues that Kant “adopts” the moral psychology 
of David Hume, according to which “it is a passion that provides the psychological push 
for every action” (1991, 40). Indeed, when comparisons are made between Kant’s 
understanding of moral motivation and the broadly empirical conception of action 
common to many English and Scottish philosophers of the eighteenth century, Hume is 
often singled out as the appropriate representative of the empirical view. This is 
surprising, however, for as Lara Denis notes and as my project as a whole suggests, when 
it comes to the influence of Scottish moral philosophy on Kant’s ethics: “Kant often 
indicated that he saw Hutcheson as more significant to ethics than Hume” (Denis 2012 
and see also Irwin 2009, 4n).85  
My aim in the remainder of this chapter is two-fold. First, I hope to correct the 
above situation by comparing and contrasting Kant’s conception of moral motivation 
with that of Hutcheson rather than Hume. I do this in order to determine the extent to 
which Kant’s conception of moral motivation, and specifically the role he assigns to 
feeling and desire therein, reflects the influence of Hutcheson. As such, in the following 
                                                                                                                                            
 
84 The amount of literature that exists on the topic is truly astounding. I make reference to what I 
consider the most important discussions later in this chapter. 
85 Kant never explicitly says that he regards Hutcheson’s moral philosophy as more important 
than Hume’s. Rather, Kant indicates this implicitly in that he engages with Hutcheson’s moral 
philosophy relatively extensively, whereas Hume’s ethical views are hardly discussed at all. In 
fact, the only instance I have found where Kant mentions Hume’s moral philosophy (aside from 
the reference already mentioned is this study at Ann 2:311) is in the Mrongrovius II lectures from 
the mid 1780s, where Kant makes the following passing remark: “Hume even believes even more 
smaller feelings lie in the moral feeling. But morality cannot even be felt” (AA 29:625). 
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it will be important for me to pay special attention to the precise role that both feeling and 
desire play in Kant’s account of moral action. Second, I hope that the following analysis 
will help clarify Kant’s complex understanding of moral motivation itself. In the present 
section (3.2) I provide an extensive explanation of Kant’s conception of motivation, 
where I take care to explain the role that both feeling and desire play therein. In the final 
section (3.3) I discuss how my account of Kant’s conception of moral motivation relates 
to some of the dominant interpretations that exist in the secondary literature. As 
mentioned, some of these argue that Kant’s account of motivation shares important 
features with his British predecessors, thus I will have occasion in this section to compare 
and contrast Kant’s and Hutcheson’s respective views on this topic. As I hope to show, 
although their understandings of motivation share certain features on a trivial level, the 
way in which their views differ is far more significant and thereby far more illuminating 
of their positions. 
3.2.1 The Problem of Moral Motivation 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Heiner Klemme correctly observes that 
“Kant seems to have first achieved final clarity concerning his ‘critical’ conception of 
moral motivation very late” (Klemme 2006, 123). This can be confirmed by referring to 
the brief discussion of moral motivation that takes place in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781), where we find Kant drawing a distinction between “the motive of happiness” and 
the motive of “the worthiness to be happy” (KrV A806/B834) and identifying the latter 
as the moral motive. This is significant, for this seems to indicate that at the time of the 
first Critique Kant had not yet come to view that “respect [Achtung]” for the moral is the 
moral motive. For this reason, Henry Allison is correct to say that the conception of 
moral motivation we find in the first Critique is only “semi-critical” (see Allison 1990, 
67). 
According to Klemme, the first presentation of Kant’s mature, Critical conception 
of moral motivation can be found in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1785), Kant’s first work devoted exclusively to moral philosophy (see Klemme 2006, 
122). In this work, Kant argues that “[a] good will is good not because of what it effects, 
or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by 
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its willing, i.e. in itself” (GMS 4:394). In this text Kant also claims that “in the case of 
what is to be morally good it is not enough that it conform with the moral law, but it must 
also be done for its sake” (GMS 4:390). The good will, therefore, does not merely 
“conform with duty” and perform actions because it is “impelled to do so by another 
inclination” (GMS 4:397), rather it is one that performs actions “from duty” (GMS 4:397), 
i.e. for the sake of duty alone. More importantly, however, and as mentioned above, what 
is characteristic of Kant’s Critical conception of moral motivation and what is presented 
for the first time in the Groundwork is the idea that actions performed “from duty” are 
actions that have “respect for the law” as their motive. Kant introduces this idea in the 
third proposition of Groundwork I when he says: “duty is the necessity of an action from 
respect” (GMS 4:400). 
Despite the fact that Kant’s Groundwork presentation of his conception of moral 
motivation is consistent with what he says in later texts, his discussion of the mechanics 
of motivation in the Groundwork is fairly limited and one could even say, along with Jens 
Timmermann, that in 1785 Kant presents only a “rudimentary” (Timmermann 2007, 182) 
view. Timmermann argues there are two reasons for this. First, he claims that “for a long 
time his [Kant’s] moral psychology was unstable” (Timmermann 2007, 182), and thus we 
do not find all the details in the Groundwork because Kant has not yet worked them all 
out in detail. Second and perhaps more importantly, “the Groundwork’s declared task of 
identifying the supreme principle of morality by means of analysing the concept of duty 
does not require an extensive discussion of human moral psychology” (Timmermann 
2007, 182). As such, it is perhaps at least understandable why we do not find an extensive 
discussion of the psychology of action in the Groundwork. 
Kant of course does eventually present a detailed view of his psychology of 
action, and above all this can be found in the Critique of Practical Reason, specifically in 
the third chapter of the Analytic, entitled ‘On the incentives of pure practical reason.’86 
                                                
86 In the following, I follow many other interpreters and base my reconstruction of Kant’s mature 
conception of moral motivation on this chapter of the second Critique. At the same time, I do not 
limit myself to this chapter. Rather, I make reference to many other texts written over the course 
of Kant’s mature period so as to provide as comprehensive a picture of Kant’s mature conception 
of moral motivation as possible. 
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Indeed, the concept that plays a starring role in this chapter, that of an “incentive 
[Triebfeder],” is central to Kant conception of moral motivation as whole and will be 
discussed in detail below. Before doing so, however, it is essential that we adequately 
grasp the problem Kant is attempting to solve in his attempt to account for the workings 
of moral action. 
In fact, we have already been introduced to this problem in the previous chapter. I 
illustrated there that although Kant had not yet made up his mind during the 1760s, after 
1770 Kant understood moral principles to have their origin in the understanding and not 
in feeling. As Kant states in the Inaugural Dissertation: “Moral philosophy … in so far as 
it furnishes the first principles of adjudication [principia diiudicandi], is only cognised 
by the pure understanding and itself belongs to pure philosophy” (ID 2:396, translation 
modified). If it is the understanding that judges what is morally good and evil, however, 
Kant believes that we are then faced with a problem when it comes to the execution of 
action. This is a problem because Kant believes that the mere understanding of what is 
morally good is not sufficient to bring us to perform such an action. As Kant claims in the 
Kaehler notes: “If I judge via the understanding that the action is morally good, much is 
still missing, that I were to do this action, concerning which I have judged” (Kae 68). 
During the pre-Critical period Kant believes that explaining how one gets from correct 
judgement to correct action is a serious problem in that he thinks that “nobody can or will 
see that the understanding is supposed to have a moving power to judge” and even goes 
so far as to say that this problem is “the philosopher’s stone” (Kae 68-9). 
To be sure, during the Critical period Kant claims that moral principles originate 
in reason rather than the understanding (see e.g. GMS 4:389), but he is nonetheless faced 
with a similar problem. By the time we get to his most developed presentation of 
motivation in the second Critique, for example, Kant believes himself to have already 
accomplished one of his main goals in the text, namely to justify the bindingness of the 
moral law on human beings, what he calls the “deduction” of the moral law, and which 
Kant accomplishes via his famous doctrine of the “fact of reason.” As he says in the first 
chapter of the Analytic: 
Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because 
one cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason … and because it instead 
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forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based on 
any intuition, either pure or empirical. (KpV 5:31, my emphasis) 
With the doctrine of the fact of reason, Kant takes himself to have illustrated not only that 
our consciousness of the moral law is a fact such that it is “given” (KpV 5:31) in reason 
itself, but also that we are aware of it as “binding” upon us, i.e. that in our consciousness 
of it, we are aware that we “ought absolutely to proceed in a certain way” (KpV 5:31). 
What this means for my purposes is that by the time Kant turns to the question of how we 
act morally and are motivated by the moral law, he already presupposes that we know 
what we ought to do and feel bound to do so. As such, similar to the problem he 
described during the pre-Critical period, Kant’s discussion of moral motivation during the 
Critical period is concerned with explaining how it is possible for our knowledge of the 
moral law or our intellectual recognition of obligation to influence the way we act.  
There are a number of ways in which the awareness of morality can move us to 
act, and at the beginning of chapter three of the Analytic Kant distances himself from two 
possible explanations. First, Kant makes it clear that our awareness of the moral law is 
not sufficient on its own to move us to act in the sense that this awareness necessitates us 
to act as it commands.87 Kant says that the will of the human being is of such a nature 
that its “reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law” (5:72), 
and he goes on to clarify that only the divine will necessarily does what the moral law 
commands ought to happen. Indeed, as Kant says in the Groundwork, strictly speaking 
there is no ought for the divine will, rather it simply does what the moral law dictates (see 
GMS 4:414). Thus in the first instance Kant denies that acting morally is only a matter of 
recognizing our duty, where acting differently simply involves changing what we 
know.88  
                                                
87 When I turn to a discussion of the various interpretations of Kant’s conception of moral 
motivation I discuss one that attributes to Kant the slightly different view that our awareness of 
morality is indeed sufficient to act, but does not necessitate our acting. This is the intellectualist 
interpretation offered, above all, by Andrews Reath. 
88 I therefore take Kant to be rejecting Socratic intellectualism here, according to which however 
we act can be explained solely by our conception of the good, and where our conception of the 
good necessitates that we act in a certain way. 
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Second, Kant distances himself from another view, according to which our 
knowledge of the moral law brings us to act by means of a feeling. Kant begins the 
incentives chapter of the second Critique with precisely this claim:  
What is essential to any moral worth of action is that the moral law determine the 
will immediately. If the determination of the will takes place conformably with the 
moral law but only by means of a feeling, of whatever kind, that has to be 
presupposed in order for the law to become a sufficient determining ground of the 
will, so that the action is not done for the sake of the law, then the action will 
contain legality indeed but not morality. (KpV 5:71)  
Reminding us of his distinction between acting in conformity with the law and acting for 
the sake of the law, Kant makes a contrast between two scenarios here: one where the 
moral law determines the will immediately, another where the moral law is only able to 
determine the will if a feeling is presupposed. The former is moral but the latter is not. 
Since acting morally consists in acting for the sake of the law, Kant is arguing that acting 
morally cannot involve acting conformably with the law but for the sake of feeling. As 
such, Kant is also ruling out the possibility that our awareness of morality can bring us to 
act by means of a feeling in this way; acting morally means acting for the sake of the law 
alone, and acting in conformity with morality but for the sake of feeling is the exact 
opposite of acting morally. What this means is that there must be another way for the 
moral law to move us to act, distinct from these two scenarios, and such an alternative is 
precisely what Kant attempts to explain in the ‘Incentives’ chapter of the second Critique. 
For Kant, if a human being is to actually perform the action it recognizes it ought 
to, then the awareness of the moral law must become what he calls an “incentive.” 
Indeed, distancing himself from the first option above, Kant defines an incentive at the 
beginning of this chapter as “the subjective determining ground of the will of a being 
whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law” (KpV 
5:72). Before turning to Kant’s understanding of an incentive directly, one further 
clarification is in order. At the beginning of the incentives chapter Kant states the 
following: 
how a law can be of itself and immediately a determining ground of the will 
(though this is what is essential in all morality) is for human reason an insoluble 
problem and identical with that of how a free will is possible. What we shall have 
to show a priori is, therefore, not the ground from which the moral law in itself 
110 
 
supplies an incentive but rather what it effects (or, to put it better, must effect) in 
the mind insofar as it is an incentive. (KpV 5:72, my emphasis)89  
What is essential to Kant’s solution to the problem of moral motivation, then, is that he 
assumes the moral law can and does become an incentive, or even is an incentive (what 
precisely this means will be explained in the next section). In other words, Kant simply 
believes that our awareness of the objective law can and does move us to act even though 
we can never know how this is possible.90 What this means is that Kant’s account of 
moral motivation is the much more modest one of explaining “what it [the moral law] 
effects (or, to put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive” (KpV 
5:72, my emphasis). The idea here is that if the recognition of the moral law alone can 
move us to act, even though we cannot explain in detail how this is possible, we at least 
need an account of what happens when it does move us, and this is what Kant sets out to 
do in the ‘Incentives’ chapter.91 With this clarification in hand, we can turn to Kant’s 
explanation of what happens in the mind when the law becomes an incentive. The first 
stage of this explanation will be to discuss the concept at the centre of Kant’s account of 
moral motivation, namely that of an incentive. 
3.2.2 The Concept of an Incentive 
As already quoted above, Kant defines an incentive in the second Critique as 
follows: “by incentive (elater animi) is understood the subjective determining ground of 
the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the 
objective law” (KpV 5:72). Kant’s reference to elater animi here is a reference to 
                                                
89 Kant makes a similar claim in the Groundwork when he says that “[t]he subjective 
impossibility of explaining freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of detecting and 
making comprehensible an interest that a human being could take in moral laws; and even so, he 
actually does take an interest in them, the foundation of which in us we call moral feeling” (GMS 
4:459-60). 
90 It is possible that Kant believe we are incapable of knowing how this happens because it would 
involve knowledge a causal connection between noumena and phenomena, the possibility of 
which, of course, is strictly denied by Kant’s epistemology. 
91 In this sense, Kant’s answer to the problem of moral motivation involves explaining how 
morality is applied to human beings. As Robert Louden notes, this is a necessary, “second” part 
of moral theory (2000, 10ff. and especially 2011, Ch. 5). 
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Alexander Baumgarten, whose conception of elater animi was rendered as Triebfeder 
(incentive) by the translator of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, G.F. Meier. Kant’s 
understanding of an incentive has much in common with Baumgarten’s, thus it will help 
clarify Kant’s usage of the term by turning to Baumgarten.  
In the section of the Metaphysics dealing with the faculty of desire, Baumgarten 
states the following: 
Whoever desires or averts intends the production of some perception. Hence, the 
perceptions containing the ground of this sort of intention are the impelling causes 
of desire and aversion, and thus they are called the INCENTIVES OF THE MIND 
<ELATERES ANIMI> [Triebfedern des Gemüths - Meier]. (Baumgarten 2013, 
241)  
According to Baumgarten, incentives are “perceptions” that ground an intention to 
produce something, and most importantly, as perceptions Baumgarten claims here that 
incentives are of “the mind.” Indeed, Baumgarten goes on to say that “KNOWLEDGE, 
insofar as it contains the incentives of the mind, is MOVING” (ibid., 241). This suggests 
that incentives involve knowledge or at least some sort of cognition in some way. This is 
important, for cognition, according to Baumgarten, can come from the higher or lower 
cognitive faculty. Cognition that relates to the lower cognitive faculty is obscure or 
confused (see ibid., 201), and Baumgarten claims that such cognitions are called sensitive 
representations (ibid., 202). When sensitive representations “are the impelling causes of 
desire and aversion,” Baumgarten says they are “stimuli” (ibid., 244) and it is due to the 
fact that such sensitive representations can be impelling causes of desire or aversion that 
Baumgarten says we have an “inferior” or lower faculty of desire (see ibid., 244).92 
Cognition that relates to the higher cognitive faculty involves knowing something 
“distinctly” (ibid., 228), as opposed to obscurely and confusedly, and the representations 
of this faculty are intellectual rather than sensible (ibid., 228). When intellectual 
representations are the impelling causes of desire or aversion, they are “MOTIVES” 
(ibid., 247), as opposed to stimuli, and it is due to the fact that such intellectual 
                                                
92 As such, Baumgarten seems to have a functional understanding of the faculties as opposed to a 
highly metaphysical one. It is not that certain faculties exist in the human mind in and of 
themselves, for Baumgarten. Rather, it is only insofar as we are capable of knowing and doing 
certain things that we can be said to have the faculty or capacity to do so. 
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representations can be impelling causes of desire or aversion that we can say we have a 
“superior” or higher faculty of desire (see ibid., 247). Accordingly, there are two kinds of 
impelling causes of desire and aversion, for Baumgarten, in accordance with the sensitive 
and intellectual nature of the representations, namely stimuli and motives. In this way 
there are also two kinds of incentives; according to Baumgarten “[t]he incentives of the 
mind are either stimuli or motives” (ibid., 247). Above all, however, what is essential to 
the idea of an incentive, for Baumgarten, is the idea that a perception or cognition can be 
moving in that it can ground or bring forth the intention to produce a representation, and 
in this way incentives bring forth desires. 
Kant seems to have been highly influenced by Baumgarten’s understanding of 
incentives, and this is clearest above all in the Metaphysik L1 lecture notes from the 
1770s.93 We saw above that Baumgarten describes incentives as “impelling causes” of 
desire, and in the L1 lectures notes Kant uses this language as well. Kant says that 
“[e]very act of choice <actus arbitrii> has an impelling cause <causam impulsivam>” 
and impelling causes can be either sensible or intellectual (ML 28:254). Continuing to use 
much of Baumgarten’s terminology, Kant says that the sensible impelling causes are 
related to “the senses” and are called “stimuli <stimuli>” and the intellectual impelling 
causes are related to “the understanding” and are called “motives or motive grounds” (ML 
28:254). Kant says that stimuli “are representations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
which depend on the manner in which we are affected by objects” (ML 28:254), whereas 
motives, i.e. intellectual impelling causes, do not depend on how objects affect us but are 
produced by the intellect itself. What is essential is that, as Wuerth observes, “[b]oth of 
these impelling causes, motives and stimuli, are what Kant also calls “incentives”” 
(Wuerth 2014, 231). 
As Klemme notes (see Klemme 2006, 122), Kant continues to believe that there 
are two kinds of incentive in the Critical period as well. In the Groundwork, for example, 
Kant refers to incentives “from the empirical field” (GMS 4:411) and he contrasts these 
with the motive of duty (see GMS 4:412). In the second Critique as well, Kant contrasts 
                                                
93 See Kant (1997, xxxi ff.) for a discussion of the dating of these notes. 
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locating “the incentive “pathologically (in sympathy or self-love)” as opposed to locating 
it “morally (in the law)” (KpV 5:85). And again in the Religion, Kant speaks of the case 
where “the law alone” is the “sufficient incentive” (Rel 6:30) as opposed to cases 
involving “incentives other than the law itself (e.g. ambition, self-love in general, yes, 
even a kindly instinct such as sympathy)” (Rel 6:30-1). Kant’s discussion of incentives 
focuses on the moral incentive, and in the Groundwork we learn that “respect for the law 
is the incentive that can give an action a moral worth” (GMS 4:440). Before turning to the 
moral incentive more directly, what remains to be determined is whether Kant views the 
idea of an incentive as something that impels us to act, perhaps in a way similar to how 
Baumgarten believed a perception or cognition could ground desire. 
Kant does in fact understand incentives in this way, i.e. as forces that ground 
desire, and that he does so is suggested by the literal meaning of Triebfeder. First, it 
should be noted that, as Stephen Engstrom states (and rightly, in my view), it is 
misleading to translate Triebfeder as “incentive,” for in modern day usage an incentive 
often refers “to some object that attracts or repels rather than to something subjective in 
the agent” (Engstrom 2010, 91). In contrast to such a meaning, Engstrom states that 
“when Kant speaks of a Triebfeder, he almost always has in mind something in the 
subject that generates action, rather than an object or circumstance that prompts it” (2010, 
92). As evidence, Engstrom notes how “[i]n its original literal meaning, Triebfeder refers 
to the mainspring of a clock” (2010, 92). Indeed, broken down literally, Triebfeder means 
“driving spring” ([An]Trieb = drive, Feder = spring).94 Engstrom therefore adds that “we 
should think of a Triebfeder as an inner spring or source of choice and action” (2010, 92). 
Similar to Engstrom, Timmerman claims that Triebfeder is “a motivating desire, the force 
that propels an agent forward” (2007, 180). That Kant understands incentives as driving 
forces to action makes sense given the problem he deals with in the ‘Incentive’ chapter as 
well. As I suggested above, when Kant says his aim in this chapter is to determine “what 
it [the moral law] effects … in the mind insofar as it is an incentive” (KpV 5:72), he is 
attempting to explain what happens when our awareness of the moral law moves us to act 
                                                
94 See Duden (2015). 
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morally. In other words, he is asking what happens in the mind when our awareness of 
the moral law itself is a driving force of action. With this clarification of Kant’s notion of 
an incentive in hand, we can now turn to Kant’s answer to this question. 
3.2.3 What the Law Effects in the Mind 
 I illustrated above that Kant’s task in the ‘Incentives’ chapter of the second 
Critique is not to show “how a law can be of itself and immediately a determining ground 
of the will,” because this “is for human reason an insoluble problem” (KpV 5:72, my 
emphasis). Kant’s aim, rather, is merely to show “what it [the moral law] effects (or, to 
put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive” (KpV 5:72, my 
emphasis). In light of the above discussion of Kant’s conception of an incentive, it is 
even more clear that Kant’s focus in this chapter is to illustrate how our consciousness of 
the moral law becomes a moving force, i.e. Kant wishes to show what takes place in the 
human mind when our awareness of the moral law is a force that moves us to act. 
In the third chapter of the Analytic, Kant argues that when our consciousness of 
the moral law becomes an incentive, what happens in the mind, at least initially, is that 
certain feelings are brought about. In the first instance, these feelings are negative. As 
Kant claims near the beginning of chapter three, acting morally involves acting “not only 
without the cooperation of sensible impulses but even with rejection of all of them” (KpV 
5:72). Feeling is affected via the rejection of the inclinations, for Kant, because he 
believes that “all inclination and every sensible impulse is based on feeling, and the 
negative effect on feeling … is itself feeling” (KpV 5:72-3). Thus, because doing what the 
law requires involves rejecting all our other sensible impulses and inclinations, it also 
involves the rejection of feeling, and the negative effect upon feeling thereby brought 
about is “pain” (KpV 5:73).  
  In fact, Kant argues that feeling is negatively affected in two ways: first, he claims 
that “[p]ure practical reason merely infringes upon self-love” (KpV 5:73), where self-love 
is “a predominant benevolence toward oneself” (KpV 5:73) or, more simply, the desire to 
bring about one’s own well-being. Self-love can coexist with the moral law once it is 
“infringed upon” and restricted, in which case Kant claims “it is called rational self-love” 
(KpV 5:73). Infringing upon self-love brings about the feelings of pain described above. 
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Second, Kant says that “if self-love makes itself lawgiving and the unconditional 
practical principle, it can be called self-conceit” (KpV 5:74). The idea here is that the 
moral law makes a claim upon us to be the unconditional practical principle of our 
conduct, and if self-love “makes itself lawgiving” as self-conceit, then it makes a similar 
claim upon us to be the unconditional practical principle. This is problematic, for in such 
a case we have a conflict between two principles that make a similar claim upon us and 
as such they cannot both coexist. If the moral law wins out in this scenario then it not 
only infringes upon and restricts self-conceit, as it does self-love, rather it “strikes down 
self-conceit altogether, since all claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the 
moral law are null and quite unwarranted” (KpV 5:73).95 As a result of this situation Kant 
claims that in addition to bringing about the negative feeling of pain, when the moral law 
strikes down self-conceit it also brings about the negative feeling of “humiliation” (KpV 
5:75). Kant seems to believe that the moral law “humiliates” self-conceit (KpV 5:73) 
because from the point of view of someone who both makes self-love into the 
unconditional practical principle and is also aware of the moral law’s (presumably more 
rightful96) claim to be this same supreme principle, the result of even considering making 
the incorrect principle supremely lawgiving is the negative feeling of humiliation. 
In addition to the negative feelings of pain and humiliation, Kant claims that the 
moral law effects a positive feeling as well. In fact, Kant believes that the positive feeling 
effected in the mind by the moral law is connected to the negative feelings. Kant clarifies 
his meaning here when he claims that the moral law 
is at the same time an object of respect inasmuch as, in opposition to its subjective 
antagonist, namely the inclinations in us, it weakens self-conceit; and inasmuch as 
                                                
95 See Reath (2006, 14-17) for a detailed and illuminating discussion of self-love and self-conceit. 
See also Engstrom (2010, 111) and Wood (1999, 290), where the conflict between the moral law 
and self-conceit is compared to the conflict Kant describes in the Religion between principles of 
self-love and those of morality (see Rel 6:36). 
96 I take it that Kant believes that even though we may not always act from or even in conformity 
with the moral law, our awareness of the moral law entails that we at least think we ought to act 
in accordance with it. This is suggested by Kant’s claim that even “the most hardened scoundrel” 
(GMS 4:454) nonetheless wishes to be good.  
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it even strikes down self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the 
greatest respect and so too the ground of a positive feeling. (KpV 5:73) 
Thus just as the moral law humiliates us by striking down self-conceit, it brings about the 
positive feeling of respect for this law as well. Indeed Kant claims that this positive 
feeling is an “indirect” (KpV 5:79) effect on the mind because it seems to arise only 
insofar as the moral law has negative effects on the mind as well.97 Why the moral law 
also brings about this positive effect can be seen by remembering my analysis above: if 
humiliation arises because we both accept self-love as lawgiving and regard the moral as 
having a more rightful claim as the supreme principle, then when we are humiliated by 
the moral law we at the same time respect it, i.e. regard it as the principle that ought to be 
supremely authoritative. Thus pain (and humiliation) and respect are two sides of the 
same coin. 
Kant believes that we feel positively about the moral law for an additional reason. 
He claims that the moral law “contains something elevating” (KpV 5:80) and he explains 
what he means when he discusses the example of a person in whom one perceives 
“uprightness of character” (KpV 5:76-7). In such a case, Kant claims that this person 
shows me the “practicality” of the law proved before me (KpV 5:77). In a similar fashion, 
the law itself proves to me the law’s practicality in virtue of the principle of “ought 
implies can” (see Rel 6:50): the law, like an upright person, illustrates to us what we can 
do in virtue of showing us what we ought to. As such, in the first instance we can say that 
                                                
97 The language Kant uses to express the idea that the positive effect arises indirectly is 
misleading. He says, for example, that the “consciousness of the moral law … inasmuch as it 
moves resistance out of the way, in the judgement of reason this removal of a hindrance is 
esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of its causality” (KpV 5:75). Similarly, he states that 
the “[r]ecognition of the moral law … fails to express its effects in actions only because 
subjective (pathological) causes hinder it” (KpV 5:79). These passages are misleading because 
they suggest a “balance of forces” model of action, according to which we would act morally if it 
weren’t for the strength of the pathological inclinations counteracting the strength of the moral 
motive. As I argue later on in this chapter, this is not Kant’s view, and in the above passages Kant 
should only be taken to be emphasizing, first, the indirect way in which the moral law’s positive 
effect on feeling arises, and, second, that this indirect effect would indeed lead to action if it 
weren’t for the pathological hindrances that make it more likely we choose in favour of them and 
not the law. What Kant is saying in the second passage just quoted is therefore that if these 
hindrances didn’t exist at all, we would have no choice but to choose in favour of the law and as 
such their removal would result in the law expressing itself in action. 
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the law is elevating in that it shows us we are capable of improving the moral worth of 
our character. Indeed, Kant says that “the soul believes itself elevated in proportion as it 
sees the holy elevated above itself and its frail nature” (KpV 5:77), thus if an upright 
person is elevating because they follow the law to a considerable degree, then the law 
itself holds an even purer example of morality before our eyes and would therefore be 
that much more elevating. We therefore feel positively towards the law, i.e. the law 
produces a feeling of elevation, because it reveals to us that we are capable of doing what 
will bring about a higher quality of our character.98  
In the first instance, then, Kant’s answer to the question of what happens in the 
mind insofar as the moral law is an incentive is that both positive and negative feelings 
are brought about. This gives rise to an interesting question: if the moral law effects both 
positive and negative feelings, are both of these feelings significant when it comes to the 
law becoming an incentive? If only one feeling is important, which one is it? The first 
point to mention in this regard is that although the negative and positive effects that the 
moral law has on feeling are both, strictly speaking, feelings, Kant seems to think of them 
as different sorts of feelings. With respect to the negative feelings of pain and 
humiliation, for example, Kant says that “[t]he negative effect upon feeling 
(disagreeableness) is pathological, as is every influence on feeling and every feeling 
general” (KpV 5:75). With respect to the positive feeling of respect, however, Kant says 
that “[s]o little is respect a feeling of pleasure [Lust],” and also that “so little displeasure 
is there in it that, once one has laid self-conceit aside and allowed practical influence to 
that respect, one can in turn never get enough of contemplating the majesty of this law” 
                                                
98 Kant appears to think that this feeling of elevation is enhanced by the fact that we are the 
authors of the law. For instance, Kant claims that, since the constraint placed upon the 
inclinations “is exercised only by the lawgiving of his [the human being’s] own reason, it also 
contains something elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical 
reason is the sole cause of it, can thus be called self-approbation with reference to pure practical 
reason” (KpV 5:80-1). Even though the law constrains inclination and results in pain, Kant is 
arguing here that once we realize that we ourselves put this constraint in place we feel the 
positive feeling of “self-approbation.” We feel self-approbation not only because it is we 
ourselves who constrain our behaviour, but because it is we who provide ourselves with a pure 
example of the law’s practicality, i.e. we elevate ourselves. As such, we feel “self-approbation” 
because we approve of our having shown ourselves what we are capable of becoming. 
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(KpV 5:77). Thus while the negative effect upon feeling is similar to all other 
pathological feelings of pleasure and pain, Kant believes the feeling of respect is neither 
pleasure nor displeasure. This is significant, for, in answer to the above questions, Kant 
does not refer to the negative feelings as the moral incentive, indeed it would be quite 
odd if the moral law were to motivate us by bringing about pain and humiliation. Rather, 
he only refers to the positive feeling of respect as the moral incentive. Therefore it is only 
this positive feeling that plays a role in Kant’s explanation of what happens in the mind 
when the law becomes an incentive.  
In light of the elevating nature of respect described above, it makes sense for the 
positive feeling of respect to be the feeling that plays the primary role in acting morally. 
In showing us that we can improve the moral worth of our character, the law might be 
said to give us reason to act morally. In this way the moral law could be said to urge us to 
act morally. Using Baumgarten’s understanding of an incentive as a guide, we could say 
that the representation of the law becomes an incentive in that it grounds a desire to act 
morally. This is precisely what I believe Kant is saying here, but before going on to 
explain this view in more detail, we should note that although the positive feeling of 
respect plays the central role in Kant’s account of moral action, this does not mean that 
the way in which the moral law constraints the inclinations plays no role. According to 
Kant, “consciousness of the moral law … inasmuch as it moves resistance out of the way, 
in the judgement of reason this removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a 
positive furthering of its causality” (KpV 5:75). Accordingly, although the negative 
feelings of pain and humiliation do not encourage us to act morally themselves, the cause 
of these feelings, i.e. the way in which the law constrains the inclinations, contributes to 
the likelihood of acting morally in that this constraint moves the counter-forces to the 
positive feeling of respect, the inclinations, out of the way. In this way, then, we can say 
that although it is ultimately the feeling of respect which, as a positive feeling and an 
incentive, is primarily responsible for us acting for the sake of the law alone, both the 
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moral law’s positive effect on feeling and its negative constraint of the inclinations play a 
role in the way in which the moral law moves us to act.99 
 This explanation of what happens when we are moved by the law might be 
confusing, for one might rightly ask in response, how exactly Kant believes the moral law 
becomes a moving force insofar as the law brings about feelings. 100 In order to make 
sense of Kant’s position, then, we need to return to the suggestion I made above, namely 
that Kant believes the law moves us insofar as our awareness of it grounds desire.  
3.2.4 Feelings and Desires 
 According to Kant, feelings have an intimate relation to desire. Kant defines the 
faculty of desire in general as “a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the 
cause of the reality of the objects of these representations” (KpV 5:9n, and see also MdS 
6:211). Desire is therefore fundamental to how we act in that it is via desire that we are 
the “the cause of the reality” of objects (see AA 20:206). Desire involves feeling in that 
feelings are a kind of representation that can serve as the cause of the reality of objects. 
Kant explains this in terms of the concept of “life.” To quote a passage just cited in full, 
Kant claims that 
                                                
99 To be clear here, it is not the negative feelings of pain and humiliation that contribute to acting 
morally, it only the way in which the moral law, first, infringes upon self-love and, second, 
strikes down self-conceit that indirectly contributes to acting morally by weakening the 
counterforces to morality. The negative feelings of pain and humiliation that result from this 
infringement and striking down do not help encourage us to act morally; as stated it would be odd 
if such negative feelings could do so. At the same time, it is interesting to note here that the moral 
law can move us to act despite the fact the moral law also causes us pain and humiliation. It is 
able to do so in virtue of the fact that the moral law encourages us to act in a way entirely 
different from how pleasure and pain may move us. As I discuss below, the moral law moves us 
not by promising more pleasure or a reduction of pain, but by bringing us to desire acting morally 
in itself. This is a desire of an entirely different kind, and which therefore operates on a level 
different from the desires for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. As such, it is capable of being 
effective despite the strength of any desire for pleasure or avoidance of pain. 
100 As I more explicitly confess later, I admit here that my reading of Kant’s conception of 
motivation assumes that the feelings effected by our awareness of the moral law do in fact play a 
causal role in moral action and thus are not, as some have argued, merely “epiphenomenal.” I 
explain why I am convinced of this view below. 
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Life is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of 
desire. The faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means of its 
representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations. 
Pleasure is the representation of the agreement of an object or of an action with 
the subjective conditions of life. (KpV 5:9n)  
This passage is relatively cryptic and all it seems to tell us is that there exists a 
connection between pleasure, life and the faculty of desire. Luckily, however, Kant 
clarifies his notion of life in the Metaphysik L1 notes. First, Kant says that life is “an inner 
principle for acting from representations” but later and even more clearly he says the 
following:  
Life is the inner principle of self-activity. Living beings which act according to 
this inner principle must act according to representations. Now there can be a 
promotion, but also a hindrance to life. The feeling of the promotion of life is 
pleasure, and the feeling of the hindrance of life is displeasure. Pleasure is thus a 
ground of activity, and displeasure a hindrance of activity. Pleasure thus consists 
in desiring; displeasure, on the other hand, in abhorring. (ML 28:247) 
In this passage Kant clarifies that feeling is linked to “life” in the sense that the feelings 
of pleasure are mental states indicating the promotion of life, whereas feelings of 
displeasure are mental states indicating a hindrance of life. This means that feelings of 
pleasure and pain relate to activity and desire in the sense that they are mental states that 
indicate what we are attracted to and should seek out, as well as what we are repelled by 
and should avoid. Indeed, if, as stated above, “[t]he faculty of desire is a being’s faculty 
to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these 
representations” (KpV 5:9fn), then it appears that Kant thinks of feeling as a kind of 
representation, by means of which we become the cause of these representations, and in 
essence this means that feelings are the grounds of desire and aversion. 
 We should be careful here, however, for if we recall the primary question Kant is 
attempting to answer when providing an account of moral motivation, i.e. the question of 
what happens when our awareness of the moral law moves us to act, we will remember 
that he explicitly rules out the possibility that this takes place by means of feeling. Kant 
makes this claim because if we do as we ought to only for the sake of a feeling and not 
for the sake of the moral law itself, then we are not acting morally. This is precisely what 
happens when feelings ground desire in the way just described, however: we desire 
(represent to cause the reality of an object) because, i.e. for the sake of, the pleasure we 
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represent as being involved therein. By suggesting that the moral law moves us to act in 
virtue of the fact that it effects feelings in the mind, then, Kant cannot mean that the 
moral law moves us by means of feelings in this way, i.e. by promising pleasure. In what 
way, then, does Kant think the feelings effected in the mind by the moral law account for 
how the moral brings us to act? 
Kant gives us a clue to the answer to this question in the second Critique where he 
discusses an interesting “error of subreption” (KpV 5:116). Borrowing the concept from 
Christian Wolff (see Dyck 2014, 24, 31, 34), Kant believes an error of subreption consists 
in, as Corey Dyck describes it, “taking intellectual objects as subject to sensible 
conditions” (ibid., 62). In the Inaugural Dissertation, for example, Kant defines this 
“metaphysical fallacy” as “the confusion of what belongs to the understanding with what 
is sensitive” (ID 2:412). The particular instance of this error that Kant discusses in the 
second Critique is an “optical illusion in the self-consciousness of what one does as 
distinguished from what one feels” (KpV 5:116). Kant describes this “error” in the 
following way:  
consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always the ground of a 
satisfaction in the action produced by it; but this pleasure, this satisfaction in 
itself, is not the determining ground of the action: instead, the determination of 
the will directly by reason alone is the ground of the feeling of pleasure, and this 
remains a pure practical, not aesthetic, determination of the faculty of desire. 
Now, since this determination has exactly the same inward effect, that of an 
impulse to activity [eines Antriebes zur Tätigkeit], as a feeling of the 
agreeableness expected from the desired action would have produced, we easily 
look upon what we ourselves do as something that we merely passively feel and 
take the moral incentive for a sensible impulse, just as always happens in so-
called illusion of the senses. (KpV 5:116-7) 
In this passage Kant refers to two things that can serve as “an impulse to activity”: first, 
there is the “feeling of the agreeableness expected from the desired action,” and second 
there is “the determination of the will directly by reason alone.” Although this latter kind 
of impulse to activity is by definition not a determination of the will by means of the 
feeling of pleasure, in light of Kant’s discussion of the feelings of pain, humiliation, and 
respect in the ‘Incentives’ chapter, this kind of determination is still bound up with 
certain feelings. The “error of subreption” that Kant speaks of here, i.e. the taking of what 
belongs to the understanding for something that is sensitive, is the mistake of assuming 
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that what takes place when reason alone determines the will is the same as what takes 
place in other cases of the determination of the will, i.e. where the expectation of the 
feeling of pleasure determines the will. The cause of this mistake lies in the fact that in 
the former case, i.e. the moral case, when reason determines the will alone the result is 
still “an impulse to activity,” even though this impulse is not the expectation of pleasure. 
Thus, what this passage seems to suggest is that Kant believes the moral law serves as an 
impulse to activity in the same way as an expectation of pleasure would be. Insofar as it 
is such an impulse to activity, what happens in the mind is that feelings are brought 
about. In other words, the pre-existing promise of feelings of pleasure, for example, is not 
needed to serve as an impulse to activity in this case. As discussed above, the most 
important feeling that the law brings about is the feeling of respect which functions as an 
incentive, i.e. as a driving force of action. In that Kant believes reason can be an impulse 
to activity on its own and can bring about a driving force of action, this suggest that Kant 
thinks effecting the feeling of respect in the mind in this case is equivalent to bringing 
about a desire. 
In fact, Kant says exactly this in other places using different terminology. In 
particular, Kant argues that the moral law moves us by bringing about a particular sort of 
desire, namely an “interest.” Kant’s concept of an interest is a technical term that relates 
to a number of other concepts belonging to his psychology of human action generally and 
should be defined in relation to them. To begin with, in the Religion Kant distinguishes 
between an inclination and an instinct on the grounds that an inclination “presupposes 
acquaintance with the object of desire” (Rel 6:29n), whereas an instinct does not. The 
idea here is that instincts, things such as “the drive in animals to build or the drive to sex” 
(Rel 6:29n), are things that we simply innately desire without ever having first 
experienced how pleasurable it is to satisfy such a desire. An inclination, on the other 
hand, implies that we do need to have already experienced satisfaction with an object in 
order to desire it. The example Kant mentions is the propensity to become addicted to 
intoxicants, where although many people “have no acquaintance at all with intoxication, 
and hence absolutely no desire for the things that produce it, let them try these things but 
once, and there is aroused in them an almost inextinguishable desire for them” (Rel 
6:29n). Kant defines inclination in the Metaphysics of Morals in a similar fashion as 
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“habitual desire,” i.e. a desire we have already satisfied and then desire again (see MdS 
6:212). Importantly, however, Kant calls this “desire in the narrow sense” because it is a 
“determination of the faculty of desire which is caused and therefore necessarily 
preceded by … pleasure” (MdS 6:212).101 Now, Kant adds here that “a connection of 
pleasure with the faculty of desire that the understanding judges to hold as a general rule 
(though only for the subject) is called an interest” (MdS 6:212). Kant makes a similar 
claim in the second Critique when he says that the concept of an interest “can never be 
attributed to any being unless it has reason and which signifies an incentive of the will 
insofar as it is represented by reason” (KpV 5:79). An interest, then, is something that 
goes beyond a mere inclination, a desire in the narrow sense, or even an incentive in that 
reason or the understanding is involved whereby they judge the pleasure involved “to 
hold as a general rule (though only for the subject)” (MdS 6:212). Kant’s concept of an 
interest captures something important, for as Iain Morrison clarifies: “If my 
understanding does not make this judgement, then my desire for x might be something 
that I never act upon again, or something that I regard as a product of a unique set of 
circumstances such that it does not hold as a rule” (Morrison 2008, 112). What is 
essential to an interest, then, is the idea that it is not a passing or momentary desire, rather 
it implies something that we desire consistently over time or that we are committed to. 
 With this definition of interest in hand we can turn to an important distinction 
Kant makes between two kinds of interests. In the Groundwork, Kant says that  
the human will can take an interest in something without therefore acting from 
interest. The first signifies the practical interest in the action, the second the 
pathological interest in the object of the action. … In the first case the action 
interests me, in the second the object of the action (in so far as it is agreeable to 
me). (GMS 4:413-4n)  
The distinction Kant makes here is between taking an interest and acting from interest. 
When I act from interest, I am interested not in the action itself, but in “the object of the 
action” and in such a case I only act in a particular way in order to attain a particular 
                                                
101 As Kant suggests here by calling this desire merely in the “narrow” sense, there are other 
kinds of desire, i.e. desires that do not have a preceding pleasure but are brought about by other 
means, such as reason alone or our awareness of the moral law itself.  
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object. In the case of taking an interest in an action directly, however, I act in a particular 
way not as a means to securing an object,102 rather I am interested in acting in that way in 
itself. The distinction between acting from interest and taking an interest is therefore 
similar to acting in conformity to the law but for the sake of a feeling, and acting for the 
sake of the law itself.  
The distinction between acting from interest and taking an interest can be 
construed as one concerning how pleasure is related to desire as well. In the case of 
pathological interests, Kant says an object interests me “in so far as it is agreeable to me” 
(GMS 4:414n), i.e. I am here committed to pursuing an object because I have experienced 
it to be agreeable in the past and recognized that this agreeableness holds “hold as a 
general rule” (MdS 6:212). In the case of taking an interest in an action immediately, 
however, I do so but not because of any kind of agreeableness. When I take an immediate 
interest in the action I take an interest in the action in and of itself. As Kant says in the 
Groundwork:  
Reason takes an immediate interest in the action only when the universal validity 
of its maxim is a sufficient determining ground of the will. … But if it [reason] 
can determine the will only by means of another object of desire, or on the 
presupposition of a special feeling of the subject, then reason takes only a mediate 
interest in the action. (GMS 4:460n)  
Taking an interest in an action immediately and desiring to perform it in and of itself is 
therefore a kind of desiring distinct from desiring to act for the sake of, or based on our 
interest in, the pleasure coming to us as a result of so acting. Most importantly, taking an 
interest in action immediately is what happens when we act for the sake of the law alone, 
because acting morally for its own sake, i.e. being interested in the action itself, is what it 
means to act morally. 
 At the same time, we should be careful here to remember that an interest, for 
Kant, is a desire functioning at a particular level of abstraction, namely it is “a connection 
of pleasure with the faculty of desire that the understanding judges to hold as a general 
                                                
102 Whether or not the object we are interested in when we act from interest is always pleasure, for 
Kant, is not clear. This is the question of Kant’s non-moral hedonism, an issue I cannot get into 
here. For a discussion see Reath (2006), Morrison (2008), McCarty (2009), Irwin (2009, 14), 
Freierson (2014, 148), and Allison (2011, 264). 
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rule” (MdS 6:212) and thus “can never be attributed to any being unless it has reason” 
(KpV 5:79). This suggests that there is a more fundamental notion of a desire that can 
exist before reason recognizes the relation between pleasure and desire to hold as a 
general rule. As mentioned above, this is what the notion of an inclination signifies, but 
Kant also seems to believe that the concept of an incentive signifies this idea. As he 
claims in the second Critique, an interest is that “which signifies an incentive of the will 
insofar as it is represented by reason” (KpV 5:79). Similarly, he also claims that the 
concept of an interest arises “[f]rom the concept of an incentive” (KpV 5:79). Indeed, 
Kant says that the moral law “awakens respect for itself” (KpV 5:74), which, as a feeling, 
functions as an incentive, and he also says that the law “produces an interest in 
compliance with the law which we call moral interest” (KpV 5:80). Thus when Kant says 
that the law both brings about feelings, an incentive, and an interest, I take him to be 
saying nearly the same thing: when the moral law moves us to act, a desire is effected in 
the mind and this is what ultimately moves us to act. The important point here, however, 
is that what brings about this desire is the representation of the moral law itself, not a 
feeling or a representation of pleasure that we expect to experience as a result of acting in 
a particular way. Indeed, when Kant says that “only, insofar as reason of itself (not in the 
service of the inclinations) determines the will, is reason a true higher faculty of desire” 
(KpV 5:25), he is implying that desire is capable of being aroused by reason itself, and 
insofar as we are capable of having such desires, we can say we have a higher faculty of 
desire.103 Indeed, much like the way in which Kant distinguishes between the other 
faculties,104 the higher and lower faculty of desire is a distinction between two kinds of 
desire based on the source of desire: the lower faculty of desire is when desire has its 
source in sensible representations, i.e. of the expectation of pleasure (see KpV 5:23ff.), 
the higher faculty of desire is when desire has its source in reason, i.e. the representation 
of moral action in and of itself (see KpV 5:25, and Engstrom 2009, 25ff.). 
                                                
103 I therefore agree with Morrisson that Kant, similar to Baumgarten, has a functional 
understanding of the faculties as well (see Morrisson 2008, 30, 32, 36, 79). 
104 For the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure see Anth 7:230, and for the faculty of 
cognition see KrV B1ff. and Kuehn (1995) for a discussion. 
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 In light of the above we are now in a position to assess why Kant believes 
effecting feelings in the mind of a human being helps explain what happens when the 
moral law becomes an incentive, i.e. a force moving us to act. In the first instance, 
feelings are intimately linked to desire, where it is a representation of a feeling that first 
pushes or pulls us to desire or be averse to what is represented. Although the feeling of 
respect, for example, is neither pleasurable nor painful, Kant says that it still functions in 
a way similar to other feelings of pleasure in that it is an impulse to activity. In this way 
Kant appears to be saying that the moral law becomes an incentive in that it brings about 
a desire in the mind of human beings. We have seen that Kant in fact says exactly this in 
that he believes the recognition of the moral law not only can, but does cause us to take 
an interest in acting morally. Taking an interest in acting morally is a distinct kind of 
desire, however, namely a desire brought about by reason alone. As such, the moral law 
moves us to act, for Kant, in that it causes us to take an interest in and therefore desire to 
act morally in and of itself. 
3.3 Interpretations of Kant on Moral Motivation  
 I began section 3.2 of this chapter with the observation that a number of scholars 
believe that Kant’s understanding of moral motivation has certain features in common 
with the empiricist psychology of action presented by, above all others, David Hume. 
Now that I have discussed Kant’s conception of moral motivation in detail, in this section 
I discuss a number of interpretations of Kant’s understanding of moral motivation that 
have been offered in the secondary literature, including those who interpret Kant as 
having a conception of motivation similar to Hume.105 I then turn a discussion of the 
                                                
105 I should mention here that in this section I do not wish to provide a comprehensive survey of 
all of the ways in which Kant’s conception of moral motivation has been understood in the 
secondary literature. There are two main reasons why I refrain from this. First, given the large 
number of interpretations, such an undertaking would be an enormous task in its own right and is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Second, a number of attempts to categorize the various 
interpretations of Kant on moral motivation already exist (see Timmons 1985, 391n23, McCarty 
2009, 170ff., and Sargentis 2012). My aim in this section is therefore a more narrow one: I 
present the various ways in which interpreters discuss the role of feeling and desire in Kant’s 
account of moral motivation. This will make it possible to see where my interpretation both does 
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similarities and differences between Kant’s conception of the psychology of moral action 
with Hutcheson’s, who, I believe, is the more appropriate interlocutor with Kant on the 
issue of motivation. This well help not only to clarify where Kant and Hutcheson agree 
and differ, but will, I hope, help clarify Kant’s account of motivation itself. I begin with a 
discussion of the interpretation claiming that feeling does not play a role in motivation, 
for Kant, before turning to the variety of ways in which interpreters have argued that it 
does play a role. 
3.3.1 The Intellectualist Interpretation 
The most well-known interpretation that denies feeling a role in motivation is held 
by Andrews Reath. Reath famously divides the phenomenon of respect into two parts or 
aspects, and claims that respect as recognition of the law, i.e. respect as the 
“consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law” (GMS 4:401n), is the 
intellectual or practical106 aspect of respect (see 2006, 10ff.), and respect as a feeling is 
the affective aspect of respect (see 2006, 10ff.). Although he notes that “these two aspects 
are connected aspects of a single complex phenomenon” (2006, 26n7), according to 
Reath’s interpretation, “it is the practical aspect that is active in motivating moral 
conduct, while the affective side, or feeling of respect, is its effect on certain sensible 
tendencies” (2006, 10). According to this interpretation, then, feeling does indeed take 
place when we are motivated by duty alone, but the important claim is that this feeling 
itself plays no causal role in the motivational process itself, i.e. it is a mere side effect and 
is inessential to the production of action. As such, other interpreters have claimed that 
thinking of the role of feeling in this way implies feeling is merely “epiphenomenal” (see 
Timmerman 2007, 42; Timmons 1985, 391n23; and Sytsma 1993, 121), i.e. it is simply a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
and does not agree with the secondary literature as well as provide the opportunity to engage with 
those who see similarities between Kant and the empiricist conception of action.  
106 Reath only calls this the practical aspect in the revised version of his essay. See 2006, 26n7. 
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part of the experience of acting morally and plays no role in the motivational process 
itself. 
Reath is not alone in denying feeling a role in moral motivation. Such a reading is 
shared by Onora O’Neill when she claims that “[t]o act ‘out of reverence for the law’ or 
‘from a sense of duty’ … is not to act with any peculiar feeling of reverence or awe” (see 
2013, 222). Robert Paul Wolff argues in a similar way that it is only “a fact about my 
phenomenal character that consciousness of submission to self-made law produces a 
feeling of reverence in me” (1973, 83). Sharon Sytsma similarly claims that “[t]he feeling 
of respect, for Kant, is the result of the already motivating power of reason” and she 
states explicitly that “[t]he feeling of respect is, as it were, the epiphenomenon of moral 
motivation” (Sytsma 1993, 121). Ralph Walker also claims that “our awareness of it [a 
moral requirement] can motivate us directly, without the need of any further feeling to 
prompt the act” (Walker 1989, 105). Henry Allision initially suggests an intellectualist 
reading (see 1990, 121, 123, 287; and also Zinkin 2006, 32 and McCarty 1993, 425), and 
even his most recent position at least seems undecided on the matter if not leaning 
towards intellectualism when he claims “the term “respect” appears to be little more than 
a place-holder for whatever non-inclination-based motivational factor is operative in 
action from duty” (see 2011, 129-30). These interpretations therefore deny that feeling is 
part of the motivational process, and claim alternatively that reason or our awareness of 
the law itself is in some way sufficient to move us to action on its own.107 
                                                
107 I admittedly find it very difficult to understand how Reath and the interpreters mentioned in 
this paragraph think motivation is possible, according to Kant, if reason or an intellectual 
recognition alone is able to motivate directly and without the cooperation of feeling or desire in 
any way. Aside from the fact that it doesn’t seem to square with Kant’s discussion of the feeling 
of respect as an incentive and his understanding of the higher faculty of desire, I wish to note here 
that I take this interpretation to ultimately dissolve into a version of Socratic intellectualism. 
Reath has the most detailed presentation of this interpretation, and towards the end of his article 
when he discusses how incentives, including the moral incentive, influence choice he claims the 
following: “Kant’s view, I want to argue, is that one chooses to act on an incentive of any kind by 
regarding it as providing a sufficient reason for action, where that is a reason with normative 
force from the standpoint of others, not just the agent” (Reath 2006, 18). What Reath claims here 
is that choice implicitly involves and is the result of a normative judgement, i.e. the judgement 
that the choice I make is one not only I, but anyone in my circumstances ought to make. Reath 
makes this claim because he believes that “the moral incentive does not operate by exerting a 
force on the will” (Reath 2006. 18), i.e. choice is not the result of the strength of the force of the 
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As should be clear from my reading above, I disagree with this interpretation. In 
the above, I have attempted to illustrate that feeling does in fact play a role in motivation. 
Above all, this is suggested by the fact that when Kant attempts to answer the question of 
what happens in the mind when the moral law becomes an incentive, he immediately 
turns to a discussion of how the law brings about positive and negative feelings in the 
mind. It would be curious for him to venture to do so if it were his aim to claim that the 
feelings brought about by the moral law do not contribute to moral motivation in some 
way. Additionally, I have attempted to explain in the above the precise role that the 
feelings effected by the moral law play in motivation: similar to how feelings of pleasure 
ground desire, although the feeling of respect is neither pleasure nor displeasure, it 
functions in the same way as the expectation of pleasure does, namely this feeling 
functions as an impulse to activity, i.e. a rudimentary form of desire or, as Kant says, an 
“incentive” which drives us to perform moral action. Rather than claiming that the 
feelings effected by the moral law are merely part of the experience of acting morally, 
then, Kant argues that feeling, which acts as a driving force produced by reason itself, has 
an essential role to play in the performance of moral action. 
3.3.2 Affectivist Interpretations 
In contrast to the above interpretation, there are also many interpreters, indeed the 
overwhelming majority of them, who argue that feeling and desire are involved in moral 
motivation, for Kant. For example, some commentators argue that when Kant claims 
feeling is involved in moral motivation, he means that pleasure and displeasure must be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
incentive. What Reath fails to consider, and which I discuss below, is that the moral incentive can 
both exert a force on the will but not necessitate it to action, i.e. the moral incentive can both 
exert a force and choice can be preserved. Alternatively, Reath seems to believe that the only way 
for choice to be preserved is for the role of the force of feeling to be excluded altogether. 
Although his view does not claim that a normative judgement necessitates that we act in a certain 
way, and in this way his view is distinct from classic Socratic intellectualism, it does claim that 
we only ever act as the result of choosing to follow a particular normative judgement all on its 
own. It also deserves mention here that during Kant’s time Christian Wolff put forth a version of 
Socratic intellectualism and Kant explicitly distances himself from this position in the second 
Critique (see KpV 5:22-4). 
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involved in moral motivation as well. At first glance this sounds plausible in that Kant 
says the moral law has a positive and negative effect on feeling and, in general he 
understands the faculty of feeling as the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure [das 
Gefühl der Lust und Unlust]. Allen Wood and Dieter Schönecker, for example, argue that 
“Kant admits moral feeling (properly understood) as a motive for action” (2015, 20), but 
they go on to say that because feeling is involved in moral motivation, “all actions, 
including moral actions, must proceed, motivationally speaking, from a feeling of 
pleasure” (Wood and Schönecker 2015, 79). Larry Herrera shares this opinion in that he 
believes “the moving power of the moral motive depends on the development of the 
mind’s preconceptual conditions of moral sensibility” and explains how this means that 
the moral motive depends on “our human capacity to experience pleasure and 
displeasure” (Herrera 2000, 397, see also 404-6). Mark Timmons has a similar 
interpretation in that he believes that “Kant’s view … is that if the moral law is to come 
into conflict with desires and, in a sense, vie for influence over the will, it must do so by 
influencing the feeling on which desires are based” (Timmons 1985, 385).108 According 
to these interpreters, then, the moral law moves us to act via the feeling of pleasure. This 
interpretation can be slightly misleading, however, for it suggests that the moral law 
moves us to act just like any other promise of pleasure and displeasure. It is likely these 
interpreters wouldn’t want to attribute such a position to Kant, but because they only go 
so far as to say that the moral law moves us via the feeling of pleasure, and do not 
explain how exactly or in what way it does so, their interpretations are less instructive 
                                                
108 Owen Ware has a similar, albeit more detailed interpretation, according to which it is not just 
any pleasure that is involved in moral motivation, rather it is the particular kind of pleasure 
captured by the elevating dimension of the feeling of respect, or what Ware calls the feeling of 
“self respect,” that does the motivating in moral action (see Ware 2014, 739). According to Ware, 
with the pleasure of self-respect we “have an effect on sensibility that is suited to play the role of 
moral motivation, for this feeling arises from an awareness of our autonomy” (Ware 2014, 739). 
Ware therefore still believes that the moral law moves us via pleasure, but this pleasure is distinct 
in kind from the pathological pleasures related to happiness. I find Ware’s view plausible and 
think my interpretation is likely in agreement with his. However, his reading is also embedded in 
a discussion of Kant’s answer to what he calls “motivational effect scepticism” (see Ware 
2014,728). I therefore refrain from discussing his view in detail, for it would take me too far away 
from my main purpose in this section. 
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than they could be. Indeed, the interesting question is not only whether feeling and desire 
are involved in moral motivation, rather, it is perhaps more interesting to know how 
feeling and desire are involved in moral motivation. As such, in the following I take care 
to show how other interpreters have explained the precise role of feeling and desire in 
Kant’s account of moral motivation.  
A number of interpreters believe that feeling is involved in motivation, for Kant, 
in that feeling is essentially the same as a passion or desire. Ido Geiger, for example, 
believes that “Kant claims that the feeling of respect for the moral law is an aspect of any 
moral action” (Geiger 2001, 286), and furthermore that the feeling of respect is “the force 
driving moral action” (ibid., 290). According to Geiger, “[a]n incentive is … the driving 
force or mainspring of action” and “the effective forces driving naturally affected beings 
– what actually move us to action in the phenomenal world – are feelings” (ibid., 289). 
Thus as an incentive, feelings, and specifically the feeling of respect, are forces driving 
human beings to act. In a similar vein, Melissa Zinkin argues persuasively that, in light of 
Kant’s pre-Critical notion of a negative magnitude discussed in the previous chapter, 
“Kant’s use of terms that refer to force is essential for understanding his theory of moral 
motivation” (Zinkin 2006, 50) and she argues that the feeling of respect for the law 
operates like such a force (see Zinkin 2006, 45). A. T. Nuyen states the thrust of this view 
even more clearly when arguing that, according to Kant, “it is a passion that provides the 
psychological push for every action” (Nuyen 1991, 40). In the case of moral action, 
according to Nuyen’s interpretation of Kant, “the feeling of respect is a mechanism that 
propels the sensuous self to moral action” (Nuyen 1991, 40). As such, Nuyen, as well as 
Geiger and Zinkin in their own way, believe that feeling, specifically the feeling of 
respect, is like a passion in that it is a psychological force pushing us to act. 
The characterization of Kant’s view that I have provided above, agrees with this 
interpretation to a certain extent. The feeling of respect, as an incentive, does indeed 
operate similar to a psychological force driving moral action, and as such it is similar to a 
passion or a desire. As mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, however, 
many of those who argue for this interpretation also claim that, because Kant ultimately 
believes that even moral action requires the presence of a psychological force, his 
conception of moral motivation has much in common with the broadly empiricist 
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conception of action put forth by David Hume, among others. Nuyen, for example, not 
only argues that “the feeling of respect is a mechanism that propels the sensuous self to 
moral action” (Nuyen 1991, 40), but he goes on to argue that insofar as Kant believes 
respect is such a mechanism, he “adopts” Hume’s moral psychology (see Nuyen 1991, 
40). Lara Denis is another who compares Kant with Hume and claims that because Kant 
believes “feelings … are essential to human moral motivation,” one can say that Kant and 
Hume “appear to share a view of human action according to which feelings … are needed 
for motivating action” (Denis 2012). Engstrom even claims that because Kant believes an 
effect on feeling is necessary for the moral law to become practical, Kant is in fact, 
strictly speaking, “in agreement” with Hume’s claim that “reason is ‘perfectly inert’” 
(2010, 97). Zinkin shares this interpretation but doesn’t compare Kant with Hume 
directly. She argues that because Kant claims it is a psychological force that moves us to 
act morally, he “is making a concession to the philosophers of moral sense” (2006, 32). 
Similarly, after Geiger argues that Kant believes “the effective forces driving naturally 
affected beings … are feelings,” he claims that “[t]his is the insight that Kant, 
surprisingly perhaps, takes from the empiricist view of agency” (Geiger 2001, 289). A 
number of other interpreters make similar claims,109 but they all agree that the main point 
of similarity between Kant’s view and the “empiricist” conception of action is simply the 
fact that even moral action, for Kant, must proceed not merely from our awareness of the 
law directly, but from a psychological feeling, passion, or force. The comparison between 
Kant and Hume is interesting, and later in this section I compare Kant with the person 
whom I believe is his more proper historical interlocutor on the issue of motivation, 
namely Hutcheson. Before doing so, however, there are two other affectivist 
interpretations of Kant that deserve discussion because they will raise important points 
that are directly relevant to the comparison between Kant and Hutcheson. 
According to one additional affectivist interpretation of Kant, a dimension is 
added according to which choice is in fact determined by the strength of the force of 
feeling. Richard McCarty defends this interpretation and according to his most recent 
                                                
109 See MacBeath (1973, 312-13), Morrison (2008, 135), Beck (1960, 212), Broadie and Pybus 
(1975, 63), and Guevara (2000, 102-3). 
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presentation of the view, he claims that “Kant viewed respect for the law as a 
psychologically forceful incentive” in that “respect is the motivating feeling that explains 
actions appraised in Kant’s ethical theory as having “moral worth”” (McCarty 2009, 
167). McCarty goes on to clarify how exactly this takes place when he states the 
following: “The strength of one’s feeling of respect can explain one’s acting on a moral 
principle rather than on an alternative maxim of inclination” (McCarty 2009, 177). In 
other words, when the feeling of respect “prevails in motivating action (or omission), it 
does so through its relative strength as a motive force” (McCarty 2009, 177), i.e. “to 
prevail it [respect] must be stronger than competing interests grounded on those 
constrained though still motivationally forceful inclinations” (McCarty 2009, 181).110 
McCarty therefore attributes to Kant the “battle of forces” model of action, according to 
which even when we act morally our action can be explained by the strongest force 
operative at the time. The essence of this view is that the strongest force currently 
exerting its influence over us determines choice. This is significant for it means that this 
interpretation attributes to Kant the view that we are ultimately not free to choose how we 
act. McCarty suggests this explicitly in an earlier article when he claims the following:  
The outcome of a moral choice-event, where agents are antecedently motivated to 
one course of action by the moral incentive of respect for the law, and to an 
alternative course of action by the incentives of inclination, is in fact always 
determined by the relative strengths of the conflicting incentives. (McCarty 1994, 
25, my emphasis) 
We therefore need to ask ourselves: in that Kant seems to find a role for feeling and 
desire even in the case of moral action, does this mean that he does away with freedom of 
choice? 
                                                
110 This view is not only McCarty’s most recent view, but is the view in his earlier work as well. 
In an early article, for example, McCarty claims that “Kant never wavered from maintaining that 
a moral feeling of respect plays an important and appropriate motivational role” (McCarty 1994, 
16), and that “[i]f that moral incentive is stronger than competing, nonmoral incentives, it will 
subsequently determine the outcome of the moral choice-event, or the performance of the moral 
course of action instead of the inclinational alternative” (McCarty 1994, 26). 
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Without getting into an extended discussion of Kant’s views on the freedom of 
choice,111 it can be illustrated fairly easily that the answer to the above question is: No. 
As I mentioned above, in the early Metaphysik L1 notes Kant adopts Baumgarten’s talk of 
“impelling causes,” which if we recall was linked to Baumgarten’s own understanding of 
an incentive. In this context Kant says the following: 
With all non-rational animals the stimuli <stimuli> have necessitating power … 
but with human beings the stimuli … do not have necessitating power … but 
rather only impelling [power] … Accordingly, the human power of choice 
<arbitrium humanum> is not brute <brutum>, but rather free <arbitrium>. (ML 
28:255)  
The core of Kant’s (early) view on the freedom of choice, then, is that what is distinctive 
about human choice as opposed to animal choice is the fact that humans are not 
determined to choose in line with whatever the incentives urge us to do. Rather, the 
nature of human choice is such that what our incentives urge us to do only impel us 
towards a particular action, such that if we are to in fact perform such action we still need 
to choose to do so. 
Kant does not only hold this view during his pre-Critical period, rather he 
continues to think of the freedom of choice in this way during the Critical period as well. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that “[t]he faculty of desire in accordance with 
concepts … is called a faculty to do or refrain from doing as one pleases” (MdS 6:213), 
and in this text he distinguishes between “animal choice (arbitrium brutum)” and “human 
choice” (MdS 6:213) in a way reminiscent of his discussion in the Metaphysik L1 notes. In 
1797 Kant claims that animal choice is “[t]hat which can be determined only by 
inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus)” and human choice “is a choice that can indeed 
be affected [afficirt] but not determined by impulses” (MdS 6:213). The mature Kant 
                                                
111 Providing an adequate explanation of Kant’s view on freedom of the will would require at 
least another chapter dedicated to the topic. Indeed, Henry Allison has devoted almost an entire 
book (see Allison 1990) to precisely such a topic. What I discuss here is therefore only those 
features of Kant’s stance on the freedom of the will relevant to my focus here. In particular, I 
focus on the issue of whether the strength of a feeling or desire makes it necessary that we choose 
in a certain way, therefore doing away with freedom. I pretend to offer neither a full explanation 
nor a defense of Kant’s stance on the freedom of the will, many aspects of which still elude 
interpreters (see esp. Allison 1990, Ch. 7 and 8; Klemme 2013). 
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therefore also believes that human choice is free choice in that “[f]reedom of choice is 
this independence from being determined by sensible impulses” (MdS 6:213). Thus both 
Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical discussion of the freedom of the will seem to suggest that 
he ultimately believes that even though the incentives are psychological forces urging us 
to act, they do not determine us to act as a function of their strength. Rather, even if an 
incentive is strong, in order to ultimately act on such an incentive we must choose to do 
so.112 
I therefore disagree with McCarty’s claim that Kant’s seemingly empiricist 
commitments imply that he does not believe in freedom of choice, although I do agree 
with the claim that, ultimately, a psychological force is operative in moral action, for 
Kant. What this discussion of McCarty’s interpretation illuminates is that there are 
important features of Kant’s position that distinguish it from the simplistic empiricist 
conception of the psychology of action, according to which all action proceeds from a 
passion or desire. Karl Ameriks presents an interpretation of Kant that makes an effort to 
point out the features of his position that differ from Hume’s, for example.  I briefly 
discuss Ameriks’ view before moving on to discuss the ways in which I take Kant’s 
position to be distinct from not Hume’s, but Hutcheson’s view of motivation. 
Ameriks notes how “[t]he first step in understanding” Kant’s position on moral 
motivation “is to point out that the philosophy of action in general requires a much more 
complex approach than the simple contrast between belief and desire commonly found in 
Anglophone ethics” (Ameriks 2006, 92). In contrast to a simplistic view of action 
involving only belief and desire, Ameriks claims that if we are to understand Kant’s view 
                                                
112 An important qualification needs to be added here. With respect to Kant’s view on the freedom 
of the will, Allison adds that “we need not take him [Kant] as affirming the utterly implausible 
view that one’s past behaviour, disposition, and circumstances play no role in governing one’s 
actions … Kant is not claiming that, all things considered, it would be equally easy for the liar to 
speak the truth on that occasion. He is claiming rather that he could have done so” (Allison 2006, 
397). Accordingly, while the strength of our feelings, including the moral feeling of respect, do 
not necessitate our acting in certain ways, it is important to keep in mind that the strength of a 
feeling certainly might make it more likely for us to choose in a particular way. Nonetheless, the 
strength of the feeling cannot determine us given the nature of our will, thus we always need to 
choose to act on a feeling no matter how strong it impels us to act in a certain way. 
 
136 
 
of action, “[t]he relevant complexity to note is that the notion of ‘desire’ – insofar as here 
it designates simply all that contrasts with ‘mere belief’ – can involve a number of very 
different components, most notably: feeling, volition, and normativity” (ibid., 92). With 
this in mind, Ameriks makes the following observation: “If one insists on calling any 
motive a desire (that is, if the term ‘desire’ just signifies the state that one is in 
immediately prior to action), then one could say in a harmless way that even Kant can 
allow that all our actions are desire-based” (ibid., 100). As is implied here, though, this 
does not help clarify what is novel about Kant’s position insofar as it is more complex 
than the simplistic belief-desire paradigm. According to Ameriks, Kant recognizes that 
“[c]ommon sense and ordinary phenomenological reflection show that people generally 
need to care or feel strongly about something in order to be likely to will and act on it; 
simply ‘seeing’ that something is the right thing to do cannot be counted on as enough” 
(ibid., 103). Ameriks therefore agrees that Kant does not subscribe to the hard 
intellectualist position, according to which merely believing what one ought to do 
necessitates that one act accordingly. In contrast to both this view and the empiricist view 
of action, Ameriks claims that Kant’s position is far more complex:  
Kant realized that we might see what we ought to do, and as a consequence even 
have a feeling pointing in the direction of doing it, and yet not move toward doing 
it.  … When we have a feeling for something in line with an action that we later 
go on to take for that thing, it is never the case that the feeling is by itself 
sufficient to be a literal motive, a ‘mover.’ … [F]or Kant it is still up to the agent, 
through its free will, to ‘incorporate’ that sign, that feeling, and to become 
actually motivated by choosing to direct itself accordingly, in contrast to all the 
other directions that might seem available at that moment. (Ameriks 2006, 106)  
As such, Ameriks believes that feeling plays an essential role in moral motivation, but he 
disagrees with McCarty’s claim that the strongest feeling actually moves us to act. 
Referencing Kant’s “incorporation thesis” (see Allison 1990, 40), which says that we 
only ever act if we choose to incorporate an incentive into a maxim (see Rel 6:24), 
Ameriks agrees with the interpretation I offer above, according to which Kant both 
assigns a key role to feelings in the motivation of action, but adds that this does not 
preclude the possibility of freedom of choice. Feeling here is indeed essential to moral 
action, but neither is it sufficient and requires not only desire but volition, i.e. willing or 
choice, in order to ultimately result in action taking place. 
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As mentioned, however, Ameriks contrasts Kant’s position with that of Hume, not 
Hutcheson. In general, I do not wish to deny the usefulness of contrasting Kant and 
Hume on the question of motivation. Indeed, I fully understand that, insofar as Hume is 
likely the most often read empiricist moral philosopher of the eighteenth century, it is 
very instructive and even natural to contrast his position with Kant’s, who is often 
regarded as the archetype rationalist moral philosopher of the period. At the same time, 
Kant engages with Hutcheson’s moral philosophy far more often than Hume’s,113 and 
this suggests that he would have been more familiar with Hutcheson’s psychology of 
action. Thus in our attempt to understand how Kant’s conception of moral motivation is 
distinct from the empiricist view, it might be more instructive to compare his view with 
Hutcheson’s position. In the following section I therefore point out some important 
differences between Kant’s and Hutcheson’s conception of moral motivation in the hopes 
that their respective positions can be illuminated as a result. 
3.3.3 Kant and Hutcheson on Moral Motivation 
 When comparing Hutcheson’s and Kant’s psychology of action, in light of my 
above reconstruction of Kant’s view I take them to agree on a very basic point, namely 
that all action, even moral action, requires the presence of an at least rudimentary kind of 
desire. This is, however, a relatively simple point and, as Ameriks claims, it is in effect 
harmless to say that Kant subscribes to such a view. What is more interesting to note and 
indeed what is more important if we want to understanding the nuances of their 
respective positions, are the ways in which their accounts of action differ. In this final 
section I identify four fundamental differences between Kant’s and Hutcheson’s 
psychology of action. 
 (1) In addition to believing that all action proceeds from a passion, an affection, or 
a desire, Hutcheson subscribes to the battle of forces model of action, according to which 
any action we undertake can be explained by the strongest force winning out against the 
opposing forces. This is clear from Hutcheson’s view, discussed in chapter one, that 
                                                
113 See footnote 82 above. 
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becoming moral involves weakening the hold that self-interest holds over us (see e.g. I4 
271), and that vice is when self-interest “overcome[s]” benevolence (see e.g. I4 175, 
269). In contrast to such a view, I argued above that Kant views incentives, for example, 
as impelling causes, where this means that their force only urges us to act in a particular 
way but can only ever actually bring us to act in accordance with what their force 
suggests if we choose to do so. I therefore take it that Kant does not subscribe to the 
battle of forces model of action and in contrast preserves room for freedom of choice. So 
while both Hutcheson and Kant, on one level, agree that a psychological force is 
ultimately at the root of our actions, for Kant these forces only ever bring us to act if we 
allow them, while for Hutcheson it is the strength of these forces that determines the way 
in which we act.114 
 (2) In chapter one, I explained how Hutcheson regards both self-interest and 
benevolence as “ultimate ends” (E4 222) of ours, i.e. they are the two foundational 
desires that all human beings possess and are the two desires to which all others can be 
reduced. What Hutcheson means when he says that all human beings desire these things 
as ultimate ends is that we all already desire them insofar as we are human beings. 
Indeed, I explained the significance of this in chapter one when I illustrated that the 
judgements of the moral sense, for Hutcheson, can only ever bring us to do what we 
judge to be morally good because what we judge to be morally good (bringing about the 
happiness of others disinterestedly) is something we already desire. This marks an 
interesting and important difference between Hutcheson and Kant.  
In this chapter I explained that Kant faces the challenge of explaining what happens 
in the mind when the moral law moves us to act on its own. I illustrated that what occurs 
                                                
114 A slight qualification is needed here. Although Hutcheson seems to believe that whether we 
act depends upon the strongest desire, passion, or affection, how we act is something we have 
control over. For example, Hutcheson rarely discusses choice at all but on one rare occasion when 
he does, he claims that self-interest and benevolence are like instincts in the sense that they are 
“previous to Reason” and therefore that our desiring them is “not the Effect of Prudence and 
Choice” (I4 196). According to Hutcheson, the only role for choice in action is “the Election of 
proper means for promoting of either” (I4 196, sic.). Thus while Hutcheson seems to believe that 
we will necessarily do whatever we desire the most, how we go about securing the object of our 
desire can be determined by reason or choice. 
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when this happens is that feelings are produced, the most important one of which is the 
positive feeling of respect which functions as an impulse to activity, and in this sense 
feeling acts as an incentive or rudimentary desire. Indeed, when we commit to pursuing 
the object of this rudimentary desire (moral actions in themselves), Kant says we take an 
interest in moral action immediately. As mentioned, Kant alternatively says that what 
happens when the moral law moves us to act is that the law “produces” an interest in us 
to act morally (see KpV 5:80). This is significant because it means that the force or desire 
at the basis of moral action is distinct from all other desires and interests in the sense that 
its source is in the moral law, i.e. our reason, and is not one we previously possess by 
nature.115 In fact, this seems to be the only way it is possible for us to fulfill an 
unconditional obligation, for Kant. As we saw, in answering the question of what 
happens when our awareness of what we ought to do moves us to act, Kant argues that 
what cannot happen is that we are moved to act morally for the sake of feeling, for this 
would make moral obligation conditional: in such as case we act morally because we 
already desire something else. This is thus the exact opposite of unconditional obligation, 
and thus it cannot be the correct explanation of how an unconditional or categorical 
moral command can move us to act. We must be bound by morality first, before we 
desire to act morally, and thus what must take place in the mind when an unconditional 
command moves us to act is that the moral command itself produces the desire at the 
basis of moral action. Thus although Hutcheson and Kant agree on a trivial level that all 
action rests on a desire, for Kant the desire at the basis of moral action must be a different 
kind of desire altogether, i.e. one that is produced by reason and the moral law itself. 
(3) A related difference is implied by the above point. If, according to Hutcheson, we 
desire self-interest and benevolence as ultimate ends by nature, this means that the 
ultimate ends of action are fixed by nature as well (see Irwin 2008, 409). On the other 
hand, if, according to Kant, it is possible for us to take an interest in acting morally and 
to desire to act morally as an end in itself, this suggests that we can choose an additional 
                                                
115 Such an interpretation is consistent with Kant’s conception of moral education, according to 
which we do not necessarily desire to be moral by nature, but must be slowly educated to have 
such a desire (see Louden 2000, 169 and 171). 
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(ultimate) end that is not provided by nature. In fact, Kant says precisely this in the 
Metaphysics of Morals where he even goes so far as to claim that “[t]he capacity to set 
oneself an end … is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality)” 
(MdS 6:392, see also MdS 6:387 and Rel 6:26-7). Indeed, Kant argues in this text that we 
have a duty to set ourselves two additional ends, namely one’s own perfection and the 
happiness of others, and insofar as we ought to make these things our ends we must be 
capable of doing so. These are ultimate ends rather than ends that serve as means to more 
foundational ones if we remember that for Kant acting morally is characterizes by acting 
for the sake of the law alone, i.e. desiring to do what we ought to do solely because we 
ought to do it. In other words, we desire to perform moral action as an end in itself, i.e. 
not as a means to some further, ultimate end. Thus if we ought to bring about certain 
ultimate ends, then we must also be capable of fulfilling this duty, which would involve 
desiring these things as ends in themselves. Kant therefore allows for the possibility of 
our setting ourselves certain ultimate ends that we do not desire by nature, thereby setting 
him apart from Hutcheson in an important way. 
(4) One final and significant difference between Kant and Hutcheson in fact concerns 
our ultimate ends or the objects or our desires. As I illustrated in the first part of this 
chapter, Kant criticizes Hutcheson for “reducing everything to happiness,” and I 
suggested that what Kant takes Hutcheson to believe when making such a claim is that all 
of our desires, even the disinterested desire for benevolence, is still a desire for pleasure. 
Hutcheson’s interpreters disagree over this issue, but I noted that Kant is at least not 
alone in interpreting Hutcheson this way. The accuracy of his interpretation aside, what is 
important is that Kant disagrees with this view and therefore believes that it is possible to 
desire objects other than pleasure. This difference is borne out in the above: in the case of 
moral action Kant claims that “[r]eason takes an immediate interest in the action” (GMS 
4:460). Indeed, because acting morally involves acting for the sake of the law as opposed 
to acting in conformity with the law but for the sake of feeling, acting morally involves 
desiring something distinct from pleasure, namely moral action in and of itself. This point 
is intimately related to the previous one, because when we choose to pursue an ultimate 
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end, at least in the moral case116 we choose an end distinct from pleasure. I therefore 
want to suggest that by claiming we are capable of desiring something other than 
pleasure, Kant takes himself to be offering a view distinct from Hutcheson’s. For Kant, 
we can desire performing moral action immediately, i.e. as an end in itself. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 My aim in this chapter was to discuss the primary ways in which moral sense 
theory, and Hutcheson’s version thereof in particular, influenced Kant’s mature moral 
philosophy. I focused on two topics, i.e. the two topics that Hutcheson considered central 
to moral philosophy and which were the focus of the previous chapter as well, namely the 
topics of moral judgement and moral motivation. In the first part of the chapter (3.1) I 
illustrated that Kant wages six main criticisms against moral sense theory’s conception of 
moral judgement, which reflects his post-1770 understanding of moral philosophy as a 
rational enterprise. Above all, moral judgement, for Kant, must be both universal and 
necessary in a way judgements based on feeling are not capable of achieving. In the 
second and third sections of the chapter I turned to the topic of moral motivation where 
my aim was to illustrate whether and in what way Kant’s mature understanding of moral 
motivation is similar to Hutcheson’s. After sketching Kant’s mature view of moral 
motivation in detail in section 3.2, in section 3.3 I discussed various interpretations of his 
view, some of which argue his position shows the influence of the empiricist conception 
of action subscribed to by both Hutcheson and Hume. I proceeded to suggest that while 
                                                
116 In the non-moral case Kant claims we choose self-interest as our end. This has varying levels 
of moral severity in line with Kant’s discussion of the three degrees of evil in the Religion. First, 
in accordance with “frailty,” i.e. “the general weakness of the human heart in complying with the 
adopted maxims” (Rel 6:29), we simply fail to choose the moral end to begin with and do not 
necessarily choose the false end, namely personal pleasure. In the second case of “impurity” we 
“adulterate moral incentives with immoral ones” (ibid.) and therefore choose both the non-moral 
and the moral end. In the third case of “depravity” we “adopt evil maxims” (ibid.), in which case 
we only choose pleasure as the object of our desire to the detriment of morality. To be noted here 
as well is that Kant’s view as I have characterized it here seems to suggest he is a non-moral 
hedonist, i.e. he believes we can only ever desire either pleasure as an end, or moral action 
immediately. Again, although I do not have the space to discuss it at length, I must admit that I 
find this interpretation of Kant plausible. For more on reading Kant in this way see Reath (2006), 
Morrison (2008), McCarty (2009), Frierson (2014, 148), and Allison (2011, 264). 
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on a very superficial level Kant’s and Hutcheson’s theories of moral motivation share 
some common features, there are also a number of very important differences between 
their views. In sum, it seems that while Kant was certainly not unmoved by Hutcheson’s 
understanding of motivation, the differences between their views are more significant 
than their similarities. My hope is that this comparison clarifies their respective views on 
moral motivation, especially in the case of Kant whose position has been the subject of 
intense debate in the secondary literature over the past few decades. In the next chapter I 
continue discussing Kant’s mature conception of motivation and I explore whether 
another thinker, namely Adam Smith, had a more positive influence on Kant’s notion of 
“respect” for the moral law. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Kant and Smith on Achtung and Moral Motivation 
In the previous chapter I discussed Kant’s mature conception of moral motivation 
in detail. Part of my focus was the extent to which feeling plays a role in Kant’s 
conception of motivation and we saw that the feeling of “respect” plays a central role 
therein. In this chapter, I primarily discuss respect not as a feeling, but rather as an 
attitude. I aim to clarify this attitude by placing it in the context of the thought of a 
thinker who is not himself a moral sense theorist but is nonetheless operating in the same 
tradition, namely Adam Smith. There are many ways in which Smith’s thought might 
have influenced Kant’s moral theory.117 In this chapter I focus on one way in particular, 
and this is how Smith’s conception of the attitude of “regard” for what he calls the 
“general rules of conduct” might help clarify Kant’s notion of “respect [Achtung]”118 for 
the moral law. I begin with an introduction (4.1), followed by a substantial section on 
Smith (4.2) where I outline his understanding of the general rules of conduct, his views 
on motivation and the sense of duty, as well as his conception of the attitude of regard. I 
then turn to Kant, where in (4.3) I briefly summarize Kant’s pre-Critical conception of 
motivation and how it differs from the Critical view, but I focus on illustrating how the 
concept of respect is absent from the early period. In section (4.4) I turn to Kant’s mature 
conception of respect where I explain the nature of respect as an attitude against the 
background of Smith’s notion of “regard” as well as discuss how it is distinct from but 
related to the feeling of respect. In the final section (4.5) I discuss the evidence that 
                                                
117 I address these later in this chapter, but see the following sources for a discussion of the 
relation between Kant and Smith: Oncken (1877), Shell (1980, 80, 102, 147), Fleischacker 
(1991), and Klemme (2000, vol. 4). 
118 I adopt what I consider the standard translation of Achtung, namely “respect.” Others, most 
notably H. J. Paton (see e.g. 1953, 63-68) and Jens Timmermann (see 2007, 181-2) have opted for 
“reverence,” in part because Kant himself uses the Latin reverentia to refer to Achtung for the 
moral law in the Metaphysics of Morals (see MdS 6:402 and 6:467). Timmermann argues that 
“reverence” is preferable to “respect” given the many present-day connotations of the latter (see 
2007, 182), but in his new translation of the Groundwork he opts for “respect” as well. 
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suggests Kant in fact read Smith, and I give reason to believe that, in addition to helping 
clarify Kant’s notion of respect, Kant may have in fact been directly influenced by 
Smith’s conception of “regard.” 
4.1 Introduction 
A characteristic feature of Kant’s moral philosophy is the idea that “respect” 
(Achtung) for the moral law is the only motive that gives action true moral worth, and it 
is generally assumed that this idea is unique to his moral philosophy. There is good 
reason for this assumption, for shortly after his first published119 use of the expression in 
the “third proposition” of Groundwork I (“duty is the necessity of an action from respect 
for the law” GMS 4:400), Kant says the following in a footnote: “I might be accused of 
using the word respect just to seek refuge in an obscure feeling, instead of giving distinct 
information about the matter in question by means of a concept of reason” (GMS 4:401n). 
Although Kant seems to be suggesting that respect is “obscure [dunkelen]” simply 
because it is a feeling in contrast to a concept of reason, one gets the impression that part 
of the reason for respect’s obscurity lies in the fact that he is using an at least uncommon, 
if not invented, expression to capture the feeling he is discussing. Indeed, Kant might 
have felt the need to defend himself here because he was concerned he would be 
criticized by the Popularphilosophen for not using “popular concepts” (see GMS 4:409). 
Whatever the precise reason for Kant’s “apologetic” tone in the footnote (see 
Timmermann 2007, 41), Kant’s first discussion of respect as an “obscure feeling” 
certainly does not provide an obvious answer to the question of whether he was assigning 
a new, technical meaning to the term or whether he was simply using an uncommon and 
obscure one. 
More than a century ago, August Oncken gave reason to believe that Kant was not 
the first to use Achtung in the technical way used in his moral philosophy, and that the 
same expression could be found in the first German translation of Adam Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments. As Oncken states:  
                                                
119 As I discuss below, Kant’s first (unpublished) mention of respect for the moral law occurs in 
the Naturrecht Feyerabend notes from 1784. 
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The concern with and consciousness of this inner moral law is the “worth” 
(“dignity”) of human beings, and the drive to obey the commands of this law 
takes place similarly in both theories through the feeling of respect [Achtung] for 
the majesty of this moral law (‘reverentia’ for Kant, ‘reverence’ for Smith). 
(1877, 92) 
To cite an example of how Smith uses “regard,” or “reverence,” as well as how these 
terms were translated in the first German edition of Smith’s Theory, consider the 
following: in the Theory, Smith gives the example of visiting a friend when you’re in a 
bad mood and being tempted to treat them poorly for no good reason. In such a situation, 
Smith says: 
What renders you incapable of such a rudeness, is nothing but a regard to the 
general rules of civility and hospitality, which prohibit it. That habitual reverence 
which your former experience has taught you for these enables you to act, upon 
all such occasions, with nearly equal propriety, and hinders those inequalities of 
temper, to which all men are subject, from influencing your conduct in any very 
sensible degree. (TMS 232, my emphasis)120 
Nichts kan euch abhalten, eine solche Grobheit zu begehen, als die Achtung 
gegen die allgemeinen Regeln der Höfflichkeit, die sie verbieten. Diese 
angewohnte Achtung dagegen, die ihr aus eurer vorigen Erfarung gelernet habt, 
sezt euch in den Stand bei allen solchen Gelegenheiten mit fast gleicher 
Schicklichkeit zu handeln, und hindert es, daß nicht jene Ungleichheiten der 
Laune, denen alle Menschen unterworfen sind, in einem sehr merklichen Grad auf 
euer Verhalten einen Einfluß haben. (GTMS 316, my emphasis) 
Achtung, as used by Smith, is therefore an attitude of “regard” or “reverence”121 taken 
towards what Smith calls here the “general rules” of “civility and hospitality,” but which 
in other places he calls more generally “the general rules of conduct” (TMS 229). In his 
study, however, Oncken goes no further than merely pointing out this terminological 
similarity. 
                                                
120 All references to Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments use the third edition of 1767, i.e. the 
edition that was the basis for Christian Günther Rautenberg’s 1770 German translation and which 
is the edition with which Kant would have been familiar. That Kant could only have known the 
third edition is significant given the major changes Smith made to the sixth edition. See Raphael 
(2010, 16) for discussion of the significance of the changes to the sixth edition. 
121 I discuss below how the terms Smith uses to describe the attitude we take towards the general 
rules are translated inconsistently, as is clear from this passage, but that Achtung is by far the 
dominant term. 
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In this chapter, part of my aim is to show that, rather than a mere terminological 
similarity, Smith’s and Kant’s conceptions of Achtung for the general rules and the moral 
law respectively have significant conceptual similarities as well. I make this comparison 
primarily in order to clarify Kant’s concept of respect, a concept which has received a 
great deal of attention by Kant’s commentators since its inception. Very early on, for 
example, August Wilhelm Rehberg criticized Kant’s doctrine of respect as an 
unsuccessful attempt to show how pure reason can have an effect on the phenomenal 
world (see Rehberg 1788). In the mid-twentieth century, Dieter Henrich criticized respect 
as problematically presupposing the fact of reason (see Henrich 1963b). More recently 
and as I discussed in the previous chapter, respect has been at the centre of a mass of 
secondary literature debating the role of feeling and sensibility in Kant’s account of 
moral motivation. The attention given to respect as a feeling in this literature, however, 
has resulted in a relatively small amount of attention being given to Kant’s understanding 
of respect as a whole, according to which respect is not only just a feeling, but involves 
what Andrews Reath has called its “intellectual aspect” (see Reath 2006, 10), namely its 
function as what I will call an “attitude” taken towards the moral law. 
As discussed in the last chapter, Reath claims there is an “intellectual” or 
“practical aspect” to respect, and he even claims that this is its “primary notion” (see 
Reath 2006, 10), which is not surprising given Reath’s take on Kant’s view of moral 
motivation. Herrera (2000, 399) and McCarty (1993, 426) take issue with Reath’s view 
that respect as an attitude is primary in motivation, and in response they claim that 
respect is not primarily a “propositional attitude” (see Herrera 2000, 409), but is rather a 
“motivational attitude” (McCarty 1993, 430).122 Similarly, Allen Wood and Dieter 
Schönecker refer to respect as a “rational practical attitude” (2015, 80). What is not clear 
here is in what exactly this attitude consists, how it is distinct from the feeling of respect, 
and indeed how it might be related to this feeling.  
In the following sections I hope to clarify these questions by placing Kant’s 
conception of the attitude of respect for the moral law in context with Smith’s conception 
                                                
122 In another article McCarty refers to respect as a “moral-motivation attitude” (see McCarty 
1994, 15). 
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of the attitude of “regard” for the general rules of conduct. I begin in the next section with 
an investigation of Smith’s conception of “regard” for the general rules of conduct. As 
we will see, similar to Kant’s notion of respect, this attitude has both a cognitive 
dimension as the recognition of the authority of these rules, as well as an affective 
dimension as the “sense of duty” which functions as a motive to action. Understanding 
Smith’s conception of the sense of duty and the general rules requires some background 
on his moral philosophy in general, therefore before turning to Kant and a comparison of 
Kant and Smith, in the next section I discuss the relevant aspects of Smith’s moral 
philosophy that will be important for the later comparison with Kant. 
4.2 Smith on General Rules and the Sense of Duty 
4.2.1 General Rules 
D.D. Raphael has argued that explaining moral judgements is the main topic of at 
least the first five editions of Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments.123 In the context 
of putting forward a theory of moral judgement, the need for moral rules arises from a 
deficiency inherent in how these judgements function, for Smith. According to Smith, 
when we make moral judgements, we judge the sentiments, affections, or passions124 of 
others, and we do this in two different ways. As Smith says early in the Theory: 
The sentiment or affection of the heart from which any action proceeds, and upon 
which its whole virtue or vice must ultimately depend, may be considered under 
two different aspects, or in two different relations; first in relation to the cause 
which excites it, or the motive which gives occasion to it; and secondly, in 
relation to the end which it proposes, or the effect which it tends to produce. (TMS 
19-20) 
These two relations lead to two different species of judgement that can be made in 
relation to a sentiment or affection: 
                                                
123 See Raphael (2007, 1-12) and Raphael (2010, 15-18) for a discussion of how this was indeed 
the central topic of the first five editions. Raphael points out how Smith altered the sixth edition 
to include a discussion of the nature of virtue. 
124 Smith does not seem to distinguish between these terms therefore I use them interchangeably 
when referring to Smith’s understanding of them in the following. 
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In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the 
affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists the 
propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action. 
In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects which the affection aims at, or 
tends to produce, consists the merit or demerit of the action, the qualities by 
which it is entitled to reward, or is deserving of punishment. (TMS 20) 
Judging an action in either of these two ways125 occurs by placing oneself, via the 
imagination, in the situation of the agent (in the case of judgements of propriety) or the 
patient (in cases of judgements of merit) and “sympathizing” with them, i.e. assessing 
whether the passions felt by the “person principally concerned” (TMS 26) are the same as 
those we would have if we were in their position. This procedure is then carried out in a 
similar way when we judge our own actions. However, in order to remove our personal 
bias when judging ourselves, via the imagination we take up the position of an “impartial 
spectator,” i.e. an imagined observer of our actions who knows the relevant details of our 
situation but who is not biased to judge in our favour, or anyone else’s. We approve of 
our own actions if we believe such a spectator would have the same sentiments we find 
ourselves to have, and disapprove if we imagine such a spectator’s sentiments would 
disagree with our own. 
 The limitations of Smith’s conception of moral judgement are apparent in the case 
of judging our own actions, and Smith deals with these limitations in Part 3 of the 
Theory. Smith addresses two main limitations to his theory of moral judgement as 
sketched so far. First, Smith’s theory of moral self-judgement only works in those 
situations where we have the time to imagine ourselves in the position of the impartial 
                                                
125 The second sort of judgement, merit, is not extremely important for my analysis in this 
chapter, therefore when speaking of Smith’s conception of moral judgement I primarily speak of 
propriety. As it turns out, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord has suggested that judgements of propriety, for 
Smith, are in a sense more fundamental than those of merit, in that judgements of merit 
presuppose judgements of propriety. For example, we would only approve of a person feeling 
gratitude, i.e. regard gratitude as a “just” effect of an action, only if we first judge the action 
triggering gratitude to be proper in the first place (see 2010, 126-7 and also Griswold 1999, 183). 
On this interpretation, judgements of propriety are ultimately the most basic, and therefore the 
most important, kind of judgement. I do not wish to evaluate this interpretation here, and my 
focus on judgements of propriety should not be taken as an endorsement of Sayre McCord’s 
view. Rather, because my interpretation of Smith does not hinge upon the distinction between 
these two kinds of judgements, I focus on propriety merely for the sake of simplicity. 
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spectator. More specifically, it is only possible for us to judge of our own actions by 
means of taking up the position of the impartial spectator when we have ample time to do 
so either before acting, or in retrospect when we are judging an action we have already 
completed in the past. Such a theory of judgement therefore seems inadequate for judging 
what we ought to do “when we are about to act” (TMS 220), for example. Smith 
addresses this worry in 3.2126 where he observes that “when we are about to act” or in the 
heat of the moment, “[t]he fury of our own passions constantly calls us back to our own 
place where every thing appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love” (TMS 220). 
In other words, when we are about to act it is difficult for us to take up an impartial point 
of view. If we are able to take up this viewpoint, Smith claims we only obtain 
“instantaneous glimpses, which vanish in a moment, and which even while they last are 
not altogether just” (TMS 220). The problem with judging our conduct in the heat of the 
moment is therefore twofold: (1) it is difficult to take up an impartial perspective at all 
given the strength of our passions when we are about to act, and (2) if we are able to 
achieve such a perspective, it is short-lived and unreliable. With respect to this second 
problem, there is a further reason why Smith believes whatever impartiality we achieve 
here is unreliable and this is because we are prone to self-deceit at the time of acting. 
Paraphrasing Malebranche, Smith claims that in the heat of the moment “[t]he passions 
… all justify themselves, and seem reasonable, and proportioned to their objects, as long 
as we continue to feel them” (TMS 220-1). What this means is that we are disposed to 
approve of whatever sentiments we have in the heat of the moment, and we judge 
however we happen to feel as “proper.” Although we can indeed take up the position of 
the impartial spectator after the fact, this is unsatisfactory because “our judgements now 
are of little importance, compared to what they were before; and when they are most 
severely impartial, can commonly produce nothing but vain regret, and unavailing 
repentance, without securing us from the like errors for the future” (TMS 221). 
The predicament we seem to find ourselves in here is not hopeless, however. As 
Smith says: “Nature, however, has not left this weakness, which is of so much 
                                                
126 References of this kind to the Theory refer to Part#.Section#.Chapter#. Where a Part only has 
one section, as in Part 3, the reference simply lists Part#.Chapter#. 
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importance, altogether without a remedy; nor has she abandoned us entirely to the 
delusions of self-love” (TMS 222-3). Our need for advice on what actions to perform in 
the heat of the moment is satisfied, according to Smith, in the following way: “Our 
continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves 
certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided” 
(TMS 222-3). These rules instruct either “that all such actions are to be avoided” (TMS 
223) or “that every opportunity of acting in this manner is carefully to be sought after” 
(TMS 223-4). As Smith states, these rules are formed by generalizing from how we judge 
the actions of others, as well as from how others judge of our actions.127 If we observe, 
for example, that we always disapprove of a certain way others act, and we have noticed 
that others also disapprove of this way of acting, then “[w]e resolve never to be guilty of 
the like, nor ever, upon any account, to render ourselves in this manner the objects of 
universal disapprobation” (TMS 223).128 These rules help us in the heat of the moment, 
                                                
127 Although these rules are based on both how we judge others and how others judge us, as well 
as how others judge third parties, it is ultimately the judgements of others that should form the 
basis of the rules. Because we form rules of conduct at least in part in order to guard against self-
deceit, we form these rules largely on the basis of the judgements of others so that our own biases 
do not become part of the rules. 
128 It is important to emphasize here what is implied by how the general rules are formed. In that 
they are formed by abstracting general guidelines for action based on how others judge the 
actions of ourselves and others, as well as how we ourselves judge of the actions of others, this 
means that general rules have their origin in particular judgements of individual situations. 
Particular situations are therefore not first judged good or bad because of their agreement with a 
general rule, which is, for example, known a priori or is a natural law. Rather, particular 
situations are judged on their own and by themselves, and these judgements are then captured in a 
general rule, to which we then make reference in the heat of the moment. It is for this reason that 
some have categorized Smith as a “particularist” when it comes to moral rules (see Fleischacker 
2013). It is also interesting to note here that the general rules essentially capture how an impartial 
spectator would judge of our passions in that they represent an amalgamation of the judgements 
we and others make in particular situations. This is clear from the fact that they are meant to be a 
quick substitute “when we are about to act” for the operation of placing ourselves in the position 
of such an impartial spectator (see Griswold 1999, 186ff. for a further discussion). However, as 
Griswold mentions (see ibid., 186), to say that the general rules are formed by inductive 
generalization from particular situations is not to say that each one of us makes these 
generalizations; some of us receive the general rules first and then we do indeed judge actions on 
the basis of rules. The point, however, is that these rules are neither innate to our minds, nor are 
they pre-given in society. Rather, their ultimate origin is always in the particular judgements of 
the sentiments and affections (see also Irwin 2008, 703). 
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i.e. at the point where it is so important for us to change how we act, because it is then 
that an agent can remember the general rules quickly and easily. We do not necessarily 
act according to such rules simply by remembering them, however. Rather, we are tugged 
back and forth by the strength of the passion and by the general rules. A person’s motives 
are variously the resolution “to adhere to his principle, and not indulge a passion which 
may corrupt the remaining part of his life with the horrors of shame and repentance” 
(TMS 227-8), or “the prospect of that security and tranquillity which he will enjoy when 
he thus determines not to expose himself to the hazard of a contrary conduct” (TMS 228), 
i.e. conduct contrary to the rules. But a passion is always there as well and “with fresh 
fury drives him on to commit what he had the instant before resolved to abstain from” 
(TMS 228). Whether or not we actually follow the rules therefore depends upon, among 
other things,129 the strength of the desires that oppose what the general rules command. 
These other desires can be of various kinds and in the next section I turn to Smith’s 
conception of motivation as well as discuss the motive he calls the “sense of duty.”  
4.2.2 Motivation and the Sense of Duty 
In the above we have seen that moral judgements concern the propriety and merit 
of sentiments and affections, and the general rules of conduct capture the sentiments and 
affections it is proper or meritorious to have in particular situations. In that we are to 
make reference to the rules “when we are about to act,” they appear to be action guiding 
in that they instruct us on which passion it is proper to act on in a given situation. In order 
to clarify how this works, in the following I discuss what types of passions there are, for 
Smith, as well as the motive Smith calls the “sense of duty” (TMS 229). 
                                                
129 It also depends upon how strong our desire is to follow these rules, but Smith is not clear about 
what desire is at the foundation of our desire to follow the general rules of morality. Indeed, this 
raises the question of Smith’s answer to the question “why be moral?” It is not clear what Smith’s 
answer to this question is, and discussing it is not directly relevant to my purposes in this chapter. 
At the very least, what is clear from Smith’s language here is that he is operating with what in the 
last chapter I called the “balance of forces” model of action, according to which the action we 
ultimately perform in a given scenario is the result of whatever desire happens to be the strongest 
on balance with the other desires operative at the time. I discuss this again below. 
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 In sections 1.2.3-5 Smith argues that there are three basic kinds of passions: the 
unsocial, the social, and the selfish passions. The unsocial passions “are hatred and 
resentment, with all their different modifications” (TMS 51), the social passions are those 
such as generosity and compassion, i.e. “all the social and benevolent affections” (TMS 
61) which we find “almost always peculiarly agreeable and becoming” (TMS 61), and the 
“selfish passions” or the passions of self-love or those directed towards private 
advantage. In addition to these three kinds of passions, Smith also believes that we can be 
motivated solely by our “sense of duty,” i.e. our sense of what we ought to do or of what 
the general rules of conduct command. As Smith states: “The regard to those general 
rules of conduct, is what is properly called a sense of duty” (TMS 229). Here Smith 
introduces the attitude we take towards the general rules as “regard,” which I discuss in 
more detail below. For the time being, it is important to note that what Smith seems to be 
claiming here is that our awareness of what we ought to do, i.e. our awareness of what the 
general rules of conduct command, at the very least gives us a reason to act that is distinct 
from the reason supplied by the three kinds of passions.130  
Interestingly and in contrast to his teacher Francis Hutcheson,131 Smith does not 
argue that acting on only one kind of passion, e.g. the social passions, is moral. On the 
contrary, he claims that the circumstances of the situation determine which passion 
should be acted upon. Contrary to what one may expect, this implies that acting on the 
basis of our “sense of duty” may not always be desirable. If this is the case, the next 
question is to determine the extent to which the sense of duty ought to be our motive. 
According to Smith, when the sense of duty should be the primary motive, and when it 
should not, “cannot, perhaps, be given with any very great accuracy” (TMS 248), but the 
                                                
130 Given Smith states that all actions proceed from a passion or affection (TMS 19-20), it is not 
clear if, when we act from the sense of duty, we also act on one of the aforementioned passions, 
or if we act on a distinct passion altogether. This is a difficult question to answer and is also 
related to Smith’s answer to question “why be moral?” in that whatever desire binds us to moral 
rules will also be the desire operative at the root of our performance of the actions commanded by 
the rules. Again, because addressing this topic would take me too far afield from my aims in this 
chapter, I save the discussion of Smith’s take on the issues for another time. 
131 See Raphael and Macfie (1976, 3) for more information. 
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answer to this question depends, first, on which sentiment, affection, or passion we are 
talking about and, second, on the “precision and exactness, or the looseness and 
inaccuracy of the general rules themselves” (TMS 248-9). I discuss each of these in turn. 
First, whether the sense of duty or a particular passion ought to be our primary 
motive depends on which sort of passion we are talking about. With respect to the social 
passions, i.e. “those graceful and admired actions, to which the benevolent affections 
would prompt us” (TMS 249), Smith claims that these “ought to proceed as much from 
the passions themselves, as from any regard to the general rules of conduct” (TMS 249). 
According to Smith, we do not approve, for example, of someone who repays a good 
deed “merely from a cold sense of duty” (TMS 249). Or, again, “[a] husband is 
dissatisfied with the most obedient wife, when he imagines her conduct is animated by no 
other principle besides her regard to what the relation she stands in requires” (TMS 249). 
Similarly, a son should not fulfill familial duties out of the sense of duty, nor should a 
parent perform parental duties from the sense of duty, rather such actions should proceed 
from the natural affections or social passions. Not every social passion should be acted 
on, however. There are situations where a social passion can become too strong and be 
harmful, such as when our “natural generosity” towards a friend can be too strong such as 
to harm us (see TMS 250), e.g. by putting another’s insignificant interest above our 
interest in survival. In general, therefore, at least with respect to the social passions Smith 
states “it is agreeable to see the sense of duty employed rather to restrain than to enliven 
them, rather to hinder us from doing too much, than to prompt us to do what we ought” 
(TMS 249). To summarize, then: it is most proper to act on the social passions, our sense 
of duty should not be our reason for acting in these cases and should only restrict the 
social passions from becoming too strong. 
With respect to the unsocial passions, Smith claims that the actions these passions 
suggest and that we approve of ought to be done from our sense of duty rather than from 
the passions themselves. We ought to punish, for example, always with reluctance “and 
more from a sense of the propriety of punishing, than from any savage disposition to 
revenge” (TMS 250). In a similar way, Smith claims the following: 
Nothing is more graceful than the behaviour of the man who appears to resent the 
greatest injuries, more from a sense that they deserve, and are the proper objects 
of resentment, than from feeling himself the furies of that disagreeable passion; 
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who, like a judge, considers only the general rule, which determines what 
vengeance is due for each particular offence. (TMS 250) 
As with the social passions, then, the general rules of conduct restrict the efficacy of the 
unsocial passions and should prevent us from acting on them. But in contrast to the social 
passions, there are situations where we ought to do what the unsocial passions suggest, 
but in such cases we should, in the end, be motivated solely by the sense of duty and 
never by the passions themselves. In the language Smith uses above, here the sense of 
duty ought not only restrict us from acting but also ought to “enliven” us and be a 
positive force for performing action, i.e. the sense of duty ought to be the primary, 
positive reason for performing such actions. 
With respect to the selfish passions, whether our actions ought to proceed from 
these passions or from the sense of duty depends on the nature of the object of these 
passions. First, Smith claims that the “pursuit of the objects of private interest, in all 
common, little and ordinary cases, ought to flow rather from a regard to the general rules 
which prescribe such conduct, than from any passion for the objects themselves” (TMS 
251). Smith gives the example of “parsimony” (TMS 251), where even if a person is poor, 
being too anxious or overly concerned with saving every single penny is disapproved 
when it proceeds from self-interest. Smith believes that we still ought to perform such 
actions, but that rather than proceed from the selfish passions: they “ought to proceed 
solely from a regard to the general rule, which prescribes, with the most unrelenting 
severity, this plan of conduct to all persons in his way of life” (TMS 251). 
With respect to the objects of self-interest that are “more extraordinary and 
important” (TMS 252), however, Smith claims that “we should be awkward, insipid, and 
ungraceful, if the objects themselves did not appear to animate us with a considerable 
degree of passion” (TMS 251). A prince “conquering or defending a province,” a 
gentlemen acquiring an estate or an office (when it does not require the performance of 
any “meanness or injustice”), or a member of parliament running for election, all these 
people should be interested in their endeavours, says Smith, out of self-interest. Smith 
claims we would despise, or at least would not approve of these people if their 
endeavours were not motivated by self-interest, for we expect such people to care about 
the endeavours that are important to them. We always admire, for example, those who 
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pursue the objects of ambition out of self-interest.132 In sum, then, the ordinary objects of 
self-interest ought to be pursued from a regard for the general rules, i.e. our sense of duty, 
and this should be the principal reason for acting in such cases. With respect to the more 
important objects, it seems our sense of duty should not be the principle reason for 
performing them and self-interest is here the most proper motive. 
As stated, Smith states that whether or not our sense of duty should be our motive 
also depends on how precise the rules are. In this regard Smith claims the following: 
The general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine what 
are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, 
are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require 
so many modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely 
by a regard to them. (TMS 253) 
Smith claims that the “common proverbial maxims of prudence,” which are founded in 
universal experience, are the best rules we can have, but it is absurd to adhere to them 
strictly.  The rules of gratitude are also not very strict. Only the rules of justice are precise 
enough that they can be relied upon: 
The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions 
or modifications, but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules 
themselves, and which generally, indeed, flow from the very same principles with 
them. … What I ought to perform, how much I ought to perform, when and where 
I ought to perform it, the whole nature and circumstances of the action prescribed, 
are all of them precisely fixt and determined. (TMS 255) 
Smith even says that “the most sacred regard” is due to these rules and that “the actions 
which this virtue requires are never so properly performed, as when the chief motive for 
performing them is a reverential and religious regard to those general rules which 
requires them” (TMS 255-6). What this means is that the more precise the general rules 
are, the more should our regard for them, i.e. our sense of duty, be the dominant motive 
of our action.  
 According to the above, therefore, there are situations where we ought to act on 
our selfish passions, situations where we ought to act on the social passions, and also 
                                                
132 Even when these passions extend beyond “the bounds of prudence and justice” (TMS 252) we 
sometimes admire those who have this passion. For this reason we admire not only heroes, but 
conquerors as well (TMS 253). 
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situations where we ought to act on the sense of duty; we ought to never act on the 
unsocial passions. Smith adds to the above that although it is not part of Christian 
doctrine to say that “the sense of duty should be the sole principle of our conduct” (TMS 
248), he claims that this sense of duty “should be the ruling and the governing one” (TMS 
248, my emphasis) and that philosophy and common sense “directs” this to be the case 
(TMS 248). This is a bit perplexing, one might think, for what does Smith mean by the 
claim that the sense of duty should be the “ruling and governing” principle of our 
conduct, if he also believes that it is not always best to act on the sense of duty?  
In claiming that the sense of duty should be the ruling and governing principle of 
our conduct, Smith does not mean to say that the sense of duty ought to be the principal 
motive of action in all cases. On the contrary, in chapter 3.4 Smith investigates “in what 
cases our actions ought to arise chiefly or entirely from a sense of duty, or from a regard 
to general rules; and in what cases some other sentiment or affection ought to concur, and 
have a principal influence” (TMS 248, my emphasis). What Smith appears to be saying 
here is that even in those cases where the sense of duty is not our sole motive and we 
ought to act on a passion, having the sense of duty as the “ruling and governing” 
principle of conduct means that the sense of duty as a motive ought to concur and, in 
modern terminology, “over-determine” our action. For example and as illustrated above, 
when discussing whether or not we should act on the social passions, Smith claims that 
these actions “ought to proceed as much from the passions themselves, as from any 
regard to the general rules of conduct” (TMS 249, my emphasis). Presumably the case is 
similar with respect to those situations where we ought to act on our selfish passions as 
well, namely we ought to pursue the significant objects of self-interest both from self-
interest and from the sense of duty. Smith’s view, then, is that when the sense of duty is 
the ruling and governing principle of our conduct, the sense of duty is always a part of 
our reason for acting in a number of different ways: it is either our sole motive and 
positively “enlivens” us to perform an action (in the case of the insignificant objects of 
self-interest and sometimes with respect to what the unsocial passions suggest), it concurs 
with another passion that ought to be the primary passion acted upon (in the case of the 
extraordinary objects of self-interest and often with respect to what the social passions 
suggest), or the sense of duty restricts the force of a passion and either prevents it from 
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becoming too strong (some cases of the social passions), or it could in principle also 
simply prevent us from acting entirely (where the sense of duty would be our reason for 
refraining from acting). Smith believes this is how we all should act, for he believes that 
the sense of duty “should” (TMS 248) be the ruling and governing principle of our 
conduct. Put differently, Smith believes we should give the rules ruling and governing 
authority when it comes to guiding our conduct. In the following section I turn to the 
attitude of “regard” towards the general rules and illustrate in more detail that to have this 
attitude, i.e. to have resolved to act in accordance with the general rules, is the same as 
having made the sense of duty the ruling and governing principle of one’s conduct. 
4.2.3 Regard 
 In the above I have suggested that the general rules are action-guiding in that they 
suggest which passions it is proper to act on, i.e. when it is proper for the sense of duty to 
be the only force that “enlivens” us to act, when it is proper for the sense of duty to 
“concur” with other passions that ought to be the primary motive, and indeed when the 
sense of duty ought to prevent us from acting at all. In this section I wish to discuss in 
further detail the nature of the attitude of “regard,” namely the attitude we take towards 
the general rules that reflects the fact that we view them as action-guiding, and what 
exactly it means to resolve to act according to these general rules, for Smith. 
The general rules of conduct are a person’s “measures of conduct which, in all his 
cool hours, he had resolved never to infringe” (TMS 227). In the first instance, then, once 
we have formed or are aware of the general rules of conduct, it is at least possible for us 
to “resolve” to live according to them. When we resolve to live according to such rules, 
however, we take the attitude of “regard” towards the them. In general, Smith in fact uses 
a number of terms to describe the attitude we take towards the general rules: he uses 
variously “regard” (TMS 229, 231, 232, 248, 249, 251, 253, 255, 256, 341, 418, 419, 
424), “reverence” (TMS 227, 230, 232, 233), and also “awe and respect” (TMS 227).133 
                                                
133 These references cite only those instances where the terms are used to describe the attitude 
taken towards the general rules. Other instances of the terms do, of course, occur in TMS but are 
not related to the attitude that is my focus here. 
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As can be seen here, based on the sheer number of times Smith uses “regard,” it is clear 
that this is the dominant term he uses to describe the attitude we take towards the rules. 
Something interesting occurs when the Theory is translated into German, however. All 
the above terms, i.e. regard, reverence, and also respect, are not consistently translated. In 
the translation we find the following terms used to describe the attitude we take towards 
the general rules: “Achtung” (GTMS 312, 316, 317, 335, 340, 342, 343, 349, 507, 553, 
554, 561), “Ehrfurcht” (GTMS 311, 313, 314, 315, 349), and “Rücksicht auf” (GTMS 
339, 345).134 As can be seen here, “Achtung” is by far the dominant term used to capture 
the attitude taken towards the general rules. What will be important for the comparison 
with Kant is not only this terminology, but the precise nature of the attitude as well, i.e. in 
what having “regard” or “Achtung” for the general rules actually consists, for Smith.135 
The first thing to be mentioned about this attitude is that it is not the kind of 
attitude that comes in degrees. It is not like the attitude of praise given to merit, for 
example, such that one praises a person proportionate to the degree they deserve it. For 
Smith, this attitude is such that one either “regards” the general rules or one does not. 
Taking the attitude of regard towards the general rules does not guarantee or necessitate 
action in accordance with them, however. For Smith, it is possible to act contrary to the 
general rules and still have regard for them. For example, in the case where someone is 
feeling a particularly strong passion for the first time, Smith says the following:  
that reverence for the rule which past experience has impressed upon him, checks 
the impetuosity of his passion, and helps him to correct the too partial views 
which self-love might otherwise suggest, of what was proper to be done in his 
situation. If he should allow himself to be so far transported by passion as to 
violate this rule, yet even in this case, he cannot throw off altogether the awe and 
respect with which he has been accustomed to regard it. (TMS 227, my emphasis) 
Allein die Ehrfurcht gegen die Regel, die seine vorige Erfarung ihm eingeprägt, 
hält die Heftigkeit seiner ungestümen Leidenschaft im Zaum, und hilft ihm die zu 
partheiischen Vorstellungen zu verbessern, die die Selbst-Liebe ihm von dem, 
was in seinen Umständen recht und schicklich ist, sonst eingeben mögte. Sollte er 
                                                
134 Again, the pages numbers listed here only refer to the places where these terms are used to 
describe the attitude taken towards the general rules. 
135 I acknowledge here that my understanding of the attitude of both “regard” and “respect” was 
greatly clarified by Darwall (1997 and 2008). 
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sich so wenig bändigen können, dass er sich von der Leidenschaft hinreissen 
liesse, diese Regel zu verlezzen, so kann er doch auch in diesem Fall die scheue 
Ehrfurcht, womit er sich gewöhnt hat, sie anzusehen, nicht völlig ablegen. 
(GTMS 309, my emphasis) 
The point here is that once we have grown “accustomed”136 to regard, have reverence, 
awe, or respect for the rules, it appears we cannot shake off their “bindingness” on us.137 
Even if we act against them, this does not eliminate the attitude we have towards such 
rules.  
What the above quote also illustrates is that having this attitude towards the 
general rules does not necessitate one’s acting in accordance with them. Rather, 
“regarding” the general rules signifies that we believe that we ought to act in accordance 
with them, i.e. that we take the general rules to be binding on us. Not only this, but as 
“the ruling and the governing” (TMS 248) principle of our conduct, our sense of duty, i.e. 
our regard for the general rules, implies that we regard these rules as having overriding 
and supreme authority as a principle of conduct. We have seen above, however, that this 
does not mean that we ought to have the sense of duty as our sole reason for acting; the 
general rules have ruling authority in that, even when we ought to act on a different 
passion, we also ought to act on the sense of duty as a concurring motive as well. In 
general, however, it is important to realize that Smith also seems to equate the attitude of 
“regard” with the sense of duty as a reason for acting. 
For Smith, the sense of duty is meant to capture the fact that our reason for acting, 
especially in the heat of the moment, can simply be: because the general rules dictate we 
ought to perform such an action in a particular set of circumstances. Having this as a 
reason for action is identical to the attitude of “regard” towards the general rules, for 
Smith, and this is clear from the outset of 3.3 where he states: “The regard to those 
                                                
136 Smith seems to suggest here that acquiring this attitude towards the general rules, i.e. the 
process by which they becoming binding, is a matter of habituation, rather than a matter of simply 
choosing to follow them, as is suggested by the language I use when I speak of “taking” this 
attitude towards the rules. Again, I do not wish to discuss in detail the question of how or why the 
general rules are binding, for Smith, therefore I leave the investigation of this question aside here. 
137 Unless we subsequently adopt a different (conflicting) ruling and governing principle of 
conduct. 
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general rules of conduct, is what is properly called a sense of duty” (TMS 229). For this 
reason, although Smith primarily refers to the sense of duty138 as our “motive” (see e.g. 
TMS 255-6),139 he also states that action should proceed from “regard” and its cognates 
as well. When Smith discusses situations where a person’s sole motive is the sense of 
duty, for example, he states the following: 
The motive of his actions may be no other than a reverence for the established 
rule of duty, a serious and earnest desire of acting, in every respect, according to 
the law of gratitude. (TMS 230, my emphasis) 
Seine Handlungen können aus einem viel edlern Bewegungs-Grunde, aus der 
Ehrfurcht gegen die festgesezte Regel der Pflicht, aus einem ernstlichen und 
redlichen Verlangen, in allen Stükken dem Gesez der Dankbarkeit gemäß zu 
handeln, entspringen. (GTMS 313, my emphasis) 
In that Smith refers to regard as a motive in cases like this, “regard” as an attitude taken 
towards the general rules is considered by Smith to be inseparable from our motive for 
acting when we act in accordance with the general rules, i.e. from the sense of duty. 
Before concluding this section, I wish to mention two points about acting on the 
basis of our regard for the general rules. First, when we regard the general rules as having 
ruling and governing authority over our conduct, not acting in accordance with these 
rules has consequences. Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator is often discussed as a 
theory of conscience (see e.g. Raphael 2007, 34-42), and insofar as the general rules 
exemplify the judgements of the impartial spectator, the general rules can be considered 
the pronouncements of conscience as well. Smith argues that a person’s rules of conduct 
are “those measures of conduct which, in all his cool hours, he had resolved never to 
infringe, which he had never seen infringed by others without the highest disapprobation” 
(TMS 227). As such, if one performs an action forbidden by the rules one recognizes as 
having authority over one’s conduct, Smith claims that such infringement “must soon 
render him the object of the same disagreeable sentiments” (TMS 227) we have seen 
directed towards others who performs similar actions.  For this reason, Smith claims that 
                                                
138 “das Gefül [sic] der Pflicht” (GTMS 312). 
139 Motive is translated as “Triebfeder” or “Bewegungsgrund” (see GTMS 338 and 313 
respectively). 
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acting in accordance with moral rules involves feelings of “agonies,”140 one is 
“terrified”141 at the thought of violating so sacred a rule” (TMS 227), one feels “the 
horrors of shame and repentance”142 at the prospect of indulging “a passion which may 
corrupt the remaining part of his life” (TMS 227-8). On the other hand, it also involves 
“the prospect of that security and tranquillity which he will enjoy when he thus 
determines not to expose himself to the hazard of a contrary conduct” (TMS 228). In fact, 
this is a simple consequence of what the rules are designed to do, i.e. they are designed to 
prevent us from acting in ways that will be disapproved by others and thereby cause us 
pain. Breaking these rules, therefore, will bring us the pain they are designed to help us 
avoid, and following them will bring us the joy of the approval of others, on which the 
rules are based. 
Second, it is important to see that having regard to the general rules ensures the 
reliability of our conduct. Smith contrasts having regard for the general rules with acting 
“accidentally” (TMS 231), for example, and he even goes so far as to say that “[w]ithout 
this sacred regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct can be much depended 
upon” (TMS 231). Smith implies, then, that not only the “duties of politeness” require 
“regard to these general rules” (TMS 232, my emphasis)143 if they are to be fulfilled, but 
even the “duties of justice, of truth, of chastity, of fidelity, which it is often so difficult to 
observe, and which there may be so many strong motives to violate,” and on which “the 
very existence of human society” depends (TMS 232). Indeed, Smith claims society 
“would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with a reverence 
for those important rules of conduct” (TMS 232-3, my emphasis).144  
                                                
140 “Angst” GTMS 310. 
141 “er erschrickt” GTMS 310. 
142 “die Schrekken der Scham und der Reue” GTMS 310. 
143 “Achtung gegen die allgemeinen Regeln” (GTMS 316, my emphasis). 
144 “wenn dem Menschen nicht eine Ehrfurcht gegen diese wichtigen Regeln des Verhaltens 
eingeprägt wäre” (GTMS 317, my emphasis). 
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In sum, what is essential in my preceding analysis is that the attitude of regard, for 
Smith, captures both the recognition of the general rules’ ruling and governing authority, 
and it is also one and the same with the reason for action Smith refers to as the “sense of 
duty.” Now that I have dealt with Smith’s view of general rules, the sense of duty, and 
the attitude of “regard” towards these rules, in the next section I turn to Kant and discuss 
the central features of his notion of “respect” for the moral law as well as compare and 
contrast its features with Smith’s notion of “regard.” 
4.3 The Development of Kant’s Conception of Achtung and 
Moral Motivation 
In chapter 2 I illustrated that the development of both Kant’s theoretical and 
practical philosophy took a decisive turn around 1769/70. In particular, it is around this 
time we see Kant explicitly endorsing a “pure” or “rational” moral philosophy. As 
previously mentioned, in the Inaugural Dissertation Kant states the following: “Moral 
Philosophy, therefore, in so far as it furnishes the first principles of adjudication, is only 
cognised by the pure understanding and itself belongs to pure philosophy” (ID 2:396, 
translation modified). In contrast to moral adjudication or judgement, at this time Kant 
also began to conceive of how moral motivation works in light of his new commitment to 
“pure” moral philosophy. In a reflection dating from the late 1760s, for example, Kant 
states the following: 
One must extract moral motivating grounds [die moralische Bewegungsgründe] 
from the mixture of all the other (and from the agreeableness of the skill in 
execution); it has a pure and heavenly origin; we find ourselves right away 
ennobled when we notice it within us and see happiness only as a consequence of 
it. (AA 19:111, R 6615) 
Although at this point in time Kant seems to have already begun thinking of moral 
motivation as “pure” and distinct from all empirical motivation linked to “agreeableness” 
and happiness, Kuehn is correct to say that Kant “still had a long way to go” (1995, 384). 
Indeed, I also mentioned in chapter 2 how Heiner Klemme identifies three claims as 
central to Kant’s mature theory of motivation: 1. Pure reason is practical on its own, 2. 
Pure reason effects a feeling of respect which is the incentive of moral action, and 3. The 
morality of action is calculated by the quality of will involved in action (see Klemme 
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2006, 123). I argued there that although Kant’s lecture notes at the time indicate he was 
already committed to the third claim, the first two claims are nowhere to be found in the 
reflections and lecture notes from the 1770s. This confirms Klemme’s claim that Kant’s 
critical conception of moral motivation is first presented in the Groundwork (see Klemme 
2006, 122), and that “Kant seems to have first achieved final clarity concerning his 
‘critical’ conception of moral motivation very late” (Klemme 2006, 123). In the 
following I wish to briefly revisit Kant’s early conception of motivation and how his 
thinking on this topic developed in order to illustrate that the notion of “respect” for the 
moral law is absent from the early view but makes its appearance only later on with the 
presentation of Kant’s mature view. 
 We have seen that, in the Kaehler lectures notes from the mid-1770s, Kant 
believes that “[t]he highest principle of all moral judgement lies in the understanding, and 
the highest principle of all moral drive to do this action lies in the heart; this incentive 
[Triebfeder] is moral feeling” (Kae 57). Put differently, moral adjudication or judgement 
“is the objective ground, but not yet the subjective ground” (Kae 56). What this means, as 
Kant states numerous times in these lectures (see Kae 57, 68, 71) and which Kant 
continues to believe during the Critical period, is that knowing and judging what is 
morally good is only half the battle and is still a far cry from actually performing the 
action. Indeed, Kant calls it a “practical error” (Kae 57) if the judgement is there but the 
incentive is not. The decisive question, then, is the following: how do we get from merely 
judging an action to in fact performing that action?  
Kant’s answer to this question during the 1770s is quite different from his mature 
view. In Kaehler we find the following view: 
nobody can or will see that the understanding is supposed to have a moving power 
to judge. The understanding can surely judge, but to give this judgement of the 
understanding force, and that it becomes an incentive to move the will to perform 
the action, this is the philosopher’s stone. (Kae 68-9) 
That it is impossible to know the connection between knowledge of the good and moving 
power is a position Kant seems to have never given up, for we find a similar claim in 
both the Groundwork (GMS 4:458-9) and the second Critique. At the outset of the 
Triebfeder chapter, for instance, Kant clarifies what he both does and does not discuss in 
the chapter. Kant states that “how a law can be of itself and immediately a determining 
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ground of the will … is for human reason an insoluble problem” (KpV 5:72, my 
emphasis). As I illustrated in the previous chapter, however, this does preclude the fact 
that the understanding and the law do function as a determining ground of the will and 
have motivating power on their own. Kant says in the second Critique that his task is 
rather merely “to determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes the incentive 
and, inasmuch as it is, what happens to the human faculty of desire as an affect of that 
determining ground upon it” (KpV 5:72, my emphasis). In the Kaehler notes from the 
mid-1770s, Kant seems to have a similar view such that although we do not, and indeed 
perhaps cannot, know how judgements gain a moving power, we do know that they do.  
As stated, however, Kant’s conception of how this plays out is much different 
during the 1770s. According to the Kaehler notes: “If I judge via the understanding that 
the action is morally good, much is still missing, that I were to do this action, concerning 
which I have judged. But if this judgement does move me to do the action, then that is 
moral feeling” (Kae 68). Thus at this point in his development we find that “[m]oral 
feeling” signifies “a capacity to be affected by a moral judgement” (Kae 68). Kant’s 
language here is misleading from the perspective of the his Critical view, however, for as 
Klemme points out (see 2006, 123), Kant had not yet come to believe that moral 
judgement itself can effect the force capable of moving us to action. Kant confirms when 
he says the following:  
To bring human beings to feel the abhorrence of vice is completely impossible, 
for I can only say to him what my understanding has insight into, and I can indeed 
bring him so far as to have such insight, but that he should feel abhorrence when 
he does not have such a sensitivity of the senses is not possible. (Kae 71) 
At this point in time Kant therefore seems to think that actually acting morally, not just 
having correct judgement, is a matter of cultivating feeling, which does have moving 
power, in such a way that it is in accord with moral judgement. Indeed, it is called moral 
feeling here partly because our feelings match morality. As it is stated in Kaehler:  
everyone can see that the action is abhorrent, but whoever feels this abhorrence 
has moral feeling. The understanding does not abhor, rather recognizes 
abhorrence and opposes itself to it, but sensibility only has to abhor, now if 
sensibility abhors that which the understanding recognizes to be abhorrent, this is 
moral feeling. (Kae 71) 
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In order to have this kind of “moral” feeling, what we have an aversion or attraction 
towards simply needs to be cultivated via habit such that it accords with what we judge to 
be morally right and wrong. As the Kaehler notes say: “Indeed we can only produce a 
habit that is not natural but stands in for nature, which becomes a habit through imitation 
and frequent practice” (Kae 72). In chapter 2 I illustrated that Kant believes this 
habituation is achieved via education and religion during the 1770s. 
As discussed in the last chapter and as we will see below, according to Kant’s 
mature view, motivationally forceful feeling is not something brought about separately 
from correctly judging. Kant’s mature position is that our recognition of the moral law 
itself brings about a feeling, namely the feeling of respect for the moral law, and this 
“moral” feeling functions as an incentive and motive of action, i.e. it has motivational 
force. Not only this, but this happens necessarily, i.e. the recognition of the law and the 
feeling of respect for it are two sides of the same coin. That Kant had not yet developed 
his mature view in the mid-1770s is clear not only from the fact that the relation between 
knowledge and feeling takes a different form in the early view, but also because Kant’s 
technical use of “respect” is absent from all of Kant’s pre-Critical writings. 
First of all, it is to be noted that Kant’s mature conception of respect for the law is 
absent from the Kaehler lecture notes. When he uses Achtung in these notes he speaks 
only more colloquially of the Achtung between parents and children (see Kae 246), and 
between friends (see Kae 303 and 336), and he often discusses respecting the rights of 
others (Kae 282, 284, 311, 352). He does speak of respecting the commands of God (see 
Kae 162-3), but does not speak of respecting moral commands. What is interesting is that 
he mentions how being honour-worthy deserves respect (Kae 76), and more generally he 
has a discussion of how virtue has an inner worth and for this reason deserves respect 
(Kae 200). There is also mention of how we have a drive to achieve what has an inner 
worth, i.e. a drive to be respected (Kae 271-6). The view that respect is due to what has 
inner worth approximates Kant’s mature view, but there is no talk of any kind of moral 
principle deserving respect. Of course, one reason why Kant does not discuss respect for 
the moral law at this time is that he had not yet developed his conception of the moral 
law/categorical imperative. As I illustrated in chapter 2, the closest Kant comes to 
formulating the categorical imperative in these notes is the following: “Morality is the 
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agreement of action with a universally valid law of the free will [Willkür]. All morality is 
the relation of action to the universal rule” (Kae 64-5). The closest Kant comes to talking 
about a law deserving respect (besides the commands of God) is during a discussion of 
the distinction between ethics and jurisprudence, where Kant states that “[v]irtue does 
indeed demand and presupposes respect [Achtung] and meticulous observance of human 
laws, but it [virtue] refers to the motive, to the disposition, from which the action, which 
has juridical correctness, springs” (Kae 106-7). Kant here refers to the observance of laws 
as respecting them, but he is only talking about “human” or legal laws here, not a moral 
law, and he does not go on to say that the virtuous motive is itself respect for the moral 
law and that this is what is essential to the moral disposition. 
A discussion of respect for the moral law either as recognition, or as a 
motivational feeling is absent from Kant’s other pre-Critical writings as well. Again, 
there are various places where he discusses respect for women (O 2:248 and 2:229) and 
for one’s wife (O 2:220, AA 20:120), as well as respect for persons in the sense of them 
deserving merit (O 2:213), and also respect for persons simply as persons (AA 27:224, 
19:513, and 24:176). There are also places where he speaks of respecting the commands 
of God (AA 18:724) and respecting civil laws (AA 19:590), and he speaks of both 
respecting the worth of humanity (O 2:217 and 2:221, AA 13:375 and 19:241) as well as 
the right of humanity (AA 15:611, 15:625, 19:162, and 19:225), but there is no mention of 
respect for a moral law or principle, nor is there reference to respect as a potential motive 
or incentive, let alone the only proper moral incentive, anywhere in the pre-Critical 
period. The first mention of respect for the moral law in any of Kant’s writings seems to 
be to be in the Naturrecht Feyerabend notes from 1784. 
Before turning to these notes, however, it is worth revisiting Kant’s view on 
moral motivation in the Critique of Pure Reason in the context of Kant’s relation to 
Smith. In this, Kant’s first presentation of his view on moral motivation during the 
Critical period,145 what we find is clearly not Kant’s fully developed, mature view. In the 
                                                
145 Although, strictly speaking, this view is “Critical” since it is presented in the first Critique, as 
mentioned earlier I agree with Henry Allison that it is best to refer to Kant’s views on motivation 
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second section of the ‘Canon of Pure Reason,’ Kant makes a familiar distinction between 
pragmatic laws and moral laws (see KrV A806/B834). What is interesting is that he says 
that pragmatic laws have “the motive of happiness”, but when following the moral law 
our motive is “the worthiness to be happy” (KrV A806/B834). This is interesting 
because although it is perhaps compatible with Kant’s mature view in that he at times 
discusses morality as the worthiness to be happy (see e.g. KpV 5:130), Kant does not yet 
seem to have arrived at his mature view of respect as the moral motive.  
The first instance of Kant’s mature view on motivation, and prior to its first 
published presentation in the Groundwork, is in the lecture notes from Kant’s class on 
natural law from 1784. Shortly after stating that an action has worth only when it is done 
from duty and not inclination, and making the distinction between acting according to 
and from duty, Feyerabend argues that “[w]e must do moral actions merely from duty 
and respect for the moral law [bloß aus Pflicht und Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz], 
without the lowest incentives [ohne die geringsten Triebfedern]” (NF 27:1326). These 
notes also speak of the law determining the will itself, and that what obligates us must be 
mere lawfulness (ibid.). Indeed, the notes state that “the law as a law must determine” us, 
and this is just to say “we must have respect for the law” (NF 27:1326). Further evidence 
that Kant had reached his mature view by this point is clear from the fact that he claims 
respect has a relation to the recognition of worth: “respect is the estimation of a worth, 
insofar as it limits all inclination” (NF 27:1326), and this “absolute worth,” he says, is set 
”in the actions” (NF 27:1326). It is therefore in these lecture notes that we see Kant’s 
discussion of respect for the law as the moral motive for the first time.  
4.4 Kant’s Mature Conception of Respect for the Moral Law 
 From the time Kant publishes his mature view on moral motivation in the 
Groundwork onwards, the concept of “respect [Achtung]” functions in a number of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
in the first Critique as “semi-critical” given its relatively underdeveloped status (see Allison 
1990, 67). 
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different ways. For instance, respect applies to three objects in Kant’s writings. First, 
what will be my focus in the following and what is the primary object of respect is the 
moral law itself (see GMS 400, 401n, 403, 405, 407, 426, 436, 440; KpV 71-90). Second, 
Kant at times discusses how persons deserve respect insofar as they are examples of the 
moral law (GMS 401n, 428, 435, 436, 439; KpV 5:76-8). Third, Kant also says that we 
respect persons simply insofar as they are persons/ends-in-themselves (MdS 448-50, 462-
8).146 Although it could be interesting to compare Kant and Smith on the second kind of 
respect,147 because my goal is to compare Smith’s notion of regard for the general rules 
and Kant’s notion of respect for the law, in the following I focus exclusively on the moral 
law as an object of respect. 
 As mentioned at the start of this chapter, Kant’s first published mention of respect 
for the law is in the “third proposition” of Groundwork I, which states: “duty is the 
necessity of an action from respect for the law” (GMS 400). The law that Kant mentions 
here is of course the moral law, which in the Critique of Practical Reason is defined as 
follows: “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a 
principle in a giving of universal law” (KpV 5:30).148 The question I am interested in here 
                                                
146 For more on these three different objects of respect see Klimchuk (2004, 39) and Allison 
(2011, 128ff. and 128n). Mary Gregor also makes a distinction between two types of respect: for 
the law, and for persons who follow the law (see 1963, 181). See also Darwall (2008) for a 
discussion of how exactly we are supposed to understand the third kind of respect in Kant. 
147 Smith, for instance, seems to have a conception of respecting a person insofar as they “regard” 
or respect the rules. In general, Smith claims that “[a]n amiable action, a respectable action, an 
horrid action, are all of them actions which naturally excite the love, the respect, or the horror of 
the spectator, for the person who performs them” (TMS 225). Respectable actions in particular, 
i.e. those which excite the respect of a spectator, are those Smith discusses under the heading of 
the “respectable virtues” and these are “the virtues of self-denial, of self-government, of that 
command of the passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity 
and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct require” (TMS 30). Given that the general rules 
do just this, i.e. command us to have certain passions and not others, it seems that a person who 
obeys the general rules of conduct would excite the respect of a spectator. 
148 It is clear that Kant distinguishes between the moral law and the categorical imperative, where 
the categorical imperative signifies the relation of the moral law to “a will that according to its 
subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a necessitation)” (GMS 413). 
However, because this distinction is not central to my discussion, I do not discuss it in the 
following. 
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is: what exactly does respect for the moral law consist in, according to Kant’s mature 
view?  
 Kant’s first clarification of respect comes in a footnote one page after he 
introduces the notion in the Groundwork. There Kant says that respect “is a feeling” 
(GMS 4:401n). However, in this footnote Kant goes on to describe respect in another 
way. He says: “What I recognize immediately as a law for myself I recognize with 
respect, which signifies merely the consciousness of the subordination of my will to a 
law” (GMS 401n). The first and most essential thing to understand about the concept of 
respect, then, is that it has two components. Andrews Reath notes this when he refers to 
the recognition of the law as the intellectual or practical149 aspect of respect (see 
2006,10ff.), and respect as feeling as the affective aspect of respect (see ibid.). Indeed, 
Reath claims that “these two aspects are connected aspects of a single complex 
phenomenon” (2006, 26 note 7). It is my task in the following to discuss these two 
aspects of respect, but my focus will be on respect signifying the awareness of the law, or 
what I will call the “attitude” of respect. I hope to clarify the nature of this attitude and its 
relation to its function as a motivationally forceful feeling by placing it in context with 
the foregoing discussing of Smith’s “attitude” of regard for the general rules. 
4.4.1 Respect as Attitude: Recognition of the Law’s Authority 
 As mentioned, Kant tells us in the Groundwork that respect “signifies merely the 
consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law” (GMS 401n). What this means is 
that respect signifies being bound to the law, i.e. standing under obligation. In order to 
characterize this attitude towards the moral law more concretely, it is first worth 
discussing how we become conscious of the law in the first place. According to Kant’s 
doctrine of the fact of reason, at first glance it may seem as if we are simply conscious of 
the moral law insofar as we are rational, i.e. that we are in some way innately aware of 
the law. Kant says the following, for example: “the moral law is given, as it were, as a 
fact of pure reason of which we are a priori conscious and which is apodictically certain” 
                                                
149 Reath only calls this the practical aspect in the revised version of his essay. See 2006, 26 note 
7. 
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(KpV 5:47). However, Kant explicitly addresses the question of how we are conscious of 
the law earlier in the second Critique: 
But how is consciousness of that moral law possible? We can become aware 
[bewußt werden] of pure practical laws just as we are aware of pure theoretical 
principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us 
and to the setting aside of all empirical conditions to which reason directs us. 
(KpV 5:30) 
Consciousness of the moral law therefore requires attentive reflection, and is not 
something that occurs without some effort; as Allison has remarked, consciousness of the 
law requires some “reflective activity” (2011, 132).150 
Once we are aware of the law, however, the attitude of respect follows 
necessarily. In the second Critique, for example, Kant says that “the boundless esteem for 
the pure moral law” - which I take to be equivalent to respect - “is inseparably connected 
with the representation of the moral law in every finite rational being” (KpV 5:80). It is 
passages like this that cause Timmermann, for example, to state that “Kant frequently 
emphasises the inescapability of reverence … whether we like it or not” (2007, 182).151 
Wood and Schönecker are therefore correct to remark that respect is not something that 
can be commanded. Rather, the only thing that can be commanded is “reflection, the 
application of practical reason, and insight into the validity of the moral law” (2015, 80). 
Once we reflect on the law, its validity and its necessity, respecting the law is 
inescapable. 
                                                
150 In this paragraph I disagree with Sytsma (1993, 119), Walker (1989, 107), and Stratton-Lake 
(2000, 34-9), all of whom claim that it is respect that first causes us to become aware of the law, 
its constraint, and even our own autonomy. Given the quote from Kant above, this view has 
problems fitting with what Kant says. It is also a problematic view from a systematic perspective, 
for if respect causes us to become aware of the law, this implies that the law is capable of 
bringing about an attitude in us and even binding us without our being conscious of this process. 
This seems to imply that being bound by the law is in some way out of our control, which 
conflicts with the law’s autonomously binding character. 
151 That the attitude of respect works this way in general is supported by the fact that Kant 
believes the distinct attitude of respect for persons who exemplify the law follows necessarily 
from our recognition of them as well. As Kant states: “before a humble common man in whom I 
perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am aware of in myself my spirit bows, 
whether I want it or whether I do not” (KpV 5:76-7, emphasis added). 
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It is important to determine what exactly we are bound to do when we respect the 
moral law. As the fundamental law of the second Critique and the three formulations of 
the categorical imperative in the Groundwork make clear, the law in question binds us to 
only act on a particular class of maxim. To take the formula of universal law from the 
Groundwork as an example, respecting the moral law involves the recognition that you 
can only act on those maxims “through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” (GMS 4:421).152 As such, the categorical imperative (the moral 
law as binding upon finite beings) restricts us from acting on maxims that cannot become 
universal laws, i.e. maxims that either cannot consistently be universalized (that fail the 
universalization test, see GMS 4:422), or cannot be universally and consistently willed 
(that involve a conflict or contradiction of will, see GMS 4:423). As such, respecting the 
moral law involves a restriction on the actions that it is morally permissible to undertake; 
acting contrary to the law, i.e. on a maxim that fails the universalization test or that 
involves a contradiction of the will, is to perform a morally wrong and therefore 
impermissible action, for Kant.  
 Respect does not signify being bound to any kind of law whatsoever, however. 
Similar to Smith’s regard to the general rules, respect for Kant signifies regarding the 
moral law as the “supreme” principle of morality (see e.g. GMS 4:392, 409, 411, 440). 
Respecting the moral law therefore implies regarding it as not only an authoritative law, 
but as a law that has supreme authority, i.e. its commands override all others. This is 
connected to the value we recognize in the law. As Kant says in the Groundwork 
footnote: “Respect is actually the representation of a worth that infringes on my self-
love” (GMS 4:401n). Respecting the law therefore involves the recognition that it has a 
particular kind of worth that trumps the value of self-love.  In the Groundwork, Kant 
distinguishes between what has a “price,” i.e. what “can be replaced with something else, 
as its equivalent,” and what has “dignity,” i.e. what “allows of no equivalent” (GMS 
                                                
152 I acknowledge that the content of the three formulations of the categorical imperative are 
different, but each formulation and the fundamental law of the second Critique all illustrate the 
point I wish to make here, which is simply that the law or any form of the categorical imperative 
all restrict the class of actions that are morally permissible.  
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4:434). According to Kant, “what constitutes the condition under which alone something 
can be an end in itself does not merely have a relative worth, i.e. a price, but an inner 
worth, i.e. dignity” (GMS 4:435). Now, for Kant, “morality is the condition under which 
alone a rational being can be an end in itself; … Thus morality and humanity, in so far as 
it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity” (GMS 4:435). Humanity 
therefore has an inner worth or dignity only insofar as it is moral. This is essentially the 
same thought expressed at the beginning of Groundwork I where Kant famously claims 
the following: “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even 
beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a GOOD WILL” 
(GMS 4:393). Over the course of the subsequent pages we learn that the concept of a 
good will is contained in that of duty (see GMS 4:397), and more specifically we learn 
that a good will is a will that does its duty from duty, i.e. for no other reason than because 
it ought to do it (GMS 4:397), and what we ought to do is commanded by the moral law. 
As such, both morality (the moral law as a command, the following of which makes a 
human an end in itself) and humanity (insofar as it is moral or an end in itself, i.e. insofar 
as it has a good will) have dignity and worth. Respecting the law implies recognizing the 
law as having this value, which, again, is a value that has no equivalent and as such is 
above everything else that has merely relative value. 
 As I illustrated above, for Smith it was possible to have “regard” for the general 
rules but act contrary to them. In other words, having regard for the rules didn’t make it 
such that you necessarily act in accordance with them. This was the case, for Smith, 
because a passion might be so strong that it overcomes the strength of our regard for the 
rules. Kant also believes it is possible to respect the law but not act in accordance with it, 
but for a different reason. If acting in accordance with the general rules involves 
overcoming the strength of other desires that oppose what the rules command, then Smith 
might be said to subscribe to what some call a “balance of forces” model of action, where 
our action is a result of the stronger force or desire on balance with the other desires 
operative at the time. Although it is a matter of debate,153 I argued in the previous chapter 
                                                
153 The overwhelming majority of views in the secondary literature agree that a “balance of 
forces” model of action is an inaccurate picture of Kants view: See Reath (2006, 12-3), Zinkin 
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that it is fairly clear Kant does not subscribe to such a view mainly because it seems to 
preclude freedom of choice, and makes our actions determined by our strongest desires. 
Kant’s view, rather, is that even where a desire is stronger than all others, there is always 
a choice to act on that desire. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is linked to 
Kant’s view on the freedom of the will, expressed in his notion of the faculty of choice 
[Willkür] and what Allison has called Kant’s “incorporation thesis,” according to which, 
as Kant says in the Religion: “freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic … 
that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as the human 
being has incorporated it into his maxim” (Rel 6:23-4). This means that respecting the 
law does not determine us to follow the law, rather, as Timmerman also observes, having 
respect for the law only makes it available as a possible reason for acting, which, if we 
were to act on it, requires us to choose to act in accordance with the law (Timmermann 
2007, 43). According to Timmermann, respect is always, in principle, strong enough to 
be a reason for acting. The question of the moral law actually motivating us to action is 
therefore not a matter of it being a force stronger than others, but of freedom – of 
choosing to act as the law commands (ibid.).154 What this means, similar to Smith’s 
notion of “regard,” is that as an attitude, respect is not the kind of thing that comes in 
degrees, rather one either respects the law or one does not, for Kant.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
(2006, 50), Ameriks (2006, 94), Herrera (2000, 403), Ware (2014, 742), Wuerth (2010, 10), Irwin 
(2009, 55) and Allison (1990, 126). In addition to Walker (see 1989, 101ff.), McCarty is the one 
who most seriously maintains that Kant does subscribe to the balance of forces model, and that 
respect needs to be a strong enough force if it is to push us to action (see McCarty 2009, 172, 
177, 181 and also 1994, 19, 25). At the same time, McCarty seems to believe that this does not 
preclude the possibility of freedom of choice because we have to assume agents are free even if 
determined by the strength of forces (1994, 29). Nonetheless, McCarty is forced to admit that 
such a view implies that at the time of acting there is a sense in which this implies action is 
beyond our control (see 1994, 28). 
154 It is slightly misleading to say here that respect is always strong enough to be a reason for 
acting. As I go on to show, the attitude of respect does not come in degrees, but as a feeling it is 
appropriate to say that it does come in degrees. Again, however, the strength of respect as a 
feeling does not necessitate the extent to which we might choose to act on it. As Allison notes 
(2006, 396) its strength might make it more likely we do choose it, but the fact remains that we 
always have the choice to act either on it or against it, regardless of its strength. 
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 In this section I have shown that respect as an attitude signifies our awareness of 
standing under the moral law, i.e. as being bound it, as a law that is supremely 
authoritative over our conduct and over our formation of maxims. As a law that is 
supremely authoritative, respect for the moral law also implies the recognition of a worth 
or a value that cannot be compared to anything else. Respect as an attitude was also 
shown to be something that does not come in degrees, nor does it necessitate action in 
accordance with the respected law. At the same time and as mentioned above, however, 
respect is also a feeling, and one that is intimately connected to the attitude of respect. In 
the next section I therefore turn to respect as a feeling and to the connection between 
respect as an attitude and respect as a feeling. 
4.4.2 Respect as Feeling 
As I mentioned above, in addition to signifying the “consciousness of the 
subordination of my will to a law” (GMS 4:401n), Kant also claims that respect “is a 
feeling” (GMS 4:401n). Confusingly at times, the concept of respect therefore refers to 
both an attitude and a feeling, and even in his first definition of the term Kant refers to it 
as both of these things in almost the same breath (see GMS 4:401n). Kant’s use of one 
term to describe these two sides of the phenomenon continues into the second Critique, 
where, in a passage already quoted, respect is discussed as “boundless esteem for the pure 
moral law” and just lines later this esteem, an attitude, is referred to as “a feeling” (KpV 
5:79-80). There is perhaps good reason why Kant uses a single term to signify both an 
attitude and a feeling, however. As a feeling in addition to an attitude, it is important to 
realize that these two aspects of respect, although different in themselves, are two sides of 
the same coin. I mentioned above, for example, how Reath states that “these two aspects 
are connected aspects of a single complex phenomenon” (2006, 26 note 7). According to 
Reath, this means that “though distinguishable, these aspects of respect need not be 
phenomenologically distinct, but would be experienced together” (2006, 12). To have the 
attitude is therefore at once to feel respect.  
If the attitude and the feeling of respect are two sides of the same coin, and if the 
attitude necessarily arises from our consciousness of the law, this means that the feeling 
arises necessarily from such a consciousness as well. Such a view is confirmed when 
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Kant says, in the Metaphysics of Morals, that “[r]espect for the law, which in its 
subjective aspect is called moral feeling, is identical with consciousness of one’s duty” 
(MdS 6:464). This also means that, just as the attitude of respect cannot be commanded, 
neither can the feeling; to feel respect requires being conscious of the moral law and 
being aware of it as supremely authoritative. 
As being connected to a kind of consciousness, however, the feeling of respect is 
distinct from other feelings based on its source. When Kant first introduces respect as a 
feeling in the Groundwork, he says that respect is not a feeling “received by influence, 
but one self-wrought [selbstgewirktes] by a rational concept and therefore specifically 
different from all feelings of the former kind, which come down to inclination or fear” 
(GMS 4:401n). Here Kant distinguishes between two different ways in which feeling can 
be brought about. On the one hand there are feelings “received by influence” (GMS 
401n). Generally understood, these kinds of feelings are received from external objects, 
the feelings themselves being pleasurable feelings (inclinations) or displeasurable, i.e. 
painful, ones (fear).155 As feelings that are received by external objects, we are passive 
with respect to them and do not control when such feelings are brought about. Indeed, we 
are dependent upon external objects for feelings of this kind to be brought about, and 
such feelings arise only contingently based on the presence of such objects. Kant 
contrasts this kind of feeling with those that are “self-wrought by a rational concept” 
(GMS 401n). As we saw above, the feeling of respect is brought about by our awareness 
of the moral law. As such, the feeling of respect has a source distinct from all other 
feelings, namely an a priori source. As Kant says in the second Critique, respect is a 
feeling “that is not of empirical origin” (KpV 5:73) and has an “intellectual cause” (KpV 
5:79). In that this feeling has a rational as opposed to an empirical origin, respect is not 
therefore brought about by receptivity, but is a product of spontaneity, i.e. it is actively 
produced by our own reason. Recall that the feeling of respect is brought about by 
consciousness of the moral law, and specifically the moral law’s overriding constraint. In 
                                                
155 That feelings in general, for Kant, involve pleasure and displeasure is clear from how he 
understands the faculty of “feeling” in the Anthropology as the “feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure” (see Anth 7:230ff.). 
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that we are in control of paying attention to the moral law and its constraint, we are in a 
sense in control of when this feeling comes about, as opposed to being dependent on 
external objects for the production of other feelings. As we have seen, this feeling also 
arises necessarily from consciousness of the law. It is for this reason that Kant claims this 
is a feeling that can be “cognized a priori” (KpV 5:73), i.e. because it is a feeling that we 
can be sure will necessarily arise. Indeed, in the Critique of Judgement Kant implies that 
respect is the only feeling of this kind when he claims that respect alone is “a special and 
peculiar modification of this feeling”, i.e. of “feeling” as a faculty in general (see KdU 
5:222). 
 Kant understands feeling in general as having to do with pleasure and displeasure 
(see e.g. Anth 7:230ff.), and because respect is a feeling, Kant thinks of it as at least 
related to pleasure and displeasure as well. In the Groundwork, for example, he states that 
the feeling of respect for the law “is something that is considered an object neither of 
inclination, nor of fear, even though it is at the same time somewhat analogous to both” 
(GMS 401n). Interestingly, above we saw that, for Smith, regard involved both a feeling 
of being “terrified at the thought of violating so sacred a rule” (TMS 227) as well as “the 
prospect of that security and tranquillity which he will enjoy when he thus determines not 
to expose himself to the hazard of a contrary conduct” (TMS 228). It seems that Kant has 
something similar in mind here. As analogous to fear and inclination, the feeling of 
respect involves a feeling of both attraction and aversion (see Timmermann 2007, 43n), 
i.e. we are attracted to the possibility of living up to the demands of the moral law and 
thereby raising the worth of both our actions and ourselves. We have an aversion towards 
the fact that the demands of the moral law require us to set aside the demands of our 
inclinations (see Wood and Schönecker 2015, 69 and McCarty 2009, 179), and we are 
also afraid of not living up to the demands of the moral law and feeling shame that we 
aren’t as good as we could be.156 
                                                
156 This is linked to Kant’s notion of the pleasurable feeling of Selbstzufriedenheit or “satisfaction 
with oneself” which is proportionate to the extent to the extent to which we have acted morally. I 
discuss this in detail in chapter 5. 
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 As discussed in the last chapter and mentioned above, respect as a feeling has 
been a topic of debate in the literature, specifically in relation to whether or not it plays a 
role in moral motivation, for Kant. In the last chapter I disagreed with Reath’s 
“intellectualist” interpretation, according to which feeling is not involved in motivation, 
but is rather “a feeling or emotion that is experienced when the moral law checks the 
inclinations and limits their influence on the will” (2006, 10). Reath argues that “it is the 
practical aspect that is active in motivating moral conduct, while the affective side, or 
feeling of respect, is its effect on certain sensible tendencies” (2006, 10). According to 
this reading, the feeling of respect is a mere epiphenomenon (see Timmermann 2007, 42) 
that is part of our experience of the recognition of the moral law, but as such it plays no 
role in our actually doing what we recognize we ought to do. I argued in the last chapter 
in favour what I take to be the now dominant view in the literature,157 according to which 
respect as a feeling does play a role in motivation. According to this view “Kant viewed 
respect for the moral law as a psychologically forceful incentive” (McCarty 2009, 167). I 
do not wish to devote any further space to offering an argument for the interpretation that 
the feeling of respect plays a role in motivation. What deserves repeating here is simply 
that the effect that the moral law has on feeling, i.e. the fact that it brings about the 
feeling of respect, is the means by which the moral law has a psychologically effective 
influence on sensibility, and this plays an essential role in the causal story of moral 
action.  
 In the above I hope to have illustrated that, similar to Smith’s conception of 
“regard” for the general rules of conduct, Kant’s conception of “respect” for the law is at 
once the recognition of its authority as the supreme principle governing which actions are 
and are not morally permissible, and is also a “feeling” or “sense of duty” which 
functions as a moral motive. Both Smith’s attitude of regard and Kant’s attitude of 
respect do not come in degrees, they are attitudes one either does or does not have, 
whether or not one is conscious of the moral law or has regard for the general rules. For 
both Smith and Kant, recognizing the general rules/moral law gives us a reason for 
                                                
157 Among those who subscribe to this view are the following: Wood and Schönecker (2015, 56-
88); Timmermann (2007, 43); Ware (2014); and McCarty (2009, 167ff.). 
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acting, i.e. because the rules/law commands it. I hope to have at least shown that reading 
Kant against the background of Smith’s idea of “regard” helps clarify the attitude of 
respect itself, as well as the distinction between the attitude and the feeling of respect. 
 If it is in fact true that Kant was influenced by Smith’s conception of “regard,” 
one might ask why Kant would have been tempted to incorporate such an idea. In the 
next section I venture to offer an answer to this more historical question where I discuss 
the evidence suggesting Kant did in fact read Smith before summarizing the development 
of Kant’s thinking on moral motivation, and suggesting that Smith’s notion of “regard” 
provided Kant with a solution to a problem he encountered while developing his Critical 
position on this topic. 
4.5 Kant and Smith 
Whether Kant read Smith, and in particular Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
was asked quite early on by Kant’s readers. As early as 1798, for example, Christian 
Garve suggested that the “sympathetic spectator of Smith … is in fact the lawgiver of 
Kant” (1798, 166).158 Schopenhauer mentions the connection between Smith and Kant as 
well, when he suggests that Smith may have influenced Kant’s conception of the 
categorical imperative.159 In a more scholarly fashion and as I mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, Oncken states in a 1877 study that we find a number of textual 
similarities in both Kant’s and Smith’s ethical works. Among other things, Oncken 
claims they have a similar conception of conscience and they both divide the moral 
subject into two persons or personalities (see 1877, 93). Oncken also claims, however, 
that, strictly speaking, we cannot say that Kant borrowed anything directly from Smith. 
He claims, rather, that it is only speculation “that Kant received stimulus from Smith, 
even if only mediately” (ibid., 96). Even though he does go on to say that this speculation 
“approaches certainty” (ibid., 97), for Oncken the evidence is not strong enough to prove 
a direct influence. 
                                                
158 See also Klemme (2000, vol. 4, viii) for a discussion.  
159 See Klemme (2000, vol. 4, ix). 
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 Sometime later, in the first critical edition and first modern German translation of 
Smith’s Theory, Walter Eckstein argues the evidence is a bit more certain that Kant in 
fact read Smith’s Theory. Eckstein points to a letter from Marcus Herz to Kant dated July 
19th, 1771, in which Herz states that he was told by “Herr Friedlander” that “the 
Englishman Smith [den Engländer Smith]” is Kant’s “favourite [Liebling]” (AA 10:126). 
Given the date of the letter, that the Wealth of Nations wasn’t published in English for the 
first time until 1776, and given the first German translation of the Theory appeared the 
year before the letter (1770), Eckstein takes this as “an extremely valuable piece of 
evidence for the fact that Kant knew Smith’s main ethical work and had a high estimation 
of its worth” (Eckstein 2010, xxii). In their introduction to the Glasgow edition of the 
Theory as well, D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie essentially come to the same conclusion 
as Eckstein and cite the same evidence for believing that “Kant knew and valued TMS” 
(1976, 31). 
 Susan Meld Shell references a number of reflections, in which she believes there 
is evidence Kant was familiar with Smith’s ethical writings (see Shell 1980, 80n, 
102n).160 Samuel Fleischacker reviews these reflections in detail, many of which make 
reference to an “impartial observer [unparteyischer Zuschauer],” and he concludes that 
“there is enough clear documentary evidence of a connection between Smith and Kant to 
justify a philosophical comparison of their work” (1991, 254). Finally, Klemme claims 
that  “clear evidence of Kant’s reading of the Theorie der moralischen Empfindungen is 
provided by student lecture notes on anthropology in 1781/2 in which Kant quotes 
explicitly from the Theorie” (Klemme 2000, vii note 13). Indeed, the place in the lecture 
notes Klemme cites (AA 25:1035) contains a discussion of gratitude to inanimate objects 
that is so similar to a discussion in Smith’s Theory that it is very probably a paraphrase 
from Smith’s text.161  
 I therefore take it to be an accepted fact that Kant read the 1770 translation of 
Smith’s Theory. Indeed, as others have suggested (see Fleischacker 1991, 253), Kant 
                                                
160 The reflections Shell cites are the following: AA 15:334, R 767; 15:592, R 1355; 19:117, R 
6628; 19:184, R 6864; 19:243, R 7078; 19:247, R 7093. 
161 Compare AA 25:1035 with GTMS 226 and TMS 164. 
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seems to have read Smith’s Theory soon after the translation appeared. This is clear not 
only from the date of the Herz letter to Kant (July 19th 1771), but also from the 
approximate dates of the many reflections cited by Shell and Fleischacker as well.162  
If Kant did indeed read Smith’s Theory, the next question to ask is why he would 
have been interested in Smith’s text apart from the fact that it was influential at the time 
(see Eckstein 2010, xviii-xxiii). In other words, what could Kant have found interesting 
in Smith’s Theory? Klemme gives four possible reasons why Kant may have been 
interested in the Theory when he read it in the early 1770s: 
1. “Kant was simply impressed by Smith’s careful observations of human feelings, 
motives and actions” 
2. “Smith had something important to say about moral motivation, a topic on which 
Kant had not arrived at a settled view during the early 1770s.” 
3. “Kant found in Smith important conceptual distinctions.” (For example, Smith’s 
distinction between praise and praise-worthiness, or that between propriety and 
merit) 
4. “Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator and his illustrations on the ‘Sense of 
Duty’ influenced Kant’s own idea of the categorical imperative” (see Klemme 
2000, vol. 4, viii). 
The comparison I have made above between Smith’s notion of regard and Kant’s notion 
of respect confirms that Kant would indeed have been interested in all these topics. I 
illustrated that during the 1770s Kant had not yet come to his mature conception of moral 
motivation, and would have therefore found what Smith has to say about motives and 
passions, including the sense of duty, extremely interesting.  
 There is, then, good reason to believe both that Kant read Smith’s Theory, and 
that Kant would have found much of what Smith said interesting. The question I would 
like to pursue in the remainder of this paper is whether or not there is reason to believe 
Kant may have been impressed by Smith’s notion of “regard” in particular, and why. 
We have seen that Kant had not yet come to his mature position on motivation as 
of the middle of the 1770s, for in the Kaehler notes we find a different conception of the 
relation between the understanding (not even reason) and motivation: the understanding 
                                                
162 R 767 (1772-3), R 1355 (1773-5?, 1776-8?, 1772-3??), R 6864 (approx. 1771), R 6628 (1769-
70 (1764-8?), R 7078 (1776-8), and R 7093 (approx. 1771?, 1769?). 
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comprehends moral principles, and in order for this to be motivating, feeling must be 
habituated to feel drawn or averted towards the same things that the understanding 
comprehends we ought to be. When feeling and the understanding do accord, Kant calls 
this “moral feeling” (Kae 71). Although Kant was already committed to a central element 
of his Critical view at the time, namely that what is essential to the evaluation of moral 
action is the quality of will, we saw that he did not yet put forth the two other views that 
are characteristic of his mature view: 1. That pure reason is practical on its own, and 2. 
that pure reason becomes practical by producing a motivationally forceful feeling of 
respect. What I wish to suggest is that, paired with his reformulation of the nature of the 
faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), it is Smith’s notion of “regard [Achtung]” as the 
recognition of moral rules which itself provides us with a motivationally effective feeling 
that allowed Kant to come to his mature view on moral motivation. 
A central question of the Critique of Practical Reason is whether pure reason is 
practical on its own and can itself determine the will. This is essentially a question 
concerning the nature of the faculty of desire. As Kant says in the ‘Deduction’ of the 
second Critique, the question is “how reason can determine maxims of the will, whether 
this takes place only by means of empirical representations as determining grounds or 
whether pure reason might also be practical” (KpV 5:45). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Kant defines the faculty of desire in the second Critique as “a being’s faculty to 
be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these 
representations” (KpV 5:10n). As Stephen Engstrom notes, such a definition leaves 
“unspecified how or by what its operation might be determined” (2009, 27). In the second 
Critique Kant explicitly criticizes Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten for 
assuming desire can be determined in only one way, namely via the representation of 
pleasure. Although they distinguish between the lower and the higher faculty of desire, 
Wolff and Baumgarten do so based on whether it is the senses (lower) or the 
understanding (higher) representing the pleasure in question. This is problematic, for 
Kant, for if one draws the distinction between the lower and higher faculty of desire in 
this way, he claims that “it does not matter at all where the representation of this pleasing 
object comes from but only how much it pleases” (KpV 5:23). The result of such a view 
is therefore that the faculty of desire is always determined by pleasure, and more 
182 
 
specifically by the higher degree of pleasure. In other words, if we think of the faculty of 
desire like Wolff and Baumgarten do, then we have a balance of forces model of action 
such that we necessarily choose what is represented as having the most pleasure (it 
doesn’t matter if this pleasure is represented by the senses or by the understanding).  In 
this way, Kant claims that Wolff and Baumgarten “deny pure reason the ability to 
determine the will without some feeling being presupposed” (KpV 5:23-4). 
In contrast to Wolff and Baumgarten, Kant does not want to deny this possibility 
from the start. As such, Kant believes that only the lower faculty of desire represents 
pleasure as a condition for the determination of the will, and the higher faculty of desire 
implies that “pleasure only follows upon its determination” (KpV 5:10n). Feelings of 
pleasure, for Kant, are therefore not only different in degree, but they can also be 
different in kind. As I illustrated above, in the Groundwork Kant distinguishes between 
feelings “received by influence” and those “self-wrought by a rational concept” (GMS 
4:401n), where the latter has a distinct, rational source. As Kant claims in the second 
Critique after criticizing Baumgarten’s and Wolff’s distinction between the lower and 
higher faculty of desire:  
either there is no higher faculty of desire at all or else pure reason must be 
practical of itself and alone, that is, it must be able to determine the will by the 
mere form of a practical rule without presupposing any feeling and hence without 
any representation of the agreeable or disagreeable as the matter of the faculty of 
desire, which is always an empirical condition of principles. (KpV 5:24) 
Indeed, it is because feelings of pleasure can both precede the determination of the 
faculty of desire, as well as follow from it (put differently: that feelings have two distinct 
sources) that the faculty of desire is not restricted to being determined by pleasure, rather 
it can be determined by other sources as well, namely reason. 
It is unclear when exactly Kant started to conceive of the distinction between the 
higher and lower faculty of desire in this way, but there is evidence that it was at least by 
the late 1770s.163 From a reflection dating from this period, Kant says: “Pleasure in 
                                                
163 It is worth noting here that Kant distinguishes between the higher and lower versions of all the 
faculties in a similar way: the higher and lower faculties differ not only in degree, but also in 
kind, and it is clear that Kant at the very least distinguished between the higher and lower faculty 
of cognition in this way in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. 
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action either precedes the law or follows from it” (AA 18:255). Here Kant is clearly 
thinking about how a (moral) law can bring a human being to act, and in line with his 
Critical view he believes that we do not follow the law solely because we see doing so as 
a means to pleasure, but that it is possible for pleasure to only follow from following the 
law for its own sake. What is interesting here is that already in this early reflection Kant 
identifies the feeling of pleasure associated with following the law for its own sake with 
respect; the above reflection continues with: “In the latter case it is respect” (AA 18:255, 
R 5615). This is in fact Kant’s first mention of respect in a way similar to his use during 
the Critical period, although all we have here is mention of respect as the kind of 
pleasurable feeling involved in following the law – he doesn’t mention respect for the law 
as an attitude). Nonetheless, what Kant’s remark here reveals, it seems to me, is the 
following: once Kant reformulated the distinction between the lower and the higher 
faculty of desire, all Kant needed to reach his Critical view was a concept that signified 
how a purely rational grasp of the law is at the same time a motivationally forceful 
feeling (and therefore related to pleasure). Smith’s notion of “regard” is precisely this: 
our recognition or regard for the general rules at once gives us a reason for acting, i.e. 
being the general rules command we ought to. If this reason is motivationally forceful, it 
is called the “sense of duty” (TMS 229). In this way, paired with his understanding of the 
faculty of desire, it is Smith’s notion of regard that provided a missing piece to Kant’s 
mature, Critical conception of motivation. 
 I suggested above that Kant likely read Smith’s Theory soon after the publication 
of its first German translation in 1770. In the above, however, I suggested that Kant 
seems to have incorporated Smith’s notion of Achtung only in the late 1770s at the 
earliest, but most likely not until the mid-1780s when Kant mentions Achtung in this 
technical way in his lecture notes on natural law (in 1784) and in the Groundwork (1785). 
If we work with the hypothesis that Kant did in fact adopt some aspects of Smith’s notion 
of Achtung, one may ask why Kant did not discuss this concept earlier. A few reasons can 
be presented to answer such a question. First and most importantly, as I illustrated above, 
Kant’s understanding of moral motivation was quite underdeveloped in the early 1770s, 
and he did not first publish his considered view until the mid-1780s. Indeed, in the mid-
1770s Kant does not even distinguish between the understanding and reason, something 
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that was surely necessary in order for him to arrive at his notion that pure reason is 
practical on its own. Furthermore, another significant reason why Smith’s influence in 
this regard did not show itself for so long could be the fact that Kant was the newly 
appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, and the years of his silent decade were 
spent working on the first Critique, rather than any work devoted specifically to moral 
philosophy. 
There is yet further reason why it is not strange that Kant only incorporated the 
influence of Smith until the late 1770s or early 1780s. Clemens Schwaiger, for example, 
suggest that Kant may have undertaken a re-reading of the moral sense theorists in the 
1780s, evidence for this being references to Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume pop up in 
Kant’s lecture notes around this time, with Shaftesbury in particular being honoured as a 
moral philosopher of value in a way he was not before (Schwaiger 1999, 190-191, note 
719; and see AA 27:1325, 28:1073, and 18:1081; NF 27:1325 and 27:1330). If this is 
accurate, then perhaps Kant re-read Smith around this time as well. Smith’s influence 
suggests itself in other ways only in the mid-1780s as well, for even early on in the 
Groundwork, for example, we find Kant referencing “a rational impartial spectator [ein 
vernünftiger unparteyischer Zuschauer]” (GMS 4:393), his language here being 
reminiscent of Rautenberg’s first German translation of Smith’s Theory.164 At the very 
least, I think it is safe to say with Fleischacker that “Smith’s work seems to have 
interested Kant for many years after he read it in 1770 or 1771” (1991, 253), and thus 
even if Kant first read Smith’s Theory soon after its translation into German in 1770, it is 
not surprising that he incorporated elements of Smith’s thought only later once he began 
to focus more seriously on topics in moral philosophy 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that understanding Smith’s notion of “regard” for the 
general rules of conduct can help clarify Kant’s conception of respect for the moral law. 
After outlining how Smith’s notion of regard embodies both a recognition of the validity 
                                                
164 See Fleischacker (1991, 251-3) for a discussion of the origin and translation of the phrase 
“impartial spectator” as well as Kant’s uptake of it. 
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and authority of the general rules, as well as the motive Smith refers to as the “sense of 
duty,” I illustrated that Kant’s mature understanding of respect for the law is absent from 
his early conception of motivation, and that it appears for the first time in his lecture 
notes on natural law form the early 1780s. I then showed that Kant’s notion of “respect” 
refers to both an attitude, our consciousness of the validity and supreme authority of the 
moral law, and a feeling, which functions as a motive. In the last section I suggested that 
it is only once Kant came to re-think the nature of the faculty of desire that he 
incorporated Smith’s notion of “regard,” and he did so because it supplied a necessary 
element to his thinking on moral motivation leading up to his mature view that pure 
reason is practical on its own. I concluded by illustrating that, although Kant seems to 
have read Smith in the early 1770s, it is not odd for him to have incorporated Smith’s 
ethical though only later on. In the next chapter, I discuss a topic related to motivation, 
namely the role of pleasure in the performance of moral action. More particularly, I 
discuss Kant’s notion of the satisfaction we experience when we are aware of having 
performed virtuous action, and I explain how he answers an objection related to this idea 
posed by Christian Garve. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Self-Contentment and Kant’s Response to the Pleasure 
Problem 
 In this, my final chapter I turn my attention to Kant’s notion of the satisfaction 
involved in the performance of virtuous action – what he calls self-contentment 
[Selbstzufriedenheit]. After a brief introduction (5.1) I explain this concept in detail (5.2) 
before outlining an objection this concept invites that was raised by Kant’s contemporary, 
Christian Garve (5.3). Garve’s objection is similar to a problem Hutcheson anticipated in 
relation to the pleasure felt by the moral sense, what I called in chapter one the “pleasure 
problem.” I argue that, with his concept of self-contentment, Kant offers a better solution 
to the problem than the one offered by Hutcheson (5.4). I conclude (5.5) by 
distinguishing self-contentment from a number of other terms, with which scholars have 
equated it in the past. 
5.1 Introduction 
 In chapter one we saw that the idea that we feel pleasure when we perceive 
benevolent actions and displeasure when we perceive the opposite is central to 
Hutcheson’s conception of the moral sense. We also saw that moral judgement, for 
Hutcheson, is ultimately based on these feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Although, as 
explained in chapter three, Kant objects to Hutcheson’s conception of moral judgement 
for a number of reasons, I have not yet discussed how Kant nonetheless preserves a place 
for a particular kind of satisfaction connected to the awareness that we ourselves have 
performed a moral action. Kant suggests that he makes room for such an idea in the 
second Critique when discussing the objection that the moral sense cannot ground 
obligation because it already assumes it. According to Kant: 
one must first value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the 
moral law, and the immediate worth that compliance with it gives a person in his 
own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in consciousness of one’s conformity 
with it and bitter remorse if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed it. 
Thus one cannot feel such satisfaction or mental unease prior to cognition of 
obligation and cannot make it the basis of the latter. (KpV 5:38) 
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Although Kant’s main argument in this passage is that we cannot feel satisfaction or 
unease in the consciousness of our virtuous and vicious action before we are bound by 
morality, and therefore that such feelings cannot ground morality, he nonetheless 
acknowledges that we do feel such satisfaction and unease in connection with this kind of 
consciousness. He says this almost explicitly shortly after the above passage when briefly 
discussing the process of moral education: “I certainly do not deny that frequent practice 
in conformity with this determining ground [i.e. acting in conformity with the moral law] 
can finally produce subjectively a feeling of contentment with oneself [Zufriedenheit mit 
sich selbst]” (KpV 5:38, translation modified). Kant therefore seems to believe that once 
one becomes bound by morality, being conscious of acting virtuously is connected with a 
feeling of “contentment with oneself” or, as he most often calls it, “self-contentment 
[Selbstzufriedenheit].” Kant has a fairly detailed understanding of this concept and it is 
my task in the following section to clarify and explain its significance within Kant’s 
moral philosophy. 
5.2 Self-Contentment 
 Kant’s most direct discussion of self-contentment is in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, where, in the section on the ‘Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical 
Reason,’ he asks the following question:  
Have we not, however, a word that does not denote enjoyment, as the word 
happiness does, but that nevertheless indicates a satisfaction with one’s existence, 
an analogue of happiness that must necessarily accompany consciousness of 
virtue? Yes! The word is self-contentment [Selbstzufriedenheit]. (KpV 5:117, 
translation modified)165 
                                                
165 Lewis White Beck suggests that Kant might be answering David Hume in this passage, who 
claims the following in the fourth appendix to his An Enquiry the Principles of Morals: “It seems 
indeed certain, that the sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a 
review of man’s own conduct and character; it seems certain, I say, that this sentiment, which, 
though the most common of all others, has no proper name in our language” (Hume 1998, 103). 
Kant owned a copy of the first German translation of the Enquiry (see Warda 1922, 50), which 
was a translation of the second edition of 1753. If it is true that Kant is in dialogue with Hume 
here, perhaps Kant’s point is to stress that there is indeed a word for the phenomenon Hume is 
describing in German. Indeed, Hume is lamenting the fact that there is no such word in the 
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Above all, self-contentment is a kind of “satisfaction,” but one that is connected with a 
particular kind of consciousness, namely, as this passage says, a “consciousness of 
virtue.” The specific nature of this consciousness is mentioned in the Vigilantius notes 
where we find that “being contented with oneself … consists in consciousness that our 
actions conform [gemäß] to the moral law” (AA 27:648). This passage is slightly 
misleading, however, for if self-contentment is connected to the consciousness of virtue 
then it cannot arise from the awareness that our actions merely conform to the moral law, 
but rather only when an action is performed for the sake of the moral law as well. Kant 
makes this clear in the Metaphysics of Morals when he says that “[w]hen a thoughtful 
human being has overcome incentives to vice and is aware of having done his often bitter 
duty,” the result is “a state of contentment and peace of soul in which virtue is its own 
reward” (MdS 6:377). In essence, then, self-contentment is a kind of satisfaction that is 
connected to the awareness of virtuous action, i.e. action not merely in conformity with 
the moral law but performed for the sake of the moral law.  Not only this, but it is 
important to stress that it arises as the result of retrospective reflection upon action 
already performed, i.e. it results from “having done [gethan zu haben]” (MdS 6:377) our 
duty. It is not, therefore, similar to the feelings discussed in chapter three which either 
precede (pleasure) or follow (respect, pain, humiliation) the determination of the will but 
which always precede action, rather it is a kind of satisfaction that follows action entirely, 
and indeed only virtuous action.166 
                                                                                                                                            
 
English language, whereas Kant was surely aware that Christian Wolff, for example, had already 
used the term Selbstzufriedenheit (see Wolff 1733, 283-4). 
166 Two points deserve mention here. First, Kant does at times speak of a correlate phenomenon 
of “discontentment [Unzufriedenheit]” (see e.g. AA 8:283n) that results from the awareness of 
having acted against and/or not from the moral law. Because this is simply the contrary to self-
contentment, I do not discuss this term extensively here. Kant himself discusses the positive 
concept of self-contentment more often and I focus on it specifically because it is this term that 
functions most prominently in the problem I discuss later in this chapter. Second, Kant 
occasionally discusses a phenomenon that might be related to self-contentment, namely the 
enjoyment we experience after completing any hard task. In the Anthropology, for example, Kant 
claims that work is “the best way of enjoying one’s life” because it is “disagreeable in itself and 
pleasing only through success” (Anth 7:232, see also H 27:47). Although similar, there is reason 
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Before moving on it is necessary to address an issue that arises in relation to 
Kant’s conception of self-contentment. Kant occasionally mentions that we can never 
know the true motives of our actions (see e.g. GMS 4:407), thus if self-contentment arises 
from the awareness that we have performed virtuous action not only in conformity with 
duty but from duty, then there is a concern that we can never in fact experience self-
contentment given we can never know with certainty that we have done our duty from 
duty, causing it to dissolve into a meaningless concept. When defining self-contentment 
Kant is aware of this issue. This is clear from the fact that he thinks we can overestimate 
our morality, as is apparent in his definition of arrogance (arrogantia). In the Collins 
lectures notes, arrogance is what “makes an unwarranted pretension to merit. It lays claim 
to more moral perfections than are due to it” (AA 27:357), and in the Vigilantius notes it 
is mentioned that arrogance can lead us to “engender a self-contentment in ourselves, and 
respect ourselves self-lovingly, without assessment of our true moral worth” (AA 27:622). 
Kant therefore believes that our assessment of the extent to which we have acted morally 
can be mistaken, and we can never be certain that we have acted morally. In contrast to 
the unjustified assessment of our worth involved in arrogance, Kant does mention “a 
justified satisfaction with self [ein gegrundetes Wohlgefallen gegen sich selbst]” (AA 
27:622, emphasis added), which presumably involves a more accurate assessment of our 
motives, although not likely certain knowledge thereof. Accordingly, what is important is 
that we do our best to assess the morality of our previously completed actions accurately 
and have reason to think we acted not only in conformity to the law, but from the law as 
well. Although we may never be certain, this is all we can hope for given our blindness to 
our true motives. 
With this clarification in hand we can turn to the nature of self-contentment as a 
kind of “satisfaction [Wohlgefallen]” (KpV 5:117). Most importantly, Kant thinks self-
                                                                                                                                            
 
to believe this kind of enjoyment is distinct from self-contentment, at least for Kant. As we will 
see, Kant distinguishes self-contentment from the pleasure or enjoyment related to happiness, and 
Kant says that the enjoyment that completing work or a hard task involves is “pleasure [Lust]” or 
“joy [Frohsein]” and is something “enjoyable [Genießbares]” (see Anth 7:232). Self-contentment, 
as we will see, is not an enjoyment in this sense. 
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contentment is a kind of satisfaction that is, in the first instance, distinct from the kind of 
satisfaction signified by happiness. This can be made clear by distinguishing between two 
kinds of contentment [Zufriedenheit]. In the Vigilantius notes we learn that 
“[c]ontentment is … of two kinds, namely (1) with oneself and (2) with one’s condition 
[Zustand]” (AA 27:643, translation modified). Kant argues that contentment with one’s 
condition “is based on the feeling of pleasure and pain” and is “contentment … taken in a 
pathological sense” (AA 27:643). Kant understands contentment with one’s condition as 
equivalent to “happiness [Glück]” (AA 27:643), which can be seen, for example, in the 
Groundwork where he says that “under the name of happiness” we understand “entire 
well-being and contentment with one’s condition” (GMS 4:393, see also 4:399). Distinct 
from contentment with one’s condition is “[c]ontentment in the moral sense” which 
“always has a reference to a state founded on consciousness of the law-abiding use of our 
freedom, and thus on the conformity of our own actions with the moral law” (AA 27:643). 
This moral contentment is contentment with one’s self, i.e. self-contentment. Kant 
therefore thinks the satisfaction involved in self-contentment is not enjoyment [Genuss] 
and is distinct from the pathological pleasure and pain characteristic of happiness and 
contentment with one’s condition. It is nonetheless still a kind of satisfaction, however, 
and as such Kant claims it is “an analogue of happiness” (KpV 5:117 and see AA 18:262). 
Kant’s distinction between contentment with one’s condition and moral 
contentment in fact clarifies why the latter is called self-contentment. Kant claims, for 
example, that “happiness and well-being do not stem from our self, but from the 
concurrence of other conditions. What comes from us is based on us, on freedom, what 
[is based] on the external, comes from nature and luck [Glück]” (AA 28:1296). Paying 
attention to the etymological root of the word happiness [Glückseligkeit], Kant therefore 
seems to understand happiness as something that is based on luck [Glück] or chance, i.e. 
as dependent upon external conditions outside of our control. We are content with our 
condition [Zustand], then, when we are content with the extent to which nature has 
provided for our well-being, something which is at least not entirely in our control.167 
                                                
167 Indeed, Kant even suggests that too much meddling on our part to secure our own happiness 
can even bring us further away from it (see GMS 4:395-6). 
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Self-contentment, on the other hand, is related to what we are capable of bringing about 
by ourselves, and as such Kant thinks of self-contentment as related to the practice of 
freedom.168 
The connection between self-contentment and freedom is suggested in the 
Religionsphilosophie Volckman notes: “The pleasure with one’s own person is called 
self-contentment [Selbstzufriedenheit]. What is characteristic of us is what freedom 
consists of. As a result, the pleasure with one’s freedom or with the quality of one’s will 
is self-contentment” (AA 28:1191). In that self-contentment results from the awareness of 
previously performed moral action, and moral action is characteristically free action, self-
contentment is something that arises from the use of our freedom. In contrast to 
contentment with one’s condition, then, self-contentment is something we are capable of 
freely bringing about ourselves, and this is why it is called self-contentment, i.e. because 
we are content with what we have accomplished ourselves, not with what has been 
provided for us by the external world. 
The nature of the satisfaction involved in self-contentment is in fact intimately 
connected to the fact that it is brought about by the use of our freedom. If self-
contentment is distinct from contentment with one’s condition and the pathological 
pleasure and pain signified by happiness, but it is nonetheless a kind of satisfaction and 
analogous to happiness, one might rightly ask what kind of satisfaction it is. In the second 
Critique Kant clarifies when he claims the following: 
Freedom, and the consciousness of freedom as an ability to follow the moral law 
with an unyielding disposition, is independence from the inclinations … and so 
far as I am conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the sole 
source of an unchangeable contentment … and this can be called intellectual 
contentment. (KpV 5:117-8)  
Kant goes on to distinguish intellectual contentment from “aesthetic” contentment, 
namely the satisfaction of the inclinations, and he claims that contentment is not the right 
term to use in the latter case because “the inclinations change, grow with the indulgence 
one allows them, and always leave behind a still greater void than one had thought to fill. 
Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them 
                                                
168 On this point compare with §787 of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics (2013, 273-4). 
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aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them” (KpV 5:118). Satisfying one’s 
inclinations can therefore never result in “contentment,” especially an “unchangeable 
contentment,” because we can never be rid of them entirely; we are, after all, both 
rational and sensible beings. The fact that the inclinations are always burdensome is 
significant here, for it is due to the fact that the inclinations are burdensome that we are 
aware of the following: 
we can understand how consciousness of this ability [freedom] of a pure practical 
reason through a deed (virtue) can in fact produce consciousness of mastery over 
one’s inclinations, hence of independence from them and so too from the 
discontent that always accompanies them, and thus can produce a negative 
satisfaction with one’s state, that is, contentment, which in its source is 
contentment with one’s person. (KpV 5:119) 
Freedom, understood in the negative sense of independence from the inclinations, is 
therefore also freedom from the discontentment and burden that goes with them. As I 
have shown in previous chapters, acting morally, for Kant, is to act “not only without the 
cooperation of sensible impulses but even with rejection of all of them” (KpV 5:72), and 
thus acting morally is a prime example of acting independently of the inclinations. The 
satisfaction associated with acting morally is therefore only a “negative satisfaction” in 
the sense that it is at least partial or temporary relief from the burden and discontent that 
accompanies the inclinations. Only in this way is self-contentment a kind of satisfaction, 
for Kant. It is not, strictly speaking, pleasure, pain, or even enjoyment, rather it is merely 
the absence of discontent and as such it can be conceived as a kind of satisfaction, albeit a 
merely “negative” one. Indeed, Kant implies that this is the most self-contentment can 
ever amount to when he says that “mere contentment with oneself … can be merely 
negative” (MdS 6:391).169 
                                                
169 One might argue here that self-contentment, as a merely “negative” satisfaction, is in fact no 
satisfaction at all and thus is not much of a reward for acting virtuously. In the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant acknowledges that there is something beyond self-contentment, i.e. something that 
is a reward for virtue but that is also more “positive.” As Kant says: “there is a subjective 
principle of ethical reward, that is, a receptivity to being rewarded in accordance with laws of 
virtue: the reward, namely, of a moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself 
(which can be merely negative) and which is celebrated in the saying that, through consciousness 
of this pleasure, virtue is its own reward” (MdS 6:391). Kant goes on to explain that this reward 
consists in the approval of others, i.e. the awareness that others appreciate our moral action. In 
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 An important point deserves clarification here. If the exercise of freedom is 
equivalent to acting independently of the inclinations, and as such is accompanied by the 
negative satisfaction of being free from their burden and discontent, then there is a worry 
that any exercise of freedom might be accompanied by such a negative satisfaction. Kant 
of course believes that self-contentment does not arise from the exercise of any free 
choice, rather the negative satisfaction involved in self-contentment arises only from the 
performance of free moral action. Not all free action results in the experience of negative 
satisfaction, for Kant, because he seems to believe that all action not motivated solely by 
the moral law involves the inclinations in some way. Kant suggests this in the 
Groundwork (see GMS 4:397), in the second Critique (see KpV 5:72), and also in the 
Metaphysics of Morals where he suggests that all action not motivated solely by the 
moral law involves the inclinations:  
since the sensible inclinations of human beings tempt them to ends (the matter of 
choice) that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason can in turn check their 
influence only by a moral end set up against the ends of inclination, an end that 
must therefore be given a priori, independently of inclinations. (MdS 6:380-1) 
As he does at numerous points throughout his writings (see e.g. Rel 6:30, GMS 4:398, 
and KpV 5:85), in this passage Kant contrasts acting morally, which involves setting a 
moral end, with acting on the sensible inclinations, which have their own ends. As 
discussed in chapter three, Kant believes that all human choice is free in the sense that the 
strength of our desires do not necessitate we act in certain ways, rather they only impel us 
and must still choose to act, even in the case of non-moral action. What this means is that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
this sense the reward for virtue is called “sweet merit” because consciousness of the appreciation 
of others produces a positive moral enjoyment in us. On the other hand, “bitter merit” is what 
Kant claims “comes from promoting the true well-being of others even when they fail to 
recognize it as such (when they are unappreciative and ungrateful) … All that it produces is 
contentment with oneself, although in this case the merit would be greater still” (MdS 6:391). As 
Kant says in the last part of this passage, the merit we receive from promoting the well-being of 
others even when they don’t appreciate our efforts is of a higher order than “sweet merit.” At the 
same time, Kant does not deny here that self-contentment is only ever negative. Importantly, 
however, the negative satisfaction of self-contentment is the only kind of merit we can ever count 
on since, as I have already mentioned, self-contentment is in our control, whereas sweet merit is 
not, for its existence depends upon the appreciation of others. 
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whenever we do not act morally, we still act freely, i.e. we choose to act, but we choose 
to act on the inclinations. Thus only acting morally involves both acting freely and acting 
independently of the inclinations, which is why only moral action is accompanied by the 
negative satisfaction of self-contentment. Kant does not, therefore, want to say that all 
action is accompanied by negative satisfaction. Only moral action is, for it is only in the 
case of moral action that we are free of the inclinations. 
Although self-contentment is the satisfaction resulting from the absence of the 
discontent of the inclinations, Kant points out that self-contentment is nonetheless not 
complete independence from the inclinations. As both sensible and rational beings, Kant 
believes that “[o]ne would therefore never ascribe to a creature the highest level of self-
contentment or with other words bliss [Seligkeit]” (AA 28:1191). Bliss, for Kant, “is the 
contentment that depends on no external conditions and this belongs to God alone. Man 
is not of this kind; he is a dependent being” (AA 29:600). As both rational and sensible, 
we can never completely remove ourselves from the burden and discontent of the 
inclinations, even though we may partially and at times do so by acting independently of 
them, i.e. by acting morally. Only God is completely “independent from external causes” 
(AA 28:699, see also AA 29:624) and thus only He is capable of achieving bliss. At the 
same time, because self-contentment is at least a partial independence from the 
inclinations, Kant calls it “an analogon of blessedness” (AA 27:656). 
Self-contentment therefore captures an important kind of satisfaction that only 
beings who are both sensible and rational can attain: whereas happiness is simply the 
well-being resulting from the inclinations and is thus attainable by all sensible beings, 
self-contentment is the negative satisfaction associated with being partially removed from 
the burden of the inclinations that human beings are capable of achieving when they act 
morally. Because we are not only rational but sensible also, we cannot achieve the 
complete (and permanent) independence from the inclinations attainable by God alone. 
Because God is wholly rational and as such is both completely as well as permanently 
independent of all inclinations, Kant observes that “one cannot say” that “God is happy,” 
but only that “he is blissfull” (AA 28:808). Human beings, on the other hand, can be both 
happy and self-content, i.e. content with their condition and content with their self, in 
virtue of the fact that they are both sensible and rational.  
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In sum, self-contentment is Kant’s concept for the negative satisfaction connected 
to our retrospective awareness of having acted morally. It is self-contentment because it is 
dependent upon our choice to act morally and not external circumstances. It is a type of 
satisfaction distinct from both happiness and bliss, but is nonetheless analogous to both.  
As was the case for Hutcheson, the fact that Kant makes room for a kind of 
satisfaction connected to acting morally makes him vulnerable to what I called in chapter 
one the “pleasure problem,” according to which acting morally might only be performed 
for the sake of this satisfaction, thereby reducing moral action to a self-interested desire. 
Kant was aware of this problem and in the next section I outline the specific version of it 
he faced, as well as his response to it. 
5.3 The Pleasure Problem: Garve’s Objection and Kant’s 
Response 
 In chapter one I illustrated that Hutcheson’s moral theory is subject to a problem 
that arises when one combines his conception of the moral sense with his theory of 
motivation. According to Hutcheson, the moral sense signifies our capacity to feel 
pleasure when we perceive objects that are morally good, i.e. benevolent actions, and he 
even goes as far as saying that the moral sense “gives us more Pleasure and Pain, than all 
our other Facultys” (I4 244). In the Inquiry, Hutcheson also argues against the idea that 
all action springs from self-interest. On the contrary, Hutcheson claims that we have the 
“ultimate desire” (I4 152) for the good of others, i.e. we desire the good of others 
disinterestedly and for its own sake and not as a means to any personal pleasure. As I 
discussed, however, the idea that we experience pleasure when perceiving our own 
benevolent actions can be problematic. If, according to Hutcheson, acting morally 
amounts to acting benevolently, i.e. disinterestedly desiring the happiness of others, and 
perceiving our own benevolent actions gives us pleasure (indeed more pleasure than all 
our other faculties), then there is a risk that we only ever act benevolently in order to feel 
the pleasure of the moral sense, i.e. the pleasure associated with perceiving our own 
benevolent actions. Hutcheson anticipates this problem when he states the following: 
the principal business of the moral Philosopher is to shew, from solid Reasons, 
“That universal Benevolence tends to the Happiness of the Benevolent, either 
from the Pleasures of Reflection, Honour, natural Tendency to engage the good 
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Offices of Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for our Happiness in this 
World; or from the Sanctions of divine Laws discover’d to us by the Constitution 
of the Universe;” … but not to attempt proving, “That Prospects of our own 
Advantage of any kind can raise in us the virtuous Benevolence towards others.” 
(I4 270) 
In other words, what Hutcheson wants to argue is both that benevolent actions are 
accompanied by some pleasure, but also that benevolent actions are never performed for 
the sake of this pleasure alone. It is important to clarify how this is the case, for, as 
Hutcheson does throughout the Inquiry in particular, he does not want to argue that 
benevolent actions can be reduced to self-interested ones. Indeed, the challenge 
Hutcheson faces here is one that concerns moral psychology: if benevolence brings us 
pleasure, then who is to say that it is not “our own Advantage” that brings about “virtuous 
Benevolence towards others,” i.e. who is to say benevolence is not really just self-interest 
in disguise.170 Because Kant makes room for a kind of satisfaction associated with acting 
morally, there is the worry that he might face a similar problem. In fact, one of Kant’s 
contemporaries raised an objection to Kant’s moral philosophy that resembles this 
problem. 
In his Essays on Various Topics from Morality, Literature and Social Life 
[Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände der Moral, Literatur und dem 
gesellschaftlichen Leben], Christian Garve claims that, according to the principles of 
some philosophers, “the virtuous individual … ceaselessly strives to be worthy of 
happiness, but – insofar as he is truly virtuous – never strives to be happy” (Garve 1792, 
111-112). It is undeniable that Garve has Kant in mind here. At the time of the 
publication of Garve’s Essays (1792), Kant had published both the Groundwork (1785) 
and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), both of which identify acting morally with 
striving to be worthy of happiness (see e.g. GMS 4:393 and KpV 5:110ff.). Garve 
                                                
170 This point is significant, because the challenge Hutcheson is dealing with does not concern 
moral education. It may in fact be possible that bringing about the happiness of others from self-
interested motives can eventually lead us to bring about their happiness as an end itself, i.e. 
disinterestedly. This is a different question, however, and is neither Hutcheson’s nor Kant’s focus 
in relation to the problem I am discussing in this chapter. 
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criticizes the idea that the striving to be worthy of happiness can be separated from the 
desire for happiness itself when he claims the following:171 
For my part I confess that I grasp this division of ideas very well with my head, 
but I do not find this division of desires and strivings in my heart; - that it is even 
inconceivable to me how any person can become aware that his longing to be 
worthy of happiness is purely separated from the longing for happiness itself – 
and has therefore performed his duty entirely disinterestedly. (Garve 1792, 112) 
Garve makes two important objections here. First, Garve argues that it is impossible for 
anyone to distinguish, via introspection for example, between these two kinds of desires, 
i.e. the striving for happiness and the striving to be worthy of happiness. Second and 
more relevant to my purposes here, Garve suggests that the desire to be worthy of 
happiness might just be reducible to the desire for happiness. Garve’s objection is 
therefore similar to the challenge Hutcheson anticipated. The problem Garve poses to 
Kant is that the virtuous motive, which is supposed to be distinct from the motive of self-
interest, might in fact be reducible to self-interest after all. Kant surely did not want to 
claim that the moral motive could be reduced to the desire for happiness, for the 
possibility of acting independently of our inclinations and solely from respect for the 
moral law is central to his moral philosophy as a whole. As such, it was in Kant’s interest 
to respond to Garve and clarify why this objection is mistaken 
In two texts written after the publication of Garve’s Essays, namely the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and the article On a recently prominent tone of superiority 
in philosophy (1796), Kant mentions the position of a certain “eudaemonist” (see AA 
8:395n and MdS 6:377) who believes that “the pleasure (contentment) that a righteous 
man has in view, in order to feel it one day in the consciousness of his well-conducted 
course of life (and thus the prospect of his future felicity), is in fact the true motive for 
conducting his affairs well (in accordance with the law)” (AA 8:395n, translation 
modified). As Kant sees it, the eudaemonist’s objection is the following: because the 
“righteous man” experiences contentment in relation to “his well-conducted course of 
life,” this contentment and not the striving to be worthy of happiness might be the true 
motive of the righteous man’s “virtuous” actions. Given the similarity between the 
                                                
171 Kant quotes this passage in his ‘Theory and Practice’ essay (see AA 8:281). 
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position of the “eudaemonist” and Garve’s objection, it is likely that Kant has Garve in 
mind here.  
In both the Metaphysics of Morals and the Tone essay, Kant responds to the 
eudaemonist by distinguishing between “pathological pleasure and moral pleasure” 
(MdS 6:378). According to Kant, “[p]leasure that must precede one’s observance of the 
law in order for one to act in conformity with the law is pathological … but pleasure that 
must be preceded by the law in order to be felt is in the moral order” (MdS 6:378). On 
the one hand, therefore, there are the pathological pleasures, the expectation of which can 
act as a motive to action.172 On the other hand, there is a certain kind of pleasure that 
only results from acting in accordance with the moral law. This latter pleasure is what 
Kant calls “moral pleasure” (ibid.) and it plays a central role in Kant’s response to Garve. 
Kant responds to Garve’s objection by claiming that Garve’s reasoning is circular 
and his objection is meaningless. Kant says the following in the Tone essay:  
since I must assume him [the righteous person] beforehand to be righteous and 
obedient to the law, i.e., to be one in whom the law precedes the pleasure, in 
order for him subsequently to feel a pleasure of the soul in the consciousness of 
his well-conducted course of life, it is an empty circle in the reasoning to make 
the pleasure, which is a consequence, into the cause of that course of life. (AA 
8:395) 
Based on his distinction between pathological and moral pleasure, then, Kant argues it is 
in fact impossible for the expectation of moral pleasure to somehow be the true motive of 
our strivings to be worthy of happiness. This is because it is only when we are already 
motivated by the moral law alone and not the expectation of future pleasure that it is 
possible for us to experience moral pleasure in the first place. To perform virtuous 
actions only for the sake of the pleasure that results from acting morally is precisely not 
to have the moral motive – it is to be motivated by the desire for pleasure. Indeed, given 
the nature of moral pleasure, it is simply a logical mistake to think one can experience 
moral pleasure if one’s reason for acting is the expectation of this pleasure. 
                                                
172 To be clear, we do not necessarily need to experience pleasure for us to desire something, for 
Kant. As I discussed in chapter three, Kant’s distinction between instinct and inclination is meant 
to capture precisely this point: an inclination “presupposes acquaintance with the object of desire” 
(Rel 6:29n) whereas an instinct does not. 
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 In the above passage Kant describes moral pleasure as “a pleasure of the soul in 
the consciousness of [one’s] well-conducted course of life” (AA 8:395). I take it that 
when Kant discusses moral pleasure he has his conception of self-contentment in mind, 
thus I believe that Stephen Engstrom is on the right track when he claims that self-
contentment is just a different term for moral pleasure (see Engstrom 2007, 144). Strictly 
speaking, however, moral pleasure is a type of pleasure and self-contentment is a 
particular instantiation of moral pleasure, but it is certainly correct to say that self-
contentment is a moral pleasure in that it can only be felt after one is already “righteous 
and obedient to the law” (AA 8:395). Indeed, I illustrated above that self-contentment is 
experienced after we have already acted morally, thus it is correct to say that self-
contentment only follows the law and does not precede it. As a moral pleasure, then, it 
would appear that Kant believes his conception of self-contentment is not vulnerable to 
Garve’s objection and the pleasure problem.  
As mentioned, Kant is not alone in claiming that there is a particular kind of 
satisfaction associated with acting morally, and nor is he alone in answering the kind of 
objection posed by Garve. In the next section I explain how Kant’s solution to the 
pleasure problem is a better response than that offered by Hutcheson. 
5.4 Kant’s Solution in Comparison to Hutcheson’s 
Kant’s solution to what I have been calling the “pleasure problem” has important 
similarities to Hutcheson’s solution to the problem, but there are also significant 
differences between their respective solutions. An interesting similarity between the two 
results from the fact that their general moral theories both identify the moral motive as 
lying not in self-interest, but in benevolence (Hutcheson) and acting for the sake of duty 
alone (Kant). As has been the focus of this chapter, they both also claim that the pleasure 
of acting virtuously (the pleasure of the moral sense, for Hutcheson, and the satisfaction 
of self-contentment, for Kant) can only be experienced when one acts from the moral 
motive and not from self-interest. As such, although Hutcheson does not say so explicitly, 
Kant’s response to the pleasure problem applies to Hutcheson’s position as well: if acting 
benevolently is equivalent to not acting on self-interest, then any pleasure associated with 
acting benevolently simply would not arise if we were to attempt to experience the 
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pleasure of benevolence from self-interest. In such a case our motive would not be 
benevolence but self-interest, thus it is a logical impossibility for the pleasure associated 
with moral action (i.e. the pleasure of the moral sense) to arise in this scenario for 
Hutcheson as well. 
The solution to the pleasure problem that Hutcheson himself provides is 
significantly different from Kant’s, however. Recall that, according to his main solution 
to the pleasure problem (see above pg. 41), Hutcheson points out that the idea that we can 
act benevolently in order to feel the pleasure associated with perceiving our own 
benevolent actions implies that we can bring about benevolent affections at will and, in 
this case, for self-interested reasons. In chapter one I showed how Hutcheson denies the 
possibility of this when he states that “neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or 
Desire can be directly raised by Volition” (I4 139). If we could raise an affection or desire 
via an act of will, Hutcheson claims we could be bribed not only to perform good acts for 
other people, for example, but to love them as well. For Hutcheson, we can be bribed to 
act in certain ways, “but real Esteem no Price can purchase” (I4 135). 
Hutcheson qualifies his solution to the pleasure problem, however, and it is here 
where we find an important difference between his position and Kant’s. Hutcheson 
qualifies his response to the problem in the following way: 
The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us from having any Affection, may 
indeed turn our Attention to those Qualities in the object, which are naturally 
constituted the necessary Causes or Occasions of the advantageous Affection; and 
if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus 
indirectly the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these 
Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no Volition of ours, nor 
Desire, will ever raise any Affection in us. (I4 140)  
Hutcheson therefore makes room for the possibility of self-interestedly, even if indirectly, 
bringing about the pleasure associated with benevolence: if certain objects necessarily 
raise benevolent affections in us, affections which are bound up with the pleasure of the 
moral sense, then we can self-interestedly seek out these objects in order to experience 
the pleasure associated with these affections. Hutcheson’s position is therefore slightly 
unsatisfying in that he seems to grant, in however a roundabout way, that we can be 
benevolent from self-interest. This is unsatisfying because if it is possible to indirectly 
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raise benevolence through self-interest, then there is the risk that true, disinterested 
benevolence is not possible after all and all action can be reduced to self-interest. 
 Kant’s solution to the pleasure problem is more satisfying than Hutcheson’s, and 
this is due, above all, to an important feature of self-contentment that has not yet been 
discussed. I mentioned above that in the second Critique Kant discusses self-contentment 
in connection with an objection he makes to moral sense theory when he says the 
following:  
one must first value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the 
moral law, and the immediate worth that compliance with it gives a person in his 
own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in consciousness of one’s conformity 
with it and bitter remorse if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed it. 
(KpV 5:38)  
Shortly after this passage, Kant discusses self-contentment in relation to moral education 
and claims: 
Someone must be at least half way toward being an honest man to even frame for 
himself a representation of those feelings [i.e. of satisfaction and mental unease]. I 
certainly do not deny that frequent practice in conformity with this determining 
ground [i.e. acting in conformity with the moral law] can finally produce 
subjectively a feeling of contentment with oneself [Zufriedenheit mit sich selbst]. 
(KpV 5:38, translation modified)  
Kant’s point here is that self-contentment can only be felt after one is “at least half way” 
moral, and thus that experiencing self-contentment can only take place once one has at 
least partially acquired the virtuous disposition, something which takes place over an 
extended period of time and involves “frequent practice,” among other things.173 What 
this means is that self-contentment is not something that can be experienced in 
connection with the performance of every virtuous action. Indeed, because self-
contentment can only be felt after one is “at least half way” towards being a moral 
person, this kind of satisfaction just isn’t the kind of thing one can expect to experience 
                                                
173 Kant outlines four stages of moral education in his Lectures on Pedagogy (see AA 9:450ff.), 
and frequent practice in conformity with the law takes place during the third, “civilizing” stage of 
moral education. For further discussion of Kant’s process of moral education see Geisinger 
(2012), Louden (2000, 38ff., 2011 Ch. 11, 2012), Munzel (2003), Surprenant (2003), and Yala 
(2005). For a discussion of the reliability of the Lectures on Pedagogy see Louden (2011, 136ff.). 
Also, in the conclusion to this project I briefly discuss how there may only be three stages to 
Kant’s conception of the process of moral education rather than four. 
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after the performance of any single action alone if one has not yet achieved the virtuous 
disposition. If one is attempting to act morally in order to experience self-contentment, 
this is a good indication that one does not yet have the moral disposition and therefore 
that one shouldn’t expect to experience self-contentment at all. 
In light of this feature of self-contentment, Kant’s solution to the pleasure 
problem is different from Hutcheson’s in an important way. It was the fact that certain 
objects necessarily raise the affection of benevolence paired with the idea that the 
pleasure of the moral sense could be experienced after the performance of every 
benevolent action that made it possible, on his account, for self-interest to indirectly raise 
benevolence. An important feature of this view is therefore that the pleasure of acting 
morally can be experienced no matter how far along one is in the process of moral 
education. In other words, according to Hutcheson one could, in principle, experience the 
pleasure of the moral sense if one is a vicious person. In relation to the pleasure problem, 
however, the issue for Hutcheson is that, if it is possible for benevolence to be raised by 
self-interest, then perhaps benevolence can be reduced to self-interest after all. By 
contrast, Kant claims that the satisfaction associated with virtuous action can only be 
experienced by one who has at least partially acquired the moral disposition, which 
means that it is strictly impossible, even indirectly, to bring about this satisfaction in a 
particular instance if one’s motive is self-interest. Thus Kant entirely rules out the 
possibility of acting morally for the sake of self-interest, and as such avoids the challenge 
posed by, in his instance, Garve: the striving to be worthy of happiness is not the same as 
the striving for happiness itself, i.e. the moral motive cannot, even indirectly, be reduced 
to self-interest.174 For this reason, the solution to the “pleasure problem” implied by 
                                                
174 I wish to emphasize here that I am only claiming that it is impossible, on Kant’s view, to 
indirectly raise the moral motive from self-interest in a particular instance of action. The 
question of whether or not the self-interested expectation of self-contentment can bring about the 
moral disposition, and thereby the moral motive, over time is a different question altogether, one 
which involves evaluating the role of self-interested action in the process of moral education, for 
Kant. For both Hutcheson and Kant, the “pleasure problem” is not one that concerns moral 
education, however. Rather, it is one that concerns moral psychology, i.e. whether the moral 
motive is reducible to self-interest. I cannot get into the issue of moral education here, but in my 
conclusion I briefly discuss how investigating the relation between Kant, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
and also Smith on the topic of moral education is worthwhile. 
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Kant’s notion of self-contentment amounts to a more satisfying solution to the problem 
than that offered by Hutcheson. 
In the next section I contrast self-contentment with a number of related terms in 
Kant’s moral philosophy, with which a number interpreters have equated it in the past. I 
use the forgoing analysis of the concept to argue that, in most cases, interpreters have in 
large part misunderstood the term. 
5.5 Terminological Clarification 
Kant’s concept of self-contentment is rarely discussed in the secondary literature. 
In those cases where it is, however, I believe it is wrongly equated with a number of 
other, somewhat related concepts in Kant’s moral philosophy. In addition to Engstrom’s 
equation of self-contentment with moral pleasure (see Engstrom 2007, 144), Lewis White 
Beck suggests that self-contentment is equivalent to both moral feeling (see 1960, 224) as 
well as the positive side of respect (ibid., 229). Additionally, Richard McCarty discusses 
moral pleasure, self-contentment, and respect as if they were the same phenomenon (see 
2007, 176). I have already clarified how self-contentment is indeed a moral pleasure in 
the sense that it is an instantiation of this kind of pleasure. Contrary to Beck and 
McCarty, however, I hope it is clear from the above discussion that self-contentment is 
equivalent to neither the positive side of respect, nor moral feeling. The main reason for 
this is that respect and moral feeling signify a feeling that takes place prior to the 
execution of action. Indeed, as I argued in chapter three, respect and moral feeling are 
feelings that are necessary for the execution of action to take place. Self-contentment, 
however, arises only once action is completed and we retrospectively reflect on the fact 
that we were motived from duty alone. Although self-contentment is surely a feeling 
associated with the execution of moral action, it occurs at a different stage of this 
execution, i.e. not during the process of execution but subsequent to it. Furthermore, both 
respect and moral feeling take place each time we are conscious of the moral law. By 
contrast and as illustrated above, self-contentment can only be experienced once one 
makes significant progress towards becoming a virtuous person, and thus it is not 
something involved in the performance of each moral action. 
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 One final clarification is in order. When one thinks of the satisfaction associated 
with virtue in connection to Kant’s moral philosophy, the first thing that comes to mind is 
his concept of the highest good. In fact, Kant’s most explicit discussion of self-
contentment actually takes place in the section of the second Critique where Kant 
discusses the nature of the highest good in detail, namely in the ‘Critical Resolution of 
the Antinomy of Practical Reason.’ Kant defines the highest good as “happiness 
distributed in exact proportion to morality” (Kant KpV 5:110-1), and, similar to self-
contentment, the connection is between “morality of disposition … as cause with 
happiness as effect in the sensible world” (KpV 5:115). There are at least three main 
reasons why self-contentment should not be understood as equivalent or even related to 
the highest good, however. Although Kant at times speaks of “[t]he production of the 
highest good in the world” (KpV 5:122, my emphasis), he believes that both the 
immortality of the soul and the existence of God must necessarily be assumed if 
happiness is ever to be a consequence of morality. God must be assumed, for example, 
because the highest good is “happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality” (KpV 
5:110-1, my emphasis), and only He has the power to effect such an exact proportion (see 
KpV 5:124ff.). Self-contentment is therefore not equivalent to the highest good, first, 
because self-contentment appears to be possible in this life, as something only a being 
that is both sensible and rational can experience, whereas the highest good is possible 
only in an afterlife. Second, and as I illustrated above, because we can never know the 
true motives of our actions, we can never, strictly speaking, experience a completely 
justified self-contentment, for we never really know if we have acted solely from duty 
alone. In other words, self-contentment is not connected to the exact extent that we are 
moral. The highest good, on the other hand, is an exact proportion between happiness and 
morality, which suggests that self-contentment and the highest good are quite distinct. 
Third and perhaps most importantly, the highest good is the connection between 
happiness and morality, whereas self-contentment signifies a merely (negative) 
satisfaction distinct from happiness altogether. Self-contentment is not meant to signify 
how morality can make us happy; it does not capture how our “supreme” good as moral 
and rational beings (morality) leads to our most “complete” good as sensible beings 
(happiness) (see KpV 5:110). Rather, self-contentment captures how acting morally is 
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rewarding in itself and, as analogous to bliss, gives us a taste of what it would be like to 
be free of our sensible inclinations altogether. For these reasons I believe self-
contentment is very different from Kant’s concept the highest good. In general, I hope 
this terminological clarification helps determine the role self-contentment is supposed to 
play in Kant’s moral philosophy. It is not a term that comes into play during the 
execution of action, rather it is only relevant (1) once we have at least partially acquired 
the moral disposition, and (2) after we have completed moral action. 
5.6 Conclusion 
 In light of both the above terminological clarification, as well as the preceding 
sections, my main task in this chapter has been to clarify Kant’s conception of the 
satisfaction associated with acting morally, i.e. self-contentment. I have illustrated that it 
is a negative satisfaction distinct from both happiness and bliss, though it is analogous to 
both. However, my second task has been to illustrate the way in which self-contentment 
amounts to a better solution to what I have called “the pleasure problem” as opposed to 
the solution offered by Hutcheson. Responding to an objection raised by Garve, and 
similar to one Hutcheson anticipated, Kant argues that the nature of self-contentment as a 
moral pleasure, and as something one can experience only after one is at least half way 
towards being a moral individual, makes it such that it is logically impossible to expect to 
experience self-contentment if one’s intention is solely to experience this satisfaction. I 
argued that although Kant’s solution has certain things in common with Hutcheson’s, 
Kant’s is ultimately more satisfying because it entirely rules out the possibility of the 
moral motive being reduced to self-interest. I concluded by clarifying self-contentment in 
relation to a number of other terms utilized by Kant and that signify certain feelings or 
pleasures related to acting morally. Ultimately, I argued that self-contentment is 
equivalent to none of them, although it is an instance of what Kant calls “moral 
pleasure.” In sum, I hope to have shed some light on a concept of Kant’s that has 
important similarities to the pleasure of the moral sense, and also one that has received 
very little attention in the secondary literature.  
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Conclusion 
 At the beginning of this project I identified two aspects of Kant’s moral 
philosophy that have received relatively little attention in the scholarship produced over 
the past half century: (1) the way in which Kant’s moral philosophy was influenced by 
his predecessors and contemporaries, and (2) the way in in which Kant’s moral 
philosophy developed over the course of his philosophical career. My aim in the 
preceding dissertation has been to shed light on these topics by investigating one of the 
most important influences on Kant’s moral philosophy: British moral sense theory. 
Indeed, it has been my main task to re-evaluate the nature and extent of this influence 
over the course of Kant’s development. I argued that such a study is necessary in light of 
the fact that the existing scholarship widely disagrees as to whether and how far moral 
sense theory influenced Kant, and also because a wealth of Kant’s unpublished lecture 
notes have been made widely available since the latest studies on the topic were 
produced. 
 The preceding chapters have attempted to shed light on the above topics, each in 
their own way. After explaining the core features of moral sense theory in chapter one, 
chapter two argued that Kant’s opinion of moral sense theory changed fairly drastically 
over the course of his pre-Critical, i.e. early developmental, phase. Whereas Kant seemed 
intrigued by the idea of a “moral feeling” playing a role in both moral judgement and 
moral motivation early on, after his “great light,” where he came to a settled opinion 
regarding the rational nature of moral philosophy, he came to reject the idea of a moral 
feeling grounding moral judgement. At the same time, his lecture notes and reflections 
after this turning point in his thinking reveal that this rejection of the idea of a feeling 
grounding judgement did not imply a rejection of the idea that a moral feeling plays a 
role in moral motivation. Nonetheless, that at this stage of his development, i.e. at a time 
when Kant was still developing his position on moral motivation, moral feeling is 
involved in action in quite a particular way: feeling must simply match or agree with 
what the understanding judges to be morally right. 
 In chapter three, my aim was to investigate Kant’s discussion of moral sense 
theory during the Critical period. I illustrated that Kant’s opinion of moral sense theory’s 
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conception of moral judgement during the Critical period is consistent with what he says 
about it after 1769. Indeed, his considered view offers six criticisms against the idea of a 
moral sense grounding moral judgement. My main focus in chapter three, however, was 
to determine if Kant continues to adopt aspects of moral sense theory’s conception of 
moral motivation into the Critical period. First, I explained Kant’s mature understanding 
of moral motivation in detail and surveyed many of the dominant interpretations in the 
secondary literature, a number of which claim Kant’s view has features in common with 
the broadly empiricist conception of action presented by Hume and others. I then argued 
that although on a superficial level Kant’s conception of moral motivation has certain 
features in common with Hutcheson’s, their differences are ultimately more significant. 
Thus while Kant was surely influenced by Hutcheson’s understanding of moral 
motivation, the extent to which he adopts its features is quite minimal. As such, it can be 
concluded that while placing Kant in context with Hutcheson is helpful for understanding 
both of their respective positions, it is clear that they ultimately disagree on issues of both 
judgement and motivation more than they agree. 
 My fourth chapter argued that although Kant only minimally adopts certain 
features of Hutcheson’s conception of motivation, Kant’s understanding of “respect” for 
the moral law as the moral motive seems to have been influenced by Adam Smith’s 
notion of the “regard” we have for the general rules of conduct. I compared their 
respective conceptions of this “attitude” and illustrated that they have much in common 
with one another. Furthermore, I ventured to show that given when the first German 
translation of Smith’s Theory was published, and given the point in time at which Kant 
first incorporates the idea of “respect” into his moral philosophy, it is likely that Kant at 
the very least drew inspiration from Smith when conceiving of the idea of respect. 
 In my fifth chapter, I illustrated that, although Kant criticizes the idea that the 
pleasure of the moral sense can ground moral judgement, he nonetheless has a place in 
his moral philosophy for the idea that we feel a particular kind of satisfaction when we 
reflect on the fact that we have performed moral conduct. This was Kant’s notion of 
“self-contentment.” I also illustrated that Kant’s understanding self-contentment is 
intended to answer an objection posed by Christian Garve, an objection similar to one 
Hutcheson anticipated in relation to the pleasure of the moral sense as well. This is the 
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objection that, if the performance of moral action is connected with a feeling of pleasure 
or satisfaction, who is to say that moral action is not always performed simply for the 
sake of this pleasure rather than from disinterested benevolence or “respect” for the moral 
law alone. I called this problem the “pleasure problem” and argued that, with his notion 
of self-contentment, Kant in fact offers a more satisfying solution to the problem than 
Hutcheson. 
 In sum, I hope to have shown that placing Kant in context with his British 
predecessors can at the very least help clarify some of the more perplexing aspects of 
both his pre-Critical and Critical moral philosophy. I hope to have shed light on Kant’s 
engagement with one of his most important influences, and by tracing the nature of this 
influence over the course of his development I hope to have shed light on the nature of 
this development itself. As I mentioned at the beginning of this study, however, the topics 
that have been my focus in the foregoing dissertation are not the only ways in which 
Kant’s moral philosophy engages with the thought of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and also 
Smith. In the remaining pages, I therefore wish to briefly outline three additional ways in 
which Kant’s moral philosophy is related to his British predecessors as a way to indicate 
possible future directions of research. 
 Moral Education. In chapter five I discussed how, according to Hutcheson, it is 
possible to raise benevolence (and the pleasure associated with it) from self-interest in a 
certain way, but that for Kant this possibility is precluded by the nature of self-
contentment. In answering the pleasure problem, however, Kant and Hutcheson are 
attempting to answer a very specific objection. The objection Garve poses to Kant and 
the objection Hutcheson anticipates is one about moral psychology, i.e. whether positing 
a kind of pleasure or satisfaction associated with acting morally threatens to reduce 
benevolence or the motive of duty to self-interest. There is another, related question 
(which itself is not necessarily a problem or objection) and this is the question of whether 
acting “morally” from self-interest can eventually produce the moral disposition. In other 
words, this is a question about moral education: is it possible, according to Kant and 
Hutcheson, for example, to act self-interestedly but in a particular way such that one will 
eventually become moral and act not from self-interest, but from benevolence and respect 
for the law? 
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 Interestingly enough, Hutcheson is not the only moral sense theorist to posit the 
possibility of acting benevolently from self-interest. Although not discussed in chapter 
one, Shaftesbury holds this view as well. In relation to the question of what reasons we 
have for acting moral, which in Shaftesbury’s case is also equivalent to acting 
benevolently, Shaftesbury has two answers: (1) acting benevolently makes us happy 
because it fulfills our natural end as human beings (see Gill 2006, 119), and (2) acting 
benevolently brings about pleasures “of the mind” (C 201) which Shaftesbury thinks are 
higher in kind than all other pleasures. As can be seen here, both of the reasons 
Shaftesbury presents as reasons we have to be virtuous are self-interested ones: we have 
reason to act morally because it makes us happy and gives us pleasure. Similarly, Smith 
claims that acting morally is in our interest as well. Although no one has made the 
attempt to fully reconstruct Smith’s answer to the question “why be moral?”, Samuel 
Fleischacker suggests that we act morally, for Smith, because we desire approval (see 
1991, 268-9). Smith claims, however, that the approval of others is “the chief part of 
human happiness” (TMS 66), which means that if we act morally because we desire 
approval, we are ultimately acting morally because it will make us happy. Thus 
Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, and Smith, at the very least make room for the possibility that 
acting self-interestedly is not incompatible with becoming moral and might even be 
compatible with the process of moral education. 
 This is interesting, for Kant also suggests that there is a role for self-interest to 
play in the process of moral education. As he claims in the second Critique: “It certainly 
cannot be denied that in order to bring either a mind that is still uncultivated … onto the 
track of the morally good in the first place, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract 
it by means of its own advantage or to alarm it by fear of harm” (KpV 5:152). Not only 
this, but Kant also suggests that acting in conformity with the moral law but from self-
interest has a role to play at a particular stage in moral education. After a first phase of 
“discipline” and a second of “cultivation,” it is only in the third “civilizing” phase that 
“the human being becomes prudent” (AA 9:450). In this phase, morality is shown to be a 
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prudent option, but this is only the precursor to the fourth175 and final phase of 
“moralization” where only morally good ends are chosen, and they are chosen solely 
because they are good in themselves, not because they are in our interest (see AA 9:450). 
Thus although Kant surely believes that moral actions should be performed solely from 
duty alone, it seems that he might also make room for the possibility of self-interest 
playing a role in moral education. Indeed, Kant suggests this when he occasionally 
discusses moral imitators (see e.g. Anth 7:293 and Louden 2000, 77) and “permissible 
moral illusion” (Anth 7:151ff.). A first way in which the foregoing dissertation could be 
continued, therefore, would be to investigate the way in which this might be true for Kant 
and to investigate if placing his position in context with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and 
Smith on this matter could help illuminate his position. 
 The Highest Good. According to Kant, we are morally obligated to perform 
particular actions in and of themselves and not for any other purpose or end, e.g. for the 
purpose of increasing our own happiness. At the same time, Kant believes that “[e]very 
action … has its end” (MdS 6:385), which means that the actions we are morally 
obligated to perform must still have an end, even if it is not our direct intention to bring it 
about. Kant calls the end of moral action “the highest good” (KpV 5:108ff.), which he 
defines as “happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person 
and his worthiness to be happy)” (KpV 5:110-1), as briefly discussed at the end of chapter 
five. Kant’s concept of the highest good and the distinction between happiness and the 
worthiness to be happy is central to his practical philosophy as a whole, and the latter 
distinction in particular is often thought to have been Kant’s own invention. However, 
Smith has an at least similar sounding distinction between praise and praise-worthiness 
(TMS 136 and 192ff. and also Irwin 2008, 699f.). I just noted how approval, i.e. praise, 
for Smith, constitutes a large part of our happiness. At the same time, Smith claims we 
                                                
175 How many stages there are in Kant’s conception of the process of moral education is unclear. 
To be sure, Kant himself says that moral education is a three-stage process (see AA 9:441), but 
strictly speaking there appear to be four stages. As Louden notes (2011, 141), the stage of 
“moralization” is distinct from “culture,” i.e. the third stage, even though Kant at times refers to 
the third stage as moralization as well. For more on this issue see Louden (2000, 38ff., 2011, 
138ff.), and Moran (2009, 475ff.). 
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cannot enjoy this happiness unless we do what is praise-worthy (see ibid.). A second way 
in which to continue the research on the relation between Kant’s moral philosophy and 
that of his British predecessors would be to investigate how, for both Smith and Kant, 
being worthy of happiness and acting virtuously is the condition of participating in 
happiness itself. 
 Also on the topic of the highest good is an interesting connection between Kant 
and Hutcheson. In Hutcheson’s thought we find an important source for Kant’s idea that 
we must make certain necessary assumptions, i.e. what Kant calls the “postulates of pure 
practical reason,” if the highest good is to be possible. Kant argues that we must assume 
both the immortality of the soul and the existence of God if we are to believe that 
happiness will ever be in exact proportion to our virtue. This is because such a proportion 
can only be achieved in the afterlife and God is the only one with the power to make it 
happen (see KpV 5:122). In fact, it has already observed by others that Hutcheson 
believes that the happiness resulting from virtue is only possible in the afterlife (see 
Schollmeier 1967, 162 and Stark 2004, 11-12n). However, Hutcheson in fact argues that 
belief in both an afterlife (Hutcheson 2002, 123) and in a divine being (Hutcheson 2002, 
187ff.) are necessary presuppositions of our belief in happiness resulting from virtue. 
Thus one could also continue the foregoing project by investigating the connection 
between Kant and Hutcheson on the idea of the postulates of pure practical reason. 
 The Obligation to Act Morally. A third and final avenue of future research 
concerns the fact that both Hutcheson and Kant seem to face a similar confusion in 
relation to the obligation they both claim we have to act morally. First, Hutcheson claims 
that “there is naturally an obligation upon all men to benevolence” (Hutcheson 2004, 
177). This can mean either that we simply ought to perform benevolent actions, or that 
we ought to have the benevolent desires from which such actions spring (see Jensen 
1971, 91ff.). However, because all actions spring from desire, for Hutcheson (see 
Hutcheson 2004, 101), regardless of how one conceives of this obligation it implies that 
we are obligated to have benevolent desires. Now, because Hutcheson believes in the 
principle that “ought implies can” (see Hutcheson 2004, 191), if we are always under 
obligation to have benevolent desires, then we must be able to have these desires 
whenever we choose. Confusingly, Hutcheson’s psychology explicitly denies that desires 
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can result from an act of will (see Hutcheson 2008, 224), thus it is unclear how we are to 
understand Hutcheson’s conception of the obligation to benevolence.  
Second, Kant, for his part, also advances two separate claims that each result in a 
similar confusion. First, Kant argues that moral obligations must be performed for a 
particular reason, i.e. solely because we ought to do them (see e.g. MdS 6:219). In this 
vein Kant claims there is a general obligation of virtue [Tugendverpflichtung] that 
instructs us to do our duty from duty, i.e. solely because we ought to do it (see MdS 
6:410). Second, Kant argues that it is our duty to make our own perfection an end of ours 
(see MdS 6:387), and since he claims that “[t]he greatest perfection of a human being is 
to do his duty from duty” (MdS 6:392), this duty also amounts to the claim that we are 
obligated to do our duty for a particular reason, i.e. solely because it is what we ought to 
do. Like Hutcheson, however, Kant also believes that “ought implies can” (see e.g. Rel 
6:50), and as such these two views imply not only that we ought to do our duty from duty, 
but that we can do so as well. In a similarly confusing fashion, however, Kant explicitly 
denies that we can be obligated to do our duty from duty (see Kant MdS 6:402-3 and KpV 
5:83). A third way in which the preceding project could be continued would therefore be 
to compare and contrast Hutcheson’s and Kant’s conception of the obligation to act 
morally in an attempt to clarify the nature of these obligations and make them consistent 
with their respective wider philosophical views.  
This is likely not an exhaustive list of the possible ways in which situating Kant’s 
moral philosophy within the context of his British predecessors could help clarify certain 
aspects of his moral philosophy that still evade an adequate explanation. Indeed, as I 
mentioned at the beginning of my project, I hope that the preceding chapters at the very 
least make it clear that placing Kant in context with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Smith is 
a worthwhile enterprise. I therefore hope that, above all else, my project has made it 
apparent and has served as an example of how understanding a historical figure in their 
proper historical context is not merely interesting from a historical perspective, but that it 
can go a long way to help clarifying some of the most interesting aspects of a figure’s 
thought in general. 
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